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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a theoretically framed and historically informed sociological analysis of how digital 
technology usage shapes religious identity in Pakistan. The development literature is dominated 
by assumptions of technologically driven progress towards secularisation and studies of 
technology projects, yet there are few empirical studies of everyday ICT day use, and religion 
remains significant in Pakistan. To explain this, I draw on theoretical literature, the Pakistan 
religious identity literature and twelve months of fieldwork (2014-2015) to present an analysis of 
how Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity by young people in three cities in the 
Punjab, Pakistan.  
  
I conceptualise identity as the performative enactment of subject positions constituted by 
discursive regimes of knowledge and power, and technologies as  assemblages of discursive and 
material elements that in their arrangement create possibilities for action. The entanglement of 
actors and assemblages in performative enactment produces phenomena, such as religious 
identity. Methodologically I adopt an agential realist perspective and utilise a mixed methods 
approach that includes a survey, document collection and in-depth interviews and observation of 
young Facebook users.  
 
My empirical findings show that the new technologies of social media, mobile phones and mobile 
internet interact with public discourse and everyday practice to shape religious identity. First, I 
show this by describing how Facebook’s construction as a blasphemous technology strengthens 
existing discourses of religious nationalism. Second, I show how Facebook’s technological 
discourses of singular authenticity shape the enactment of religious identity with implications for 
religious minorities. My final analysis theorises how the use of Facebook shapes religious identity 
through the emergence of what I call ‘digital secularisation’.  
 
Together this thesis makes the following contributions. First, it provides a much-needed empirical 
account of the adoption of a new communication technology being rapidly adopted.  Second, it 
makes a theoretical contribution through showing how conceptualising identity as performative 
and technology as assemblage helps explain the resurgence of religion in processes of 
development and social change. This explanation is presented as a theory of ‘digital 
secularisation’.  
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Glossary 
 
Ahle Hadith Reformist Muslim sect who reject jurisprudence in favour of the hadith 
Adab Refinement or 'correct practice' of Islam 
Ahle Sunnah Term for Sunni Muslims who don't subscribe to a specific sect 
Ahle Tashi Urdu term for Shia 
Ahmadi Minority Islamic sect founded in 1889 who believe their founder, Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet. 
Ashura Shia commemoration ritual, held during Muharram 
Barelvi Islamic reform movement originating in Bareilly, India. Commonly 
regarded as syncretic for belief in intercession. 
Betak Guest sitting room for male visitors 
Bid’ah Innovation in religious thought 
Biraderi Kinship group 
Burqa Enveloping outer garment worn by women to cover their bodies, 
including their face, in public 
Chador Shawl worn by women 
Chador A large piece of cloth worn to cover the upper body and head, 
especially by Muslim women 
Chappals Sandals 
Deobandi Sunni Islamic revivalist movement, originating in Deoband, India. 
Follows Hanafi jurisprudence. Commonly regarded as conservative for 
their strict interpretation of Islamic texts.  
Dupatta A length of material worn to cover the chest by women in South Asia 
Eid The festival that marks the end of Ramadan 
Fatwa A religious decree 
Fiqh Arabic for Islamic jurisprudence; there four Sunni fiqh and two Shia 
Ghar Urdu for home 
Gupshup Urdu for chatting, gossiping 
Hadith  Commentary on the Quran 
Hajj The pilgrimage to Mecca, regarded as one of the five obligations for 
Muslims 
Hanafi A Sunni school of Islamic jurisprudence 
Hidayat Religious guidance 
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Hijab Veil worn by Muslim women in public to cover their head and chest 
Hudood literally means limits of acceptable behaviour in Islamic law. Refers to 
General Zia’s restrictive Hudood Ordinances 
ijtihad Independent reasoning and thought 
Imam A religious leader of Islam, descended from the Prophet 
Imam Bargah Shia congregation hall 
Inshalla ‘If God wills it’ 
Izzat Honour 
Jaffri  A Shia school of Islamic jurisprudence 
Jahil Religious ignorance 
Jamaat Muslim gathering or congregation 
Jamaat Islami Islamic revivalist political and social conservative movement formed in 
1941 by Abul Ala Maududi in India 
Juma Urdu for Friday 
Kabah The building at the centre of Islam’s most sacred mosque Al-Masjid al 
Haram in Mecca. 
Kafir Infidel 
Khilafat  A pan-Islamic protest movement against British colonial rule in India, 
and a key part of the movement for Islamic Pakistan 
Madrassah Islamic school for religious education  
Mahram Allowable Muslim woman's escort, defined as unmarriageable kin 
Majalis Shia gathering to commemorate Ali 
Malang A wandering Sufi ascetic 
Masjid Mosque 
Matam Shia practice of self-flagellation 
Maulvi Religious teacher 
Maulvi Honorary title accorded to venerated Ulema 
Millatfacebook A social network site for Muslims set up to fill the gap left when 
Facebook was banned in 2010.  
Mirzai Derogatory term for Ahmadis (implies they are followers of Ghulam 
Ahmad Mirza, not Allah) 
Mohajir Urdu speaking Muslim immigrants who emigrated to Pakistan after 
Partition 
Mohalla An area or community in a town or village 
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Mosque Islamic place of worship 
Muharram The second holiest month of the Muslim year, and marked by Shia to 
commemorate the death of Ali 
Mujra A form of exotic dance with Mughal genealogy, commonly associated 
with prostitution 
Mullah Islamic clergyman 
Namaz The prayers Muslims perform five times a day  
Niqab Veil worn by female Muslims that covers the face apart from the eyes 
Paindu Derogatory Urdu / Punjabi word meaning ‘villager’ 
Paloo Veil worn by women over the upper part of the body 
Pir Saint, particularly Sufi 
Purdah Practice of female seclusion, including covering body 
Qari Someone who recites the Quran according to the proper rules 
Quran Islam's holy book 
Ramadan The ninth and holiest month of the Muslim year, during which most 
people fast 
Sawab Religious merit 
Shalwar Kameez The traditional trousers and shirt of the Indian sub-continent, refers to 
both male and female 
Shariah Islamic law 
Sipahe Sahaba  Anti-Shia Sunni sectarian militant organisation, formerly a political 
party 
Sufi Follower of the mystical, esoteric dimension of Islam. Sufis come from 
many different Islamic schools.  
Sunnah The way of life prescribed for Muslims based on the teachings and 
practices of Muhammad 
Thota Urdu for porn 
Ummah The community of all Muslims 
Urdu National language of Pakistan  
Wahhabi Conservative sect of Sunni Islam  
Zina Islamic law concerning unlawful sexual relations. The Zina Ordinance 
was part of General Zia’s broader Hudood Ordinances 
  
 
  
 13 
Acronyms 
3G Third Generation Mobile Data Technology 
2G Second Generation Mobile Data Technology 
AFP Agence France Presse 
ANT Actor Network Theory 
DFID Department For International Development 
DOID LSE's Department Of International Development 
GB Gigabyte 
GoP Government Of Pakistan  
GT Road Grand Trunk Road 
ICG International Crisis Group 
ICT Information And Communication Technology 
ICTD Information And Communication Technology For Development 
IS Information Systems 
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence 
LSE  London School Of Economics 
MI Ministry Of Interior 
NA Pakistan's National Assembly 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation  
PBS Pakistan Bureau Of Statistics 
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1 Introduction  
 
“People sharing more – even if just with their close friends or families – creates a more open 
culture and leads to a better understanding of the lives and perspectives of others.”  
      (Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook 2012, 67–70) 
 
“It all started because of Facebook. They said our boy posted this blasphemous picture on 
Facebook. So we had a fight and after 15 minutes the mosques announced on loudspeakers, 
‘Come on, we have to kill them.’ They should not be spared today.” 
(Male Ahmadi, Gujranwala, 02.04.2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Research Motivation 
This thesis is motivated by a concern to further understand the social changes linked to the use of 
new social media, and specifically the use of Facebook in Pakistan. Facebook is being rapidly 
adopted, particularly by young people, and is linked to debates about religion and vulnerable 
minority groups.  
 
Social media in Pakistan have been the subject of widespread controversy for the access they 
provide to content that many find offensive, particularly on religious grounds of blasphemy – a 
crime that, in Pakistan, is punishable by death. In 2008, public protests over the presence of 
blasphemous videos on YouTube led to the government regulator, the Pakistan 
Telecommunication Authority (PTA), introducing a ban that lasted until the site removed the 
videos a few days later (Reporters Without Borders 2008; BBC 2008). In 2010, the regulator 
banned Wikipedia, YouTube, Flickr and Facebook, following public protests against a 
competition called ‘Everybody Draw Muhammad Day’ in a bid to prevent access to blasphemous 
material (Walsh 2010; I. Ahmed 2010). Although Facebook initially resisted, citing a 
commitment to the principle of free speech, it relented a week later and removed the offending 
Photo 3: Facebook user, Shahanalog. Credit: Author 
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content. In 2012, the regulator banned YouTube once again for hosting the film The Innocence of 
Muslims, which mocked the Prophet Mohammad; the ban lasted until January 2016 when 
YouTube implemented a Pakistani version of the site (Tsukayama 2012).  
 
Controversies about Facebook are not limited to concerns about blasphemous material originating 
in the United States or principles of free speech, but are also linked to the plight of vulnerable 
groups. In 2014, three Ahmadi women were killed in Gujranwala when an Ahmadi youth was 
accused of posting blasphemous content on Facebook. An NGO report on digital blasphemy 
concluded that ‘false accusations about a subject as evocative and sensitive as blasphemy can be 
spread within seconds – leaving the accused deeply vulnerable’ (Digital Rights Foundation 2015). 
In addition to issues relating to blasphemy and religious minorities, Facebook is also linked 
increasingly to the role of women in Pakistani society. In July 2016, Qandeel Baloch, a young 
Punjabi woman who was described as Pakistan’s Kim Kardashian for her rise to fame through  
posting raunchy photos and provocative music videos on Facebook, was killed by her brother, 
ostensibly for ‘ruining’ the family’s ‘honour’ (Mohsin 2016). Indeed, online attacks against 
women are described as a growing problem, and the targeting women on social media is 
increasingly described as translating into offline harassment and violence (Bukhari 2014).  
 
These controversies are situated within a context of changing religious identities. Pakistan’s 
history of religious identity and the role of the media and middle-class populations are key to 
understanding these phenomena.  The dominant groups that have shaped Islamic identity in 
Pakistan are the reformist movements of Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahle Hadith that responded to 
questions of modernity and secularism, and are characterised  by two modernising traditions 
(Metcalf 1982; Robinson 2008). The first, characterised by the Barelvi movement trace their 
origins to Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilli (1856–1921) and are commonly known as the country’s 
‘folk’ or Sufi)1 Muslims for having maintained historical Islamic intercessionary beliefs such as 
the importance of pirs (spiritual leader) and shrine worship (Metcalf 2002).  The other reformist 
movement rejects the belief in intercession in favour of a direct relationship with God through the 
text of the Quran and Hadith (commentary on the Quran), and is most commonly represented by 
the Deobandi and Ahle Hadith schools of thought (Metcalf 1982). Inspired by the influential 
Islamist reformist Shah Waliullah2 (1703–62) the Deobandi were founded in India in 1867 and 
sought to purify Islam of bid’ah – corruptions of, or innovations from, the original text of the 
Quran and Hadith – through hidayat (teaching the right way) (Metcalf 1982) and ‘a strict 
                                                 
1 Sufi Islam consists of four orders: the Qadiriyya, the Suharwardia, the Naqshbandia and the Chishtia. 
Importantly, followers of the Sufi orders are also found among Deobandi as well as Shia followers. 
2 Although modernist in approach, Shah Waliullah’s ijtihad was directed not towards secular rationalism, 
but towards the return of a pure form of Islam based on the words in the Quran, which would form the 
basis of an Islamic resurgence. 
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adherence to the classical texts of Islam’ (Waseem 2004, 31). The Deobandis’ closest rivals were 
the Ahle Hadith, an interpretive reformist tradition that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in 
Bhopal, India and challenged the bid’ah of other Islamic movements. The Deobandi and Ahle 
Hadith commitment to ijtihad, adab and hidayat led them to view other Muslims, particularly the 
Barelvis but also the Shia, as being jahil (ignorant). While the Deobandi and Ahle Hadith 
movements viewed the Barelvis as ignorant, all three movements dismissed the other significant 
reformist movement, the Ahmadis as not being Muslims at all. The Ahmadiyya are a reformist 
movement founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835–1908) who claimed to be the 
promised Mehdi or Messiah, thus breaking with established Islamic orthodoxy that holds 
Muhammad to be the last prophet. Like other reform movements, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed sought 
to rescue Muslims from moral deficiency through the reformation of society along Islamic lines 
(A. H. Khan 2015), and thus the Ahmadis uphold a conservative revivalist doctrine and strict 
norms of piety, family and gender codes (Gualtieri 1989, viii).  
 
The assertion of a singular Pakistani identity has been through the ‘othering’ of competing 
identity groups that has furthered sectarian tension between religious sects. Although the Barelvis 
have historically been more tolerant of the Shia (Metcalf 1982) there has long been an increase 
in anti-Shia unanimity among the Sunni sects and intermittent calls to ban all Shia public rituals 
(ICG 2005). Indeed, the more fundamentalist groups, such as the Deobandi anti-Shia militant 
group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, have called for a constitutional amendment to define Shias as 
non-Muslims, framing them with the Ahmadis, perhaps the most persecuted minority in Pakistan. 
Most Sunni and Shia religious groups view Ghulam Ahmed’s claims as heresy and while efforts 
to classify Ahmadis as non-Muslims date back to before Partition it was under Bhutto that 
Ahmadis were non-Muslims (A. A. Ahmed 2010; Qasmi 2014) and under General Zia in 1983 
that an amendment to the blasphemy laws prohibited Ahmadis’ use of Islamic terminology and 
practice of Islamic rituals (A. A. Ahmed 2010, 296). In other words, the Islamisation reforms 
structured religious identities along sectarian lines by forcing to the fore questions about what 
constituted an Islamic identity and who got to determine the answer (A. A. Ahmed 2010; Zaman 
1998). 
 
Pakistan’s conservatism and sectarian divisions have continued to, as Islamist movements have 
found a receptive audience for their modernist, reformist message amongst Pakistan’s middle 
class, traditionally early adopters of new technology. Contrary to popular accounts of progress 
and modernisation that assume a decline in religiosity, there is increasing evidence of middle 
class, urban support for conservative, reformist Islam.  Studies of elite universities have found 
high levels of support for conservatism, Islamism and an 'us vs them’ othering of other religious 
groups (Siddiqa 2010), whilst many describe how middle and upper class women are drawn to 
 18 
piety movements such as Al-Huda (Ahmad 2008; Babar 2008; Dorsey 2017). Finally, some 
studies have argued that the poor are less likely to support militant groups than middle class 
Pakistani, concluding that ‘The negative relationship between poverty and support for militancy 
is three times stronger in urban Pakistan than in the country as a whole.’ (Blair et al. 2013) 
 
The debates about Facebook’s role in public life, and the charges of blasphemy are part of a 
history in which the media have played a significant role in shaping religious and national identity.  
At the time of independence in 1947, the only independent news media in the country were 
newspapers owned by political parties or figures linked to the various Muslim nationalist 
movements (Michaelsen 2011; Mezzera and Sial 2010), while broadcast media were owned by 
the state. State control over television and radio was important in maintaining institutional 
authority as well as building a national identity; the military would commonly seize control of 
broadcast stations in the several coups that occurred between 1958 and 1999. Indeed, the 
broadcast media were an instrumental mechanism through which General Zia-ul-Haq advanced 
his Islamisation programme in the 1980s (Talbot 2012; Jaffrelot 2015). Under his regime, 
newsreaders on Pakistan Television (PTV) were forced to don headscarves  and the national 
broadcaster’s famed drama serials have long helped define gender roles in the country (Kothari 
2005).  
 
Perhaps the most significant shift in Pakistan’s media came in 2002 when General Pervez 
Musharraf liberalised the satellite media and telecommunications of a post-9/11 turn towards the 
West and against conservatism, in what he termed an attempt at ‘enlightened moderation’ 
(Musharraf 2004). This liberalisation opened up Pakistan’s public sphere, at least to the liberal 
elite that Musharraf believed would help further an agenda of political, economic and social 
modernisation (Naqvi 2011). In the years that followed, the number of television channels and 
radio stations mushroomed, while mobile phones and the Internet were gradually adopted as 
networks were slowly rolled out beyond the main urban areas. According to the PTA, in 2004/05 
there were just under 12 million mobile subscribers, 26,000 broadband subscribers and no mobile 
Internet users3. By 2013/14, there were 139 million mobile subscribers and 1.3 million broadband 
subscribers. Mobile broadband or 3G Internet services were only launched in 2014 and grew from 
13 million to just under 30 million subscribers the following year.  
 
These changes in Pakistan’s media and communications environment have been linked to a 
variety of changes in the country, with the most widely debated to date being the implications for 
politics. Although the political implications of the mass media’s liberalisation are already widely 
                                                 
3 PTA: www.pta.gov.uk, accessed 25.6.2016 
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recognised (Jaffrelot 2015; Lieven 2012; Talbot 2012), mobile phones and the Internet have also 
been linked to accounts of political change. They were described as being critical to enabling 
public protest and mobilising lawyers against the sacking of the chief justice during Pakistan’s 
state of emergency in 2009, when President Musharraf shut down the broadcast media (Yusuf 
2009). In 2012, they were also described as being critical to catalysing the youth to turn out and 
vote for Imran Khan (Khan 2012). Analysts suggest that the potential for these new technologies 
to act as catalysts for change is limited only by their low levels of penetration (Kugelman 2012). 
Yet the adoption of social media in Pakistan is growing rapidly, with Facebook users growing 
from only 6 million Pakistanis in 2012 (Kugelman 2012) to just under 13 million active monthly 
users in 2014 (Pakistani Advertising Society 2014).  
 
These new social media are different from the established mass media in several important ways. 
First, where Pakistan’s national media represent, like all print and broadcast media, a top-down, 
one-way information process, social media are horizontal and allow many people to send 
information to many other people. Where the mass media granted the state and institutions of 
authority control over public discourse, social media allow individual users to participate in public 
debate, granting groups such as religious minorities and women the opportunity to express 
themselves in ways they could not before. A second implication for control is that, where 
journalists, editors and owners of newspapers and television channels are vulnerable to the 
influence of the state and public opinion, social media sites such as Facebook are owned and 
managed in countries far outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s legal system and court of public 
opinion. Social media, then, present the promise of a challenge to national, legal and cultural 
structures of control, empowering individuals and platforms of personal expression.  
 
While it is the political challenge that attracts the greatest attention and is where the process of 
individual empowerment is most apparent, the role of social media in social and cultural change 
is far more complex. Despite the apparent promise of political liberation, in 2015 only 20 percent 
of Pakistanis polled said they felt the Internet was a ‘good’ thing (Pew Research Centre 2015). In 
August 2016, the highly controversial Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill (PECB) was approved 
by the National Assembly despite concerns that it could be used to curb freedom of expression. 
The first arrest under the bill was of a young man accused of using Facebook to harass and 
blackmail women (The Express Tribune 2016). The backlash against vulnerable groups, such as 
religious minorities and women, challenges the conventional notion that social media empower 
individuals in processes of social change. Although social media provide a new means for 
expression, this is often met with harsh response and violence.  
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These complexities and contradictions cloud an understanding of the role that social media play 
in processes of social change in Pakistan. Too often, they are described in terms of binary relations 
where individuals are pitted against political, social or cultural structures. Yet these accounts do 
not adequately explain the complex and contradictory experiences of young people using 
Facebook, particularly among minority and vulnerable groups. These experiences appear to be 
embedded in the everyday practices of individual identity and social interaction.  
 
There is a need for scholarly input into these debates to understand such everyday practices and 
develop appropriate policy and practice responses. This thesis, then, aims to address this need and 
contribute to constructive engagements with technology in everyday life.  
 
1.2 Personal Motivation  
It is these contradictions that frame the personal motivation for this research, as they reflect 
questions that emerged from years of practice in the field of information and communication 
technology (ICT) and development. In 2004, I went to Pakistan for two years with Voluntary 
Services Overseas as a volunteer communications advisor with a gender and HIV NGO. My 
experience of working with newly independent media and religious leaders to promote changes 
in gender and social norms was fascinating: with the liberalisation of the media at the time, it 
seemed it could become an integral part of social change. I became a passionate advocate for the 
role of media and communications in development and for the next five years advised 
development institutions on the use of media and communications, often in Pakistan and 
predominantly in South Asia.  
 
This passion turned to concern following two experiences in 2009 and 2010. The first was the 
establishment of a mobile phone-based news service in Afghanistan that failed because users 
would not pay for it. What concerned me most, however, was that, despite the huge investment 
and efforts to offer news that people said they needed, we had no idea who used it and why or 
what changes it brought about (if any). The second experience was advising a UK government-
run counter-extremism campaign in Pakistan and discovering the implications of its support to an 
Ahmadi magazine to counter Sunni militants. The programme team’s lack of knowledge was 
shocking and stimulated a desire to better understand the relationship between everyday 
technology use and user identities. This led to the pursuit of further studies in the form of this 
thesis as an attempt to resolve some of these contradictions and, in so doing, to contribute to a 
better understanding of, and engagement with, the role of ICT in processes of social change.  
 
My research, therefore, is motivated by the following considerations. It responds to the social and 
cultural complexities emerging from the use of mobile Internet in Pakistan and the use of social 
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media in particular. It also responds to the personal experience of a policy deficit in understanding 
the realities of social media and religion in people’s everyday lives and the need to address this 
through substantive empirical research.  
 
1.3 Research Goals, Questions and Objectives 
In line with the empirical and analytical considerations outlined above, this research project 
addresses the following research question and objectives. The central question of this thesis is: 
‘in what ways does the use of Facebook shape the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan?’.  
 
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to produce an historically situated, theoretically informed 
account of the relationship between religious identity and the use of social media in Pakistan in 
order to contribute to the theory surrounding the relationship between identity and ICT and thus 
to the development sector’s engagements with processes of social change.  
 
These questions are answered by analysing data gathered in Pakistan in three research locations 
in northern Punjab. The largest is Gujranwala, Pakistan’s seventh-largest city with 1.1 million 
people4 and situated approximately 70 km from Lahore on the Grand Trunk Road. The second is 
Gujrat, approximately 50 km north of Gujranwala, with a population of just over 251,000. The 
third is Mandi Bahauddin, a small town of just under 100,000 people about 70 km west of Gujrat. 
Gujrat was the smallest town to be included in the first wave of 3G mobile rollout in 2014.  
 
The timing of the study was fortuitous: one month after my fieldwork began, the long-delayed 
3G services were started, allowing me to identify people who were not using and were just 
beginning to use fast mobile Internet services. Furthermore, there was a general sense of 
excitement about the technology and people were thus willing to talk about their use of the 
Internet, Facebook and the role these media played in people’s everyday lives.  
 
1.4 Thesis Argument  
The underlying argument of this thesis is that theorising social change in both development and 
the Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICTD) literature benefits 
from acknowledging that human beings are not autonomous, rational individuals who can be 
liberated from their social context. Indeed, to assume that they are, and to build practices based 
on this assumption, is to instil a process of alienation that, as this research demonstrates, can be 
emotionally traumatic and even physically dangerous. Instead, it argues that theorising human 
                                                 
4 Pakistan has not held a census since 1998. As such, this thesis uses figures from that time, but with the 
caveat that they are certainly higher now. The alternative figure from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics for 
2010 for Gujranwala is 1.67 million. 
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beings as subjects constructed in discourse reveals the operation of power through which the 
discourse is constructed and thus allows an understanding of forces that constitute the individual.  
 
The thesis also argues that theorising technologies as possessing inherent qualities, such as the 
capacity to liberate, blinds analysis of the actors, interests and discourses that are embodied in the 
material form of the technology. Instead, theorising technologies as sociomaterial assemblages 
allows us to trace the actors and interests represented in the technology. Specifically, this allows 
a recognition of the interests, ideas and ideologies that are embodied in the materiality of 
Facebook as a technology that, when it intra-acts with users, demands the enactment of particular 
forms of subjects.  
 
1.5 Research Methods 
This research project adopts a mixed-methods design based on a cumulative 12 months of 
fieldwork conducted over 18 months between March 2014 and September 2015. A mixed-
methods design is helpful when exploring a phenomenon for which extant research is fragmented 
or inconclusive (Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013, 36). This research, therefore, adopts a 
sequential explanatory design (Creswell 2014; Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006, 11) consisting 
of a telephone survey in order to explore and generate hypotheses about the relationship between 
identity and ICT use and to identify participants for further qualitative research. The second phase 
had two concurrent components. The first consisted of individual interviews with ICT users and 
the second, an analysis of the media coverage of a specific ICT incident – the banning of Facebook 
for hosting blasphemous content in 2010. The rationale for this approach is that quantitative data 
provides a general description of the relationship between mobile Internet use and identity 
performativity, whereas qualitative data explains this relationship and the discursive construction 
of Facebook in discourse.  
 
The research design privileges qualitative research because this reflects the most substantial data 
collection and analysis. It adopts a narrative analysis approach that treats interviews as stories that 
reveal themes, understood as discourses (Taylor and Littleton 2006). Newspaper accounts are also 
treated as stories that are analysed for discourses (Bauer and Aarts 2000). The design is thus 
intended to analyse the construction of technologies in discourse and the enactment of identity in 
discursive accounts of practice.  
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1.6 Expected Contribution 
Given the background, motivation and questions discussed above, this thesis makes the following 
empirical and conceptual contributions to the literature on development, ICTD and Pakistan 
studies.  
 
First, it presents an empirical account of an emerging phenomenon, namely, the use of mobile 
phones to access social media in the Global South. While there are some accounts of mobile 
Internet and social media use in Global South (Donner and Gitau 2009; Rangaswamy and Arora 
2015; Kumar 2014) and one study of mobile phone use in Pakistan (Rollier 2010), to my 
knowledge, there have been no studies of social media and religious identity in Pakistan. This 
research, therefore, presents a series of case studies of young Muslim men and women’s use of 
Facebook to enact and negotiate religious identity in Pakistan’s Punjab province.  
 
Second, the study makes two conceptual contributions. The first is a theorisation of identity in 
general and of religious identity in particular and how this contributes to the development and 
ICTD literature. It does so by demonstrating the value of theorising identity as performative 
enactments to understand the relationship between individuals and technologies in processes of 
social change. The second is a contribution to the ICTD literature in demonstrating the value of 
conceptualising technology as a sociomaterial assemblage – a contribution that has implications 
for the study and theorisation of the relationship between technologies and processes of social 
change.  
 
 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline  
This thesis consists of 11 chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the dominant development models and how they address culture, religion 
and secularisation. This is followed by a review of the literature on ICTs and religion, showing 
how, as the field has developed, it has adopted a more sociological approach that considers 
identity to be performative and sees the role of technology as being more nuanced than as an 
assault on religious authority. The classical sociological conceptualisations of religious identity, 
modernity and reflexivity are juxtaposed with alternative views that describe religious identity as 
performative and material.  
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Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework that integrates religious identity and technology. It 
draws on feminist theories to develop a concept of identity as performative enactments of 
hegemonic discourse and helps to extend this discursive account by conceptualising religious 
identity as constituted in both discursive and material form. The chapter then turns to a 
theorisation of technology, outlining technological determinist and social constructionist 
perspectives to highlight the impasse they present. It explores the potential of resolving this 
impasse through a common framework of structuration, but finds that this leads back to earlier 
accounts of modernity and echoes of modernisation theory. Instead, a sociomaterial 
conceptualisation of technology is developed that draws on actor–network theory and agential 
realism, locating these concepts and their ontological commitments in the technology, media and 
communication studies literature. This is followed by an outline of affordance as a midrange 
theory to operationalise a sociomaterial conception of technology, illustrating how, when applied, 
this shows Facebook to be a technology that enacts a singular, authentic and archival subject that 
is always framed as a liberal, secular subject of value.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the methodological framework, which defines the ontological and 
epistemological positions adopted as agential realist with a narrative discourse analytic approach. 
The multi-stage and multi-method nature of the research design is outlined and explained as a 
process that supports hypothesis testing and theory development. The narrative analytic approach 
is also outlined and justified. The complexities and challenges of the fieldwork are described, 
particularly the challenges of multi-site research, of working with research assistants, gender 
barriers and the problem of respondents who respond the way they think they are expected to.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 are two shorter chapters that link the hegemonic discourses in Chapter 5 to the 
practices of everyday technology use. Chapter 5 is the first quantitative empirical chapter and 
explores the link between discourses of religious identity with mobile Internet use practices in the 
field sites of Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. It presents descriptive statistics that show 
differences between religious and gender identities in terms of mobile and social media use 
patterns. These differences are presented as themes that are further explored in the subsequent 
qualitative empirical chapters. Chapter 6 describes how discourses of religion are translated by 
mobile phone retailers as part of attempts to shape how people use social media and the content 
they consume, presenting them as intermediaries as they teach people how to use technologies 
and services. Based on interviews with shopkeepers from the three field sites who sell content 
and teach users, it describes the different ways in which they shape the audio and visual content 
people buy and how they use their devices.  
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Chapter 7 presents case studies of Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni Facebook users in the three field sites. 
It describes how the design and features of Facebook mean that Ahmadis are marginalised from 
social media, Shia users negotiate identity enactments while Sunni users occupy a position of 
authority. It also describes how Facebook’s algorithm structures religious debate for Sunnis in 
such a way that discourses of singular authenticity interact with practices of hidayat (guidance) 
and bid’ah (religious innovation) to increase sectarian tension.  
 
Chapter 8 presents case studies of male and female Facebook users, focusing on the practice of 
creating fake and multiple accounts. It describes how users break Facebook’s demand for 
authenticity by creating fake accounts in order to play tricks on each other and find romance. It 
also describes how users create multiple authentic accounts to manage the boundaries of social 
context and how this can support the separation of female relatives from male friends in a way 
that echoes the practice of purdah (female seclusion). In describing the experience of female users 
who willingly submit to this contraction of their digital space, the chapter opens up questions 
about the nature of subject formation through submission to religious practice.  
 
Chapter 9 presents an analysis of the empirical chapters by applying the theoretical framework. 
It draws on a framework of secularisation used to describe how the Jamaat Islami shape religious 
practice to argue that Facebook shapes religious identity in Pakistan through a process of ‘digital 
secularisation’. The chapter explains how Facebook’s discourse of singular authenticity interacts 
with discourses of religious nationalism to diffract religious identity such that it reinforce a 
hegemonic religious nationalism as well as emergent forms of religious identity. It explores 
through analysis of female Facebook and piety practices how individual agency and religious 
identity can constitute modern subjects.  
 
Chapter 10 discusses the findings of the analysis in the context of the questions raised in the 
discussion of ICTD and development literature.  The chapter argues that Facebook’s demand for 
singular authenticity reinforces normative identities and that, therefore, religion remains 
significant in users’ lives. It discusses the implications of these findings for theories of ICTD and 
development,and suggests that adopting a performative and sociomaterial perspective of identity 
and technology leads to a critique of development as a discourse of domination, and instead 
outlines a contribution towards a sociomaterial theory of development.   
 
This chapter has outlined the background, motivation and questions that provide the foundation 
for this thesis. It has described the core argument advanced in the thesis, followed by a description 
of the methodology adopted and an overview of the chapters as they appear in the thesis. The 
chapter that follows starts the journey with a review of the literature. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Situating Technology and Social Change 
The spread of mobile phones and the Internet over the last decade has been linked to some of the 
most fundamental social changes, from the economic transformation of resource-poor 
environments and the populist uprisings of the Arab Spring to the empowerment of women and 
the rise of fundamentalist religious movements. The claims made for these personal digital 
technologies are based on their affordances for new forms of access to information and 
communications – affordances that place the power of information and communication in the 
palm of someone’s hand. Being able to access the Internet through a mobile phone means that 
individuals are constantly connected to networks of people and data in ways that are historically 
unprecedented.  
 
These affordances form the basis for descriptions of the role of technology as enabling new forms 
of culture, social organisation, and change (Giddens 1991; Castells 2010; Shirky 2008). For 
example, Giddens links individual access to information and communication to affordances for 
‘the “lifting out” of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across 
indefinite spans of time-space’ (Giddens 1990, 21). Similarly, Castells argues that the Internet’s 
network structure affords a new form of abstract, universal social formation that he terms the 
‘network society’ (Castells 2000). These affordances are commonly used to explain the role of 
technology in these processes of social change as enablers of individual liberation and freedom 
(Diamond, 2010). These explanations are grounded in the belief that technologies such as the 
Internet and mobile phones can empower individuals and liberate them from oppressive forms of 
culture and authoritarian regimes (Giddens 1991; Castells 2010; Shirky 2008; Diamond 2010).  
 
These accounts of social change reflect the dominant narrative in the literature on processes of 
development, modernisation and social change. This normative account argues that 
industrialisation, globalisation and access to new forms of communication together disrupt 
traditional sources of meaning and stability to create a sense of Marxist alienation and 
Durkheimian anomie. From this dislocation, individuals are presumed to be set free, or forced, to 
exercise choice over who they are, who they affiliate with and the political movements they 
support (Giddens, 1986; 1991). Many theorists assume that these choices will be for social 
arrangements and political movements that support freedom of choice, democracy and, in many 
cases, open political economies (Diamond, 2010).  
 
At the heart of this thesis of modernisation and individual choice lies an implicit conceptualisation 
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of the individual as a ‘rational actor’. This is at the heart of classical economic theory, which 
underpins the dominant narrative in the literature on development and social change (Cowen and 
Shenton 1996). This standard model of the individual in part derives its ability to make large 
predictions about behaviour by simplifying the ‘messy and mysterious internal workings of 
actors’ (Freese 2009, 98). This simplification is the essence of the utility-maximising actor of 
classical economic theory (Friedman 1953) – conceptualised as an individual who makes 
decisions based on a universal rationalism motivated by the pursuit of needs and self-interest 
maximisation. In large part then, theories and explanations of the relationship between technology 
and processes of social change depend on the existence of a universal way of thinking, of 
approaching decisions and of the values that underpin those decisions.  
 
Yet, there is increasing evidence from mainstream development policy and practice that this 
utility-maximising, rational actor does not exist and that, instead, context and culture play an 
important role in individual identity and behaviour (World Bank 2015; Banerjee and Duflo 2012; 
Kahneman 2013). These findings reflect a decentring in accounts of human behaviour from an 
inner universal rationalism outwards to the role of what sociologists and anthropologists describe 
as cultural explanations for individual behaviour (Bourdieu 1977; Swidler 1986). ‘Culture’ here 
is understood not as a set of individually held values (Hofstede 2001), but as a ‘repertoire for 
social action’ (Swidler 1986). 
 
Studies of the role of new media and technologies in processes of change and development are 
situated at the intersection of diverse academic communities. Two recent books, New Media, 
Development and Globalisation (Slater 2013) and After Access (Donner 2015) are indicative of 
this cross-disciplinary field. Slater addresses the broad implications of changing technological 
and social worlds: while rooted in sociological debates, his study engages with and contributes to 
media and cultural studies, studies of digital culture, development, geography and anthropology. 
Donner examines the specific implications of a more mobile Internet and situates his work within 
academic communities researching ICTD and the broader community of mobile communication 
studies. Following this cross-disciplinary example, this literature review covers studies from the 
fields of international development, sociology and sociology of religion to  information systems 
(IS), communication studies and science and technology studies.   
 
2.2 Development Models  
This section reviews the dominant models in the international development literature, namely, 
modernisation theory, dependency theory, neoliberalism, human development and the critical 
post-development perspective. It concludes that many dominant accounts share the assumptions 
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that development means the decline of tradition in the face of modernisation and that individuals 
are universally rational, thus seeing social change as a process of secularisation. This reflects a 
limited view of the role that context and technology play in individual behaviour. Therefore, we 
make an argument for the field of development to look beyond instrumental technology use and 
widen its conception of the individual to include the role of culture and, specifically, religion in 
shaping individual identity and behaviour.  
 
Modernisation Theory  
The optimistic post-war development theorist’s view was akin to the paradigm of modernisation 
that has influenced much of development and theories of social change. The success of post-war 
European reconstruction led to the belief that, if the newly independent postcolonial nations 
followed the same patterns of social change, they too would end up with the same kind of society 
and levels of development as Western countries. Theorists emphasised a technologically driven, 
Schumpeterian process of linear, path-dependent social change in which communication 
technologies were key to diffusing the information, ideas and values of modern society (Rostow 
1960; Lerner 1958; Schramm 1964; Rogers 1962). Modernisation theory thus argued that 
industrial technology produces not only economic growth, but also broader institutional and 
cultural changes (Hoogvelt 1978). These changes are characterised as being increasingly 
differentiated and individualistic, such that they would lead traditional societies to emulate 
industrialised Western nations (Eisenstadt 1966; Lerner 1958).  
 
Critics of modernisation theory argued that it under-theorised ‘tradition’ and that, fundamentally, 
modernisation theory is characterised by ethnocentric Enlightenment dichotomies such as 
between nature as tradition and technology as modern, and between men and women (Randall 
and Theobald 1985, 35; C. V. Scott 1996, 24). Because of its emphasis on social and cultural 
change, modernisation theory is regarded as one of the more sociologically informed theories of 
development (Viterna and Robertson 2015).  
 
Dependency Theory  
By the 1970s, in contrast to optimists who viewed technology as driving processes of 
development and social change, dependency theorists argued that development was impeded by 
resource flows from poor to wealthy nations and sustained by neo-colonial inequalities, 
inappropriate paradigm transfers and socioeconomic dualisms (Prebisch 1949; Dos Santos 1973). 
They rejected the neoclassical and structural change theories of economic development, instead 
emphasising power imbalances as impediments to development. Nonetheless, dependency 
theorists maintained an understanding of modernisation through economic development as the 
path to progress. Technology was viewed as an integral part of patterns of inequality and power 
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relationships. Attempts to address digital inequalities might serve to maintain inequitable 
relationships between poor and rich countries (Wade 2002), while the former tried to resist the 
direction, control and ownership of rich countries over mass media content in order to protect 
their (poor countries’) national identity, culture and economies (MacBride Commission 1980).  
 
Neoliberal Economics  
By the 1980s, theorists in industrialised countries recognised that linear growth and structural 
change models had failed, but countered Marxist dependency by arguing that development 
failures were the result of corrupt and inefficient governments (Krueger 1974; Lal 2000). 
Development institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund thus focused 
on policies understood as the ‘Washington Consensus’, which promotes competitive free markets 
and curtails the distorting involvement of the state (Chang 2003; Venugopal 2015; Todaro and 
Smith 2014). Because free markets function through price information asymmetries (Akerlof, 
Spence, and Stiglitz 2001), ICTs are viewed as drivers of GDP (Waverman, Meschi, and Fuss 
2005), efficiencies in fish and grain markets (Jensen 2007; Aker 2010) and political processes 
(Aker, Collier, and Vicente 2013). The Washington Consensus continues to be the dominant 
model through which most development interventions are conceptualised. 
 
Human Development  
Towards the end of the 1980s, there was a growing sense that neoliberal market fundamentalism 
was not enhancing the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable. The most influential 
alternative to the Washington Consensus has been the human development and capability 
approach, which conceptualises development as freedom of choice and the ability to exercise 
those choices (Sen 1999; Haq 1994). While some scholars suggest that moving beyond economic 
outcomes explicitly counters the dominant neoliberal paradigm (McNeill 2007, 13), others argue 
that it is easily accommodated within growth development strategies such as neoliberal 
approaches (Hart 2001; Jolly 2005). ICTs are central to the capability approach as they help 
inform individuals’ ability to make judgements and exercise the informed choices that reflect their 
quality of freedom (Gigler 2011; Kleine 2013; Madon 2005; Sen 1999; Zheng 2009).  
 
Post-Development  
A further critique of development emerged during the 1980s. Like dependency critiques, post-
development theorists viewed development in terms of structural inequalities, but unlike the 
dependency perspective, they drew on postcolonial and subaltern studies and postmodern theory 
– particularly Foucauldian discourse and genealogical analysis – to challenge the very concept of 
development (Zai, 2007). Concepts such as poverty and progress are viewed as being socially 
constructed and used as a vehicle for capitalist imperialism (Sachs 2010; Escobar 1995). 
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Furthermore, as a social construction, the idea of development as a project is arguably based on 
the same ideological commitments as modernisation theory in that it holds Western economic and 
social structures to be a universal goal. Post-development theorists, therefore, reject the idea of 
development ‘not merely on account of its results but because of its intentions, its world-view and 
mind-set’ (Pieterse 2000, 175). The post-development perspective explains development as a 
macro-systemic formation of Western knowledge and ideology, and not just a function of 
resource inequality. As such, development is viewed as a continuation of Western colonialism 
through epistemic hegemony (Donovan, 2014).  
 
Summary  
This section has reviewed the development models of modernisation, dependency theory, 
neoliberalism, human development and  post-development. It has shown that the development 
literature on development and technology is dominated by assumptions of a process of 
modernisation and is underpinned by the conception of the individual as a voluntary sovereign 
actor. As a result, the role of culture and context in the formation of identity has received limited 
attention. The common thread running through these development perspectives is the belief that, 
as societies modernise and individuals achieve greater ability to exercise choices, religion will 
decline and societies will undergo a process of secularisation (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011). The 
next section, therefore, outlines theories of secularisation and contemporary accounts of 
modernity.  
 
2.2 Development and Secularisation  
Development theories largely assume a process of social change that relies on the existence of a 
rational actor and is characterised by a process of secularisation that, in the development literature, 
is under-theorised (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011). Secularisation theory has its roots in sociologies 
of religion (Casanova 2007), but it is within the broader sociological conceptualisation of 
modernity that contemporary accounts of the decline of religion have received the greatest 
attention.    
 
2.2.1 Secularisation Theory 
The post-Enlightenment concept of the secular as a set of conditions characterised by a binary 
between ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’ has characterised 20th century theorising of social 
progress. Early accounts of secularisation characterised secularisation as a process in which 
‘modern’ life replaced religion (Berger, 1969; Luckmann, 1967). However, these theories of 
secularisation, which have informed the models of social change that characterise international 
development theory (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011)  have suffered critique in the face of continuing 
religiosity in Western and non-Western societies as well as accounts of the inherently related and 
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dialogical relationship of the religious and the secular. A key part of accounts that unpack 
normative accounts of the secular is the distinction between secularisation as a process of social 
change and secularism as a state policy of separating religious institutions from the state.  
 
Theories of secularisation have faced critique, with scholars proposing further refinement of the 
processes and problematising of the concept. Although some scholars rejected commitments to 
secularisation (Berger 1999, 2012), others argued instead for further development of the theory. 
Casanova (1995, 2003) critiqued the classical theories of secularisation to propose instead three 
varieties of secularisation. First, secularisation as a process of general religious decline, secondly 
secularisation as the privatisation of religion and thirdly secularisation as the structural 
differentiation as the social and scientific spheres liberate themselves from religious authority. As 
Casanova (1995) notes, in this account religion does not necessarily privatise and may retain 
authority over public life. Scholars such as Habermas (2008), initially a proponent of the 
secularisation thesis, acknowledged the continuing relevance of religious experience, but 
argued it needed to be understood in secular terms. Taylor (2007) argued against 
secularisation as a ‘subtraction’ that revealed authentic secularism, but instead that 
secularisation and faith were simply examples of ‘self-understandings and human 
potentialities’ (Taylor, 2007:3). The concept of ‘the secular’ has also been problematized, and 
shown to have been shaped by specific social and historical circumstances. Asad (1993, 2003) 
argued that European concepts of the secular reflected particular interests through their 
prescribing of particular modes of being as legitimate and others illegitimate. Furthermore, Asad 
also showed how, contrary to classical accounts of secularisation (and implicit in much 
development theory) ‘the secular’ cannot be understood separately from ‘the religious’, as both 
are inherently intertwined and are dialectically related.  
 
The concept of the secular has also been problematized through its relation to Islam, particularly 
since 9/11 and the war on terror which pitted radical Islam against the liberal, democratic West. 
Roy (2007) for example argues against the dichotomisation of radical Islam and Western 
liberalism, showing how radical Islamist movements emerge out of global processes and thrive 
because they are detached from specific any cultural background. In this way Islamist movements 
are secularising forces because they “individualise(s) and de-socialises religious practice(s)’ 
(2007: 76).  Mahmood (2011, 2015, 2006) draws on Asad to argue that the normative conception 
of secularisation demands a religious identity that ‘is compatible with the rationality...of liberal 
political rule’ (2006, 344). She counters this secular-religious dichotomy that characterises the 
secular subject as liberated and autonomous through an account of Islamic women finding agency 
in the practice of religious norms and piety. These counters to the normative understanding of 
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secularisation illustrate how it structures specific modes of being as progressive and delegitimise 
others as backward and regressive.  
 
2.2.2 Secularisation in South Asia and Pakistan  
South Asian engagement with the concept and theory of secularisation has largely been to critique 
and problematize it, particularly from a post-colonial perspective. In India, scholars such as 
Madan (1987), Chatterjee (1994) and Nandy (1998) rejected the legitimacy of secularism because 
of it’s Western origins and inability to explain the Indian context. Others, such as Barghava (2011) 
have argued for a ‘rehabilitation’ of the concept of secularisation through a recasting of the 
concept to reflect ‘contextual’ specifities. Bhargava suggests that the concepts utility can be 
retained by recognising that secularism can take diverse forms, such as the Indian case in which 
the state takes a stance of ‘principled distance’ that is determined by whether intervention is 
compatible with religious freedom and civic equality. Bhargava thus rehabilitates the concept of 
secularism by expanding it beyond the limits of liberalism. Other scholars have problematized 
the term through highlighting distinctive characteristics of the Indian experience, emphasising for 
example the relational nature of the religious and the secular in India (Bilgrami 2012; Chakrabarty 
2009). Others such as Pandey (2007).have engaged with the progressive values associated with 
secularism, highlighting the relationship between secularism and the totalising, homogenising 
state that marginalises difference and asserts a uniform, majoritarian culture.  
 
In Pakistan debates around secularisation have been dominated by discussion of of Islamisation, 
with scholars such as Talbot (2012) describing how Jinnah’s conception of a secular nation has 
been taken over by forces of Islamisation that have divided the nation along religious lines. This 
dominant perspective on Pakistan has been challenged by scholars who argue that it fails to 
acknowledge the historical complexity and diversity of religion in Pakistan, and that it sets up a 
false dichotomy between Islamisation and secularisation. Historians have emphasised the 
ambiguity and lack of specificity in Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan, and highlighted the important 
roles that religious movements played in Pakistan’s struggle for independence (Jalal 1985; 
Gilmartin 1998). Others have emphasised the diversity of religious life in Pakistan to explore the 
complex relationship between Islamism, secularism and secularisation (Iqtidar 2011), creativity 
in religious life (Marsden 2005) and challenges secularisation’s unique claim to individual 
sovereignty (Chaudhry 2013; Jamal 2009; Babar 2008a; Ahmad 2008).  
 
Iqtidar’s account is particularly important in exploring secularisation as a process of social 
change. She unpacks the relationship between secularism and secularisation, showing how 
theories that argue secularisation leads inevitably to secularism fail to explain the Pakistan 
experience, where she demonstrates that religious institutions, such as the Islamist Jamaat Islami, 
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can be a force for secularisation even whilst they reject secularism as a policy.  An important part 
of Iqtidar’s work involves showing how processes of secularisation do not necessarily lead to 
state policies of secularism. She demonstrates this by showing how Islamist movements such as 
the JI are secularising but not towards the ideology or vision of secularism: ‘My attempt here is 
not to suggest that the Islamists are secular in the sense of consciously identifying with the 
ideology of secularism--in fact it is very much the reverse of that--but that they are secularizing, 
that is, they are facilitating a process of secularization as rationalization of religion’ (2011, 22).  
 
Iqtidar’s argument that the JI is secularising force rests on the claim that it is a modern institution 
that produces modern subjects, and that the concept of secularisation describes a process of 
rationalism and modernity. Iqtidar shows this through three characteristics that constitute JI's 
modernity. Firstly, Muslims in Pakistan can exercise religious choice, as they live in a competitive 
religious marketplace, and can choose to affiliate to one of the many Islamic groups such as one 
of the ulama-led maslaks (Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-e Hadis, or Tablighi Jama`at), one of the 
Islamist groups such as JI. Secondly, the JI has 'rationalised' religion through the exercise of 
conscious and rational thought to the application of faith to contexts outside the private sphere. 
Third and finally, this process reflects the “objectification” of religion - the conscious 
rationalisation of questions of individual religious identity, questions that historically were 
unproblematised and taken for granted. These characteristics make the JI a secularising 
organisation because they demands the enactment of modern forms of subjectivity, transforming 
religious practice “into a largely individualized decision that must be justified internally, that is, 
within a subject, and externally, to others around the subject” (2011, 157). 
 
Scholars have also shown how the established secular – religious and modern-traditional 
dichotomy fails to reflect the lived experience of everyday life in Pakistan. Ewing (1997) for 
example looks at Sufi pirs and their followers, describing how religious belief accommodates 
‘modern’ practices in ways that are meaningful and coherent for individuals. Similarly, Marsden 
(2005) counters the secularist claim that Islam is a homogenous force and Pakistani’s have 
submitted to a singular, authoritarian form of belief. He describes how individuals exercise 
creativity and dialogue in relation to faith and particularly in relation to Islamist groups, and that 
they “do not think that it is only formally educated Islamic purists or ‘modern’ secular 
people who have the capacity to live rational, discerning, intellectually acute and morally 
sophisticated lives” (2005, 10).  
 
The claim that secularisation is a path that leads away from faith to individual freedom is 
also challenged by a number of scholars, particularly through accounts of female 
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participation in religious groups and practices. Jamal (2009) describes how female members 
of the Jamaat-e-Islami party simultaneously construct pious identities and claim to be modern 
subjects (Jamal 2009, 9). Many of the women that Jamal describes explain how they ‘understood 
the place of modernity in their lives which was not necessarily oppositional to Islam’ (Jamal 2009, 
10). The conscious adoption of submissive piety practices both outward (such as the veil and 
purdah) as well as inward (such as practising patience and tolerance) are described as being 
compatible with a notion of modernity. Similarly, Babar (2008b) and Ahmad’s (2008) describe 
how female participation in religious revival movements are experienced as empowering and 
enabling. Both accounts describe how membership in the movement strengthens a sense of 
identity, revealing ‘nuanced, in-depth understandings of women’s negotiations of power relations’ 
(Chaudhry 2013, 246).  
 
Despite these challenges to the theory of secularisation, there remains only limited enquiry into 
religion and secularism in non-Western contexts. Even though detailed work of religious life in 
non-Western contexts has generated significant insights, a review of the American sociology of 
religion literature finds that studies of religion have not diversified as one might expect, while the 
sociology of religion does not reflect increased attention to Islam, following September 11 
(Smilde and May 2015). It concludes by arguing that the literature on the sociology of religion 
needs more non-Western accounts of the changing relationship between religion and secularity 
and its attendant processes of social change.  
 
This section has reviewed the literature on development, secularisation and secularisation in 
South Asia. It shows that the role of religion and secularisation has not received a great deal of 
attention in the development literature, and that this literature is characterised by an assumed 
process of secularisation. The secularisation literature shows how secularisation as understood in 
the West leads teleologically towards secularism and a dichotomy between religion and non-
religious life, but that studies of religious practices in non-Western context reveal secularisation 
as a process of rationalism that leads towards a form of modernity in which religion maintains a 
significant and meaningful role in everyday life. Finally, it shows that there has been limited study 
of religion and secularisation outside of Western contexts. 
 
  
 
2.3 The Individual in Models of Development and ICTD  
The dominant development models and theories of secularisation share a common 
conceptualisation of social change as the transition from traditional to modern societies, with 
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modern societies defined by the characteristics of Western modernity. These perspectives on 
development and social change also share conceptualisations of the individual, as this section 
illustrates by reviewing accounts of the individual in models of development and ICTD. It shows 
that they conceptualise the individual as a rational, utilitarian and reflexive agent.  
 
The Rational Individual in Development 
While modernisation theory assumes that individuals will adopt rationalism and the pursuit of 
self-interest as part of development progress, the neoliberal and human development approaches 
share the belief that individuals are already rational, self-interest-maximising agents. The 
voluntary, self-interest-maximising agent of Adam Smith’s classical economics is a prerequisite 
for the effective functioning of free markets. Similarly, although the human development 
approach makes an explicit departure from the singular focus on economic growth, it retains a 
shared conception of the individual as a rational, reasoning agent. For example, in order to know 
which functioning’s they value and what life they wish to lead, individuals must have access to 
information and the capacity to reason (Sen 1999, 190). As Gasper notes, ‘central to Sen’s view 
is the choosing, reasoning individual’ (Gasper 2002, 451).  
 
Thus, the individual is conceptualised as a rational individual whose purpose is, through the 
expansion of his or her capabilities, the pursuit of individual freedom. At the heart of both the 
neoliberal and human development approaches is a belief in the self-governing individual who is 
empowered through liberation from communal and social ties (Hopgood 2000) to exercise 
autonomy, calculation and reflexivity in the market (Shani 2012, 108; Jolly 2005). In contrast, 
Foucauldian-inspired post-development critiques largely render the individual as a passive 
‘subject’ under discursive and structural hegemony (Lie 2008).  
 
These accounts of a rational, sovereign individual have been increasingly challenged, including 
from the bastions of orthodox development policy. The micro and behavioural economic study of 
development interventions finds that beneficiaries do not act as predicted and are not universally 
rational (Rodrik 2008; Banerjee and Duflo 2012; Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2011; Bertrand et 
al. 2005). Building on these findings and others, in 2015 the World Bank’s annual flagship 
publication on development theory, the World Development Report, titled ‘Mind, Society and 
Behaviour’ (World Bank 2015), explicitly critiqued the assumptions of universal rationalism and 
the self-interest-maximising individual as culturally contingent. As a result, the report rejects the 
assumption of a voluntaristic, self-interest-maximising rational actor. It concludes that the source 
of individual choices and behaviour is far more external and, as such, development theory and 
practice should pay more attention to ‘social practices and institutions’ (World Bank 2015, 12).  
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This recognition has long been made by development sociologists who highlight the role of states 
(Evans 1995), institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff 2008) and gender (Moser 1989; Moghadam 
1992) in processes of development. Indeed, there is growing recognition within mainstream 
development theory of what sociologists and anthropologists have long argued, that the cultural 
context in which people live plays an important part in how they behave and understand the world 
(Bourdieu 1977; Swidler 1986). The World Bank report therefore concludes that this 
conceptualisation of individual decision-making implies that, to really understand human 
behaviour, there needs to be greater engagement with the culture in which people live and its role 
in shaping individuals themselves.  
 
The rational, sovereign actor that underpins mainstream development models is increasingly 
challenged and the role of culture in human identity and behaviour recognised. In order to explore 
the relationship between technology and identity, the following section considers how the 
individual is conceptualised in the ICTD literature.  
 
The Instrumental Individual in ICTD Studies  
Studies of ICTD have long been characterised by assumptions of the individual as a voluntaristic, 
self-interest-maximising agent at the expense of paying attention to the role of local contexts and 
cultures in shaping individual behaviour (2012). Similarly, ICTD studies tend to either assume a 
universal set of values leading to universally generalizable conclusions or focus on situated 
studies that do not explore the roots of cognitive or emotional bearings on behaviour (Avgerou 
2010; Madon and Avgerou 2004, 163). As a result, there is a long-standing call for greater 
attention to the role of context, culture and development in the relationship between ICTs and 
individual behaviour. Madon and Avgerou call for greater focus on the ‘contextual origins of the 
meanings, emotional dispositions, and competencies of actors’ (2004, 176) and Walsham and 
Sahay call specifically for greater attention to ‘individuals and issues such as identity’ in future 
IS research (Walsham and Sahay 2006, 20).  
 
The assumption of the individual as a voluntary agent is also linked to a predominantly 
instrumentalist view of ICTs in development, where ICTs are exclusively linked to specific 
transformations such as public service delivery or narrowly defined sectors such as agriculture or 
health (World Bank 2012a, 12, 2012b). This emphasis on instrumental outcomes has led to a 
narrow definition of ICT success in which non-instrumental use outside predefined goals is 
regarded as a failure (Chirumamilla and Pal 2013; Ratan and Bailur 2007). Yet, it is argued that 
attention to the non-instrumental use of communication is important for the following reasons. 
First, the nature of the device affords the consumption of entertainment over productive use, as 
small screens and keypads limit the productivity claims of optimistic development arguments 
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(Napoli and Obar 2013; Napoli et al. 2014). Second, emerging research highlights the value of 
non-instrumental use such as in developing digital skills (Donner and Gitau 2009; Rangaswamy 
and Arora 2015; Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2013; Kumar 2014) and introducing wider conceptions 
of development that include non-instrumental aspects such as play (Chirumamilla and Pal 2013; 
Sey and Ortoleva 2014).  
 
While the historic focus on instrumental technology use was perhaps understandable in an age 
when communication technologies were more directly controlled by agents of development such 
as the state, the adoption of technologies by individuals demands a broader focus. Assumptions 
of rationality are not enough to explain non-instrumental use, which plays an important part in 
everyday ICT use and thus in processes of social change.  
 
The Reflexive Individual  
An underlying conceptualisation of the individual that the development and ICTD literatures draw 
on is the idea of the reflexive individual. Sociologists such as Giddens and Castells describe the 
idea of ‘individual reflexivity’ (Adams 2003) as an underlying account of the modernity to which 
most development theories attend. Adams argues that common to these accounts of modernity is 
a theorisation of modern society as one in which individuals are free to exercise greater choice 
about their identity, leading to changing allegiances and social networks, the transfer of risk from 
institutions to the individual and greater self-awareness. Thus, Giddens describes identity as fluid 
and malleable, with the self as a project in which individuals must construct biographical 
narratives that are coherent to themselves and to others (Giddens 1991). For Castells, 
globalisation and networked technology lead to ‘the dissolution of shared identities’ (Castells 
1997, 355). To deal with this fluidity and dissolution, individuals have to develop ‘self-reflexive 
beliefs’ (Giddens 1991, 53) as ‘social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light 
of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character’ 
(Giddens 1990, 39).  
 
The concept of reflexivity is also present in alternative theorisations of modernity. Eisenstadt, for 
example, argues that a ‘high degree of reflexivity’ enables modernity’s ‘potential for self-
correction, its ability to confront problems not even imagined in its original program’ (Eisenstadt 
2000, 25). Indeed, according to Weber, there is ‘no substance and no other core to modernity than 
a shared lineage to the idea of reflexivity’ (R. Weber 2015, 33). In other words, intrinsic to 
accounts of the decline of traditional institutions such as religion and the conditions of modernity 
is the idea of individuals making reflexive choices.  
 
The idea of the reflexive, expressive self is subject to a number of critiques. Alexander argues 
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that the self-reflexive thesis invokes a traditional/post-traditional dichotomy that reflects ‘the 
same simplistic set of binary oppositions as did modernisation in its most banal form’ (Alexander 
1996, 44). The self-reflexivity thesis holds that Western individuals were constrained by tradition 
and culture, that they ‘were once naive cultural dupes’ (Adams 2003, 225), but were liberated 
through the conditions of modernity. The parallels with modernisation theory and its thesis of a 
liberating ideology are clear, leading Alexander to argue that the self-reflexivity thesis offers an 
‘historically arbitrary, Western-centred, and theoretically tendentious approach to tradition’ 
(Alexander 1996, 45).  
 
Summary 
This section has argued that normative theories of development assume a process of 
modernisation that rests on the idea of a universal, rational and reflexive agent. This has been 
challenged by emerging insights into human behaviour and patterns of technology and for being 
Western-centric. These critiques are not simply philosophical or ontological ivory-tower debates 
removed from the challenges and injustices of the world. Theorising identity as being 
autonomously and self-reflexively produced masks the power and ideological formations in 
which individuals are situated (Lodziak 2002; Zizek 1997). Furthermore, universalising this self-
reflexive sovereign subject ignores its historical origins in Western, Christian modernity and 
marginalises the possibility of alternative forms of identity and subjectivity (Adams 2003, 235).  
 
In other words, this section has argued that non-instrumental, everyday technology use and 
religious identity are important areas of study to inform our understanding of the relationship 
between technology and development, with the latter conceptualised as a broader process of social 
change. In order to take this forward, the next section reviews the literature on religion and 
religious identity as a prelude to exploring the literature on ICTs and religion.  
 
2.4 Conceptualising Religious Identity 
The literature on religious identity is both diverse and diffuse, covered from a range of different 
disciplines and perspectives. This section provides a thumbnail sketch of this story, outlining the 
conceptual diversity that religious identity has taken in the sociology of religion literature. It 
outlines the conceptualisation of religion in the main sociological schools, namely, religion as 
illusion, as a source of integration, as a social structure, as functionalist and as socially 
constructed. It concludes with an outline of contemporary theorisations of religion as a lived, 
material phenomenon.  
  
A common view of religion is that it is an illusion, that the content and meaning of faith are false 
and mask a true materialist, secular reality. In this Marxist analysis, while religion may serve as 
 40 
an opiate to mask the experience of alienation, it is also described as a construct used by specific 
groups to advance their own interest. Religion as a balm is commonly described as ‘deprivation 
theory’ and has informed studies of working-class religion and social movements (Furseth and 
Repstad 2006). Others describe religion as a set of resources exploited by elites, including in 
patterns of patriarchy (Halliday 2003; Shaheed 2010). This reductionist view of religion is 
criticised for failing to acknowledge its role in emancipatory movements (Collins 1998) and as a 
source of meaning and expression, such as the wearing of hijab (Woodhead 2002) or piety 
practices (Mahmood 2011; Jamal 2011).  
 
In contrast to the idea of religion as illusion in Marx’s conflict theory, religion is also explained 
as a mechanism for social order and integration. Durkheimian accounts of religion describe it as 
the totem or embodiment of society in symbolic form. Like Marx, Durkheim assumes an 
underlying materialism on which broader collective representations and culture rest, leading 
towards a group rather than individualist account (Giddens 1976; Durkheim 1978). However, the 
assumption of an a priori role for religion is criticised for failing to account for the historical 
processes through which religions rise or fall (Emirbayer 2004, 13). Indeed, sociologists in the 
1960s and 1980s turned away from Durkheim’s emphasis on social stability towards the sociology 
of Weber, Marx and de Tocqueville (Emirbayer, 1996) to develop ‘conflict sociology’ (Collins 
1994) and theories of ‘resource mobilisation’ and ‘political process’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
Tilly 1978, 1981; McAdam 1996).  
 
While Marx and Durkheim’s account explains religion in terms of social structures, Weberian 
perspectives emphasise its role in the individual’s need for meaning. Thus, for Weber, religion 
can only be understood from the viewpoint of the meaning of religious behaviours (M. Weber 
1920, 1). In this sense, religion serves as a source of cultural identity and an explanation of social 
change, such as the emergence of capitalism from Protestantism. Weber’s thesis has been 
criticised for failing to recognise the significance of rationalism – adopted by Protestants in favour 
of Catholicism’s traditionalism – as a driving force of capitalism and modernity (Robertson 1959; 
Fanfani, Campanini, and Clark 1935; Tawney 1926). One of Weber’s great contributions though 
was to separate the truth claims of religion so that, unlike Marx, Freud and Durkheim, religion 
can be understood as a meaningful force in the lives of individuals.  
 
While structuralist and individualist accounts of religion focus on society or the individual, 
functionalist accounts aim to integrate the two (Christiano, Swatos, and Kivisto 2015, 39). 
Functionalist accounts of religion challenge the idea that rational self-interest is the main driver 
of progress and, instead, argue that culture and particularly religion are central drivers of change. 
This argument implies a rejection of the idea of secularisation as a universal process, seeing it 
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instead as an outcome of Western and Christian values (Parsons 1951, 1964, 1971). One of the 
important dimensions of this Christian modernity is the idea of self-built, ‘achieved’ identities in 
contrast to given, ascriptive identities in the pre-modern societies that served to legitimise and 
maintain social hierarchy (Parsons 1951, 111). Similarly, Geertz’s (1973) anthropological 
account of religion – one of the most influential in sociology and anthropology (Furseth and 
Repstad 2006) – draws on both Weber and Parsons to emphasise the meaning that individuals 
ascribe to their experiences. This functionalist account conceptualises religion as a way for human 
beings to interpret and be in the world, bringing meaning to chaos and disorder. For Geertz, 
religion is a cultural phenomenon with an existential function.  
 
The 1970s saw a shift in the social sciences as the certainties of before were reconceptualised as 
social constructions. The ‘social constructionist turn’ (P. L. Berger and Luckmann 1966) also 
introduced new conceptualisations of religion (P. L. Berger and Luckmann 1981; P. L. Berger 
1967; P. L. Berger 2009; Luckmann 1967). Although Berger and Luckmann (1966) share the 
dichotomy between traditional and modern societies, in contrast to Parsons’ functionalist account 
of religion, they understand it from the perspective of the individual as a resource or ‘sacred 
canopy’ that provides order and legitimates the vulnerable social structure that individuals 
recognise as reality (P. L. Berger and Luckmann 1981, 113). This account of religion has been 
critiqued for assuming a universal desire for meaning and intolerance for inconsistency (McGuire 
2008) and for failing to account for the manipulative use of religion and thus veiling the operation 
of power (Horrell 2001). 
 
The period since the 1980s has seen enormous diversity in emerging theories of religion. These 
reflect the growing influence of the natural and behavioural sciences (Stausberg 2009) as well as 
genealogical approaches that emphasise history and power (Asad 1993), an ethnographic turn 
towards the study of ‘vernacular religions’ and ‘lived religions’ (Mathews 1998; Orsi 1985) and 
a material turn towards ‘objects, practices, spaces, bodies, sensations, affects and so on’ (Hazard 
2013). These latter areas of attention reflect a shift away from the study of religion as belief and 
instead as a phenomenon that is historically situated and enacted through practice and material 
entities.  
 
One of the most influential has been the work of anthropologist Talal Asad (1993). Asard argued 
that any attempt at a universal definition of religion and indeed the secular must inevitably fail 
because religion as a concept is a product of a specifically Western modern discourse, and that 
any definition of religion is always a product of a political struggle to determine modes of thought 
and power on society. Asad thus rejects the concept of religion as symbolic activity that is separate 
from instrumental, everyday life argues that religion is constituted by practices and discourses 
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that are often not religious in nature. Religion, in other words, is not always religious – bur rather 
part of everyday life. The implications of this are, as Asad argues “If anything is agreed upon, it 
is that a straightforward narrative progress from the religious to the secular is no longer 
acceptable” (2003, 1). Asad (2003) makes the same argument to reframe an understanding of the 
secular5, firstly distinguishing the concepts of the secular from secularism, arguing that “over 
time a variety of concepts, practices, and sensibilities have come together to form the ‘the secular’ 
[which is] conceptually prior to the political doctrine of ‘secularism’ (2003,16). The concept of 
religion, and indeed of the secular, are not universal ideas or representations of phenomena with 
some core ‘essence’, but rather constituted by multiple concepts that are manifest through diverse 
practices that evolve and change over time.  
 
For Vasquez, the study of religion is ‘to study how embodiment and embeddedness in time and 
place enable and constrain diverse, flexible, yet patterned subjective experiences that come to be 
understood as religion’ (2010, 7). This account of religion, while controversial and at the margins 
of the study of religion (Hazard 2013; Stausberg 2012), presents a substantial alternative to the 
Western-centric study of religion.  
 
Classical sociological accounts of religion are characterised by their focus on the nature and 
function of religion as belief in the form of texts, ideas and structure. This emphasis is dominated 
by accounts of changes in religious belief that are characterised by the decline of religion in public 
life and the assumption of progress towards a secular modernity. This account of secularisation 
is also acknowledged in later and more contemporary accounts as a particular product of Western 
– and specifically Christian – social and political histories. In this sense, in classical sociological 
accounts of religion is the common assumption that individuals are progressing towards greater 
individualisation and autonomy, and away from being defined by religion and tradition. Indeed, 
these accounts of religion echo the theories of development and modernity in which individuals 
are rational, choice-making subjects. 
 
2.5 ICTs and Religion  
The small but growing body of literature on ICTs and religion has developed particularly since 
the emergence of the Internet. This section describes three historical ‘phases’ of research, 
concluding that the field has become more theoretically nuanced and complex in its approach to 
the relationship between the Internet and specific aspects of religious practice.  
                                                 
5 Asad of course argues that there is no ‘the secular’ as the ‘the’ implies calcification, and similarly there 
is no absolute form of religion, or of Islam, Christianity or other faith. Instead there are only genealogical 
formations that emerge out of historically contingent situations and manifest in particular practices.  
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The first phase of research reflects the modernisation thesis – that the technology would introduce 
entirely new forms of social organisation. Højsgaard and Warburg (2005) describe how the 
literature of the 1980s examined the innovative nature of the Internet and the idea that religion 
‘could (and probably would do almost anything’ (2005, 8). Thus, scholars introduced terms such 
as ‘cyber-religion’ to describe new forms of religious practice and communities that existed solely 
online (Dawson 2000) or to describe the online presence of existing religious groups (Brasher 
2004). Common to most is the argument that cyber-religion represents ‘a solid opposition to 
traditionally structured religious institutions’ (Højsgaard and Warburg 2005, 30). The early 
literature on the Internet thus imagined that the Internet would disrupt established social 
institutions. 
 
The second wave of research sought to find ‘a more realistic perspective’ (Højsgaard and 
Warburg, 2005), recognising the importance of people as well as technologies in religious 
practice. This wave of research sought to establish a structure to the field, with a number of edited 
collections seeking to identity common questions and methodology (Hadden and Cowan 2000; 
Dawson and Cowan 2004; Højsgaard and Warburg 2005). While Højsgaard and Warburg’s edited 
volume examines how the Internet was used by established religious groups, a ‘distinctive issue’ 
explored in the volume is the construction of religious identity and community online by new 
religious movements such as Branch Dravidians, Scientologists, Wiccans and new cyber-religions 
(Højsgaard and Warburg 2005, 8). 
 
This early literature on the relationship between technology and religion explores both how the 
technology is incorporated into the practices of existing religious movements as well as how it 
enables new religious movements to emerge. Campbell (2013b) argues that this wave of research 
represents ‘disparate collections of studies… rather than cohesive commentaries on how religious 
groups and practices as a whole are being shaped by Internet technology and culture’ (2013b, 9). 
Like early accounts of the use of technologies by social movements, this work is descriptive rather 
than analytical, mapping the empirical rather than theoretical terrain. The few forays into linking 
the study of ICTs and religion with broader theoretical debates in the literature on technology and 
social change explored how the Internet might strengthen or weaken established religious 
authority. Piff and Warburg’s (2005) study of Internet use in the Baha’i tradition explores the 
nature of authority in official and unofficial online spaces. They emphasise the tension this raises 
in terms of its implication for the way religious authorities maintain credibility through 
‘plausibility alignment’.  
 
Significantly, even these early studies of the relationship between the Internet and religion 
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engaged critically with questions about the relationship between online and offline communities. 
Studies of the Internet and religion explored whether online relationships were as authentic as 
offline relationships, and the implications for community (Campbell 2005), hierarchy and 
authority (Introvingne 2005). Thus, studies of the relationship between technology and culturally 
located social practices engaged critically and in a nuanced way with the role of communications 
technology in social change.  
 
The third wave of research reflects a substantial development of the field and includes studies 
that explore religious rituals and practices online; how the Internet influences definitions and 
understandings of religion; the relationship between online and offline forms of religion; and the 
study of religious community, identity and authority (Campbell 2013, 682). Campbell argues that 
the field is developed enough to be defined as a subfield of ‘Internet studies’ and that this 
positioning is possible by structuring the field as five research areas that reflect concerns within 
Internet studies, namely, convergent social practice, embedded reality, networked community, 
shifting authority and identity as performance (Campbell 2013b, 682).  
 
The idea of convergent social practice addresses the enduring engagement with the difference 
between online and offline social interaction. Helland (2000), for example, distinguishes between 
the presence of established religious groups online as ‘religion online’ and new religious groups 
that emerge from online spaces as ‘online religion’. For example, many of these studies find that 
online religious practices challenge established authority, much in the same way as arguments for 
the transformative power of the Internet in processes of modernisation. Yet, this literature also 
shows how the Internet is part of transformations of religious practice rather than a 
marginalisation or replacement, as argued by the secularisation thesis. These transformations 
generally reflect the ‘individualisation’ argument, as Campbell concludes from studies of rituals 
and practices online, arguing that ‘spirituality online is highly individualized and self-directed’ 
(Campbell 2013b, 682).  
 
The view that the Internet transforms rather than replaces religion is explored in the literature that 
describes religious practice as ‘embedded’ and reflects a particular strand of the secularisation 
school of thought. Campbell (2013) argues that this distinction between online and offline reflects 
the idea that ‘online religious practice is intertwined with rather than divorced from traditional 
religious frameworks’ (Campbell 2013, 684). Here, the literature recognises and explores how 
religious practice, history and narratives inform decisions about, and thus shape, Internet use. The 
Internet is understood as being embedded within users’ own reality, even as users embed their 
reality within online practices. This move reflects a rejection of the idea that the Internet is a 
‘separate’ space, as scholars of social movements and modernity have argued. Campbell links this 
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move to a rejection of the dualism between online and offline that is increasingly common in 
Internet studies (for an in-depth look at the ontology of what Jurgenson terms ‘digital dualism’, 
see Jurgenson 2011).  
 
The field of religion and the Internet has, in particular, explored the dynamics of religious 
communities’ practices and behaviours online. This research shows that online religious 
communities often operate differently from traditional religious institutions and structures 
(Campbell 2013b, 685). This literature has evolved from simple descriptions of religious groups 
– such as Islamic cyber-communities or Buddhist cyber-sanghas – to detailed studies of how and 
why people join these communities and the implications of online communities for offline 
communities Campbell suggests that much of this research finds that online communities 
complement, rather than substitute for, existing communities – a finding the author links to similar 
debates in Internet studies that explore community through the ‘network’ metaphor. This literature 
on religion and the Internet reflects broader accounts in Internet studies of how technologically 
enabled networks result in the decline of geographic and inherited social ties to communities with 
shared interests and values. Thus, this literature reflects the argument that computer-supported 
social networks foster ‘global connectivity, the fragmentation of solidarities, the de-emphasis of 
local organizations’ (Wellman et al. 1996, 213). 
 
The literature on the Internet and religion also examines how the use of new ICTs affects 
traditional and new sources of authority. This describes how the Internet allows new forms of 
religious authority, from default gatekeepers such as webmasters to individuals who bypass 
traditional institutions to become influential figures. These new forms of authority can also 
translate offline, as Herring (2005) shows in a description of how leaders of a Christian newsgroup 
found their offline authority enhanced. At the same time, established religious groups also use the 
Internet to shore up their authority, for example, by monitoring followers in user groups and 
establishing policies to constrain debate. Religious groups also seek to exercise control over the 
use of new technologies, as shown by studies of how the Orthodox Jewish community sought to 
introduce a ‘kosher cell phone’ to limit access to technologies that threatened their authority by 
enabling users to share images and participate in debates (Campbell 2007; Rashi 2012). Rashi 
(2012) shows how the Orthodox leadership was able to ban access to 3G Internet-enabled phones 
in order to reaffirm and enhance their authority in the community. As the study of ICTs and 
religion has developed, the literature has increasingly adopted a sociological perspective. This 
sociological turn is outlined in more detail in the following section. 
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2.6 ICTs and Religious Identity 
The relationship between the Internet and religious identity has drawn substantial attention from 
scholars. As Campbell (2013b) says, it reflects a common line of enquiry with Internet studies 
and common concerns with the broader literature on technology, modernisation and processes of 
social change.  
 
Lövheim (2013) characterises the trajectory of research into the relationship between ICTs and 
religious identity as moving from utopian disruption and empirical mapping to a more nuanced 
theorisation. Lövheim argues that the first phase – like early research into the Internet and identity 
more broadly (see Turkle 1995) – theorised the Internet as a place where people could shrug off 
the constraints of traditional religious authority and exercise greater freedom in the emerging 
spiritual marketplace ‘where users might pick and mix their spiritual identities’ (Lövheim 2013, 
45). This includes research such as Lövheim and Linderman’s (2005) study of how young Wiccan 
practitioners found forms of freedom by creating identities outside the supervision of their coven. 
Brasher (2004) concludes that online religious practice ‘could become the dominant form of 
religion and religious experience in the next century’ (2004, 19). Yet, as Lövheim (2013) 
subsequently notes, the empirical grounding for these studies was ‘thin’ and based on a few case 
studies, such as that of online neopagans.  
 
The second phase sought to critically interrogate these claims through empirical research on 
online religious practices. This largely challenged the utopian claims of early studies of the 
Internet and religion. Dawson, for example, concludes that ‘the influence of alternative identity 
formations on the practice of religion is minimal and speculative at present’ (Dawson 2000, 37). 
Cowan, on the other hand, argues that the construction and performance of identity online is a 
process of co-construction (2005, 155) and should not be theorised as an individualistic process 
that is only online or offline. This reflects the ICT and social movement literature that explores 
the relationship between online and offline mobilisation. Crucially, however, the ICT and religion 
literature tends to conclude that technology is less significant for, or more co-constitutive of, 
practice and identities. As Lövheim (2013) argues, this phase of research tends to conclude that 
‘online contexts generate discursive and social infrastructures for religious identity formation’ 
(2013, 48). 
 
The third phase described by Lövheim (2013) explores how online identities are integrated into 
everyday life; it recognises the continuity and connection between individuals’ online and offline 
identity enactments. Thus, studies explore how personal blogs and podcasts constitute religious 
practice or religious behaviour in computer games (Feltmate 2010). Lövheim suggests that this 
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research explores the way individuals use technology to construct and scrutinise religious 
narratives, and the meaning and function of technology in religious life and practice.  
 
This literature, then, explores how the relationship between ICTs and religion leads to changes in 
religious practice and which technological characteristics are implicated in how specific practices 
change. For example, Teusner’s (2013) study of Australian Christian bloggers shows how ‘lay’ 
adherents who attempt to challenge established religious authority had to conform to normative 
discourses to maintain visibility on Internet search engines. Because search engine algorithms 
privilege popular search terms that reflect dominant discourses, to be successful the bloggers had 
to conform to the very discourse they aimed to counter. This last theme situates research into the 
Internet and religion in the context of late modernity. In this context, it shows how all forms of 
identity, including religious identity, are understood as being characterised by individual choice 
and what Giddens terms ‘intrinsic reflexivity’ (1991, 20).  
 
There remains a tension between this framing of religious identity as individual choice and 
Lövheim's argument that ‘religious identity in modern society is still a social thing, deeply 
anchored in the social situations and relations individuals want and need to stay connected to in 
order to find meaning and act in everyday life’ (Lövheim 2013, 52). This argument counters the 
assumptions of technologically driven individualism and context-free behaviours, and is 
characteristic of the normative view in the literature on technology in processes of modernisation. 
It also competes with the presumption of a universal form of rationalism and marginalises the 
possibility of allowing other forms of being, in other places, into theorisation.  
 
The study of the Internet and religion thus explores how identity construction challenges 
established authoritative sources of identity, fragments group identity and creates a space for 
minority identities to flourish. Campbell argues that the literature also shows how technology 
should be understood as supplementing, and not replacing, traditional sources of identity 
(Campbell 2013b, 688). These themes and perspectives reflect debates that are more nuanced than 
their equivalent in the development and ICTD literature, where the dominant literature conceives 
of identity as singular and liberated. As Campbell notes, the nuance of debates about the Internet 
and religion reflect the debates about identity in Internet studies. She points to an evolution from 
earlier studies, which considered online identity as liberated, ‘virtual’ selves (Turkle 1995), to 
later debates that find close relationships between online and offline identities, but emphasise the 
performative nature of online identity. She suggests that studies of the Internet and religion and 
of the broader Internet studies field are characterised by approaches to identity informed by 
Erving Goffman view of identity as ‘performative’ (Goffman 1959), and that ‘the Internet is seen 
as one of a number of tools within modernity empowering individuals to act out their identity in 
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unique ways’ (Campbell 2013b, 688).  
 
The theorisation of technology and religious identity thus appears to offer research trajectories 
that counter the Western-centric ontological conception of the individual, which presumes a 
rational reflexivity. Yet, while there is an acknowledgement of the social context in the literature 
on technology and religious identity, theorisation of the nature of the individual and the self 
remains limited.  
 
The literature on the Internet and religion follows a similar theoretical trajectory to the literature 
on ICTs and modernisation, but has ended up in a more sociological theoretical position. Like 
early accounts of how the Internet would transform processes of development, the first wave of 
Internet and religion research anticipated the emergence of new forms of religious organisation 
and the disruption of the old. The second wave of research mapped the terrain of ICT use in actual 
religious practice, opening the door to more critical accounts of the complex relationship between 
technology and social practice. The third wave established new domains of enquiry in this 
nuanced terrain – highlighting themes of convergent social practice, embedded reality, networked 
community, shifting authority and identity as performance – to reflect concerns in the Internet 
studies literature with notions of ‘networked society’. Like the technology and modernisation 
literature, these themes theorise increasingly individualistic and expressive social practices, 
countering modernity's secularisation thesis.  
 
The literature on ICTs and religious identity explores questions of individual identity construction 
and the notion of identity as performance, positioning these debates within discourses of 
modernity and the associated process of individualisation. Yet although the literature on ICTs and 
religion has made significant theoretical advances in conceptualising the role of identity, the 
nature of religious identity itself has been under-theorised. Other studies demonstrate that 
sociological analysis and theorisation of the functioning of technology and the conceptualisation 
of identity can generate important insights into the nature and possibilities of social change, but 
the same nuanced analysis has not been carried out into the relationship between technology and 
religious identity – particularly not in non-Western countries and contexts.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a review of the main development models and found that the dominant 
ones can be broadly described as characterising social change in terms of a process of 
secularisation towards the conditions of modernity. The review of the literature on secularisation 
and modernity found that these theories of social change are generalisations of the Western 
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experience – a critique also made by the post-development perspective. The conceptualisation of 
the individual in theories of development, ICTD studies and modernity show that, broadly 
speaking, they share a view of the individual as rational, instrumental and reflexive. Critiques of 
this conceptualisation highlight its empirical limitations and location within Western discourse. 
The assumptions and lack of theorisation about the role of identity in the ICTD literature 
prompted a long-standing call for further theorisation of the relationship between identity and 
technology use.  
 
The literature review has shown that the development and ICTD literatures are dominated by 
assumptions of change as a process of secularisation and the individual as a sovereign, rational 
actor; this has led to a focus on economic growth and the instrumental use of technologies. As a 
result, these accounts struggle to explain why religion continues to be significant in people’s lives, 
despite their use of supposedly secularising and individualising technologies. In a related fashion, 
the emphasis on instrumental technology use fails to account for non-instrumental use or explain 
its role in processes of social change.  
 
Accounts of social change in the development and ICTD literatures need theorisations about the 
implications of why religion remains significant. An important part of this is developing 
alternative theorisations of the individual and identity to overcome the problematic implications 
of assuming that individuals are universally rational and eventually secular. An important way to 
do this is to expand the ICTD framework by paying attention to non-instrumental technology use 
in processes of social change.  
 
To respond to this call, the literature on the relationship between ICTs and religion was reviewed 
to identify ways in which it explains the relationship between ICTs and religious identity. This 
nascent field was shown to have developed increasingly sociologically sophisticated accounts of 
technology and religion. In theorising identity as performative, it points towards concepts of 
identity that go beyond the assumptions of a sovereign, rational subject. In theorising technology 
as socially constructed, studies have shown how it is possible to move beyond the instrumental 
determinism that characterises the dominant accounts of technology in development. While 
performative accounts of identity provide an alternative that overcomes the problematic nature of 
the rational actor, the literature on ICTs and religion has only paid cursory attention to theorising 
technologies themselves. It is to a fuller theoretical account of identity and technology that the 
next chapter turns.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter establishes a theoretical framework to help explain the issues identified in Chapter 
2. The literature review found that the discourse on development modernity had been dominated 
by conceptualisations of the individual as a liberal, reflexive self, leading to a problematic account 
of social change as a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. In these accounts of social 
change, the dominant perspectives assumed a technological determinism that lacked sensitivity 
to context, while contextually sensitive accounts paid inadequate attention to the role and 
theorisation of individual identity.  
 
The theorisation draws on the idea of religious identity as performance, as referred to by Lövheim 
(2013), and extends this through postmodern theories of Foucauldian discourse (1970, 1977, 
1978) and performativity proposed by gender theorist Judith Butler (1990, 1993). This allows an 
alternative conceptualisation of identity to the problematic liberal agent of the dominant 
development models and accounts of modernity. It also draws on Teusner’s (2013) description of 
how a search engine’s design shaped the enactment of Christian activists’ identity to theorise 
technology. Thus, the theoretical framework adopts a socially embedded approach that 
understands the design of technologies to be significant and the design itself to be a socially 
embedded phenomenon. It adopts a sociomaterial perspective that draws on concepts from 
technology sociologists Callon (1986) and Latour (2005) and feminist technology theorist Barad 
(2003, 2007) to theorise technologies as entanglements of both social meaning and material 
elements.  
 
3.1 Theorising Religious Identity 
As an alternative to the liberal, sovereign subject of modernity, this section draws on a 
postmodern conceptualisation of identity constituted through three conceptual elements. The first 
conceptual element theorises religious identity as a discursive subject, drawing on Foucault’s 
notion of discourse and the discursively constituted subject. It explores the implications of a 
Foucauldian account of religious identity, highlighting its conceptualisation as a cultural construct 
that exists within and functions as part of discursive regimes of power. The second conceptual 
element draws on Butler’s account of performativity to expand Foucault’s passive subject, 
showing how religion as a discursive regime produces subject positions that are enacted to 
‘perform’ identity and thus constitute the self. The third element extends Butler’s emphasis on 
language to accommodate the material through Barad’s (2003; 2007) account of material 
performativity and Vasquez’s (2010) materialist account of religious identity. The section 
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concludes with a summary of the conceptualisation of identity that lays the foundation for the 
subsequent theorisation of technology.  
 
Studies of identity took a distinctive turn in the 1980s, heralding paradigmatic changes that 
offered new theoretical lenses challenging individualist accounts of identity. Social and economic 
changes, such as the emergence of neoliberal democracy and ensuing claims of ‘the end of 
history’, were accompanied by new developments and critiques variously termed post-
structuralism, postmodernism, performativity and queer theory, the discursive or cultural turn and 
‘the moment of postcolonial theory’ (Wetherell 2010, 13). These theoretical lenses helped shift 
the focus from what identity was to how identity was established. Departing from the ‘modern’ 
individual, they sought to ‘de-centre’ the location of identity from the ‘essential’ qualities of a 
sovereign individual outwards to the cultural and linguistic context in which the individual was 
located. In doing so, these perspectives offered an alternative to the individualism that was 
liberated by technology and to the underlying idea of the reflexive, expressive and choice-making 
self. Identity, instead, was found not in the individual but in the context in which individuals lived. 
These perspectives helped overcome the constraints of modernisation theory and of rational, 
reflexive individualism.  
 
3.1.1 Religious Identity as the Discursive Subject 
Foucault (1970, 1977, 1978) describes the operation of discourse as the mechanism through 
which power is exerted over the human body, and knowledge as one of the discursive structures 
through which power is enacted. Although Foucault did not conduct a systematic examination of 
religion, it features throughout his work as one of the discursive structures through which power 
is exercised (Carrette 1999). Foucault’s work examines both how discourse is structured and how 
it operates in processes of social change. He describes how the dominant discourse since the 
eighteenth century has concerned the modern, autonomous and rational subject, and emphasises 
how specific knowledge forms such as myths and religion serve to uphold this discourse. In this, 
Foucault differs from the functionalist school of thought in that religion does not serve a specific 
social function, but rather is functional in maintaining a discursive regime.  
 
Carrette (1999, 2000), a scholar of Foucault and his work on religion, argues that there are five 
dominant themes within Foucault’s conceptualisation of religion. First, argues Carrette, although 
Foucault did not examine religion directly, he considered it a part of broader culture. Second, 
religion exists within the human processes of power and knowledge and, as such, is socially 
constructed. Third, religion, for Foucault, is embodied – in line with his belief that discourse is 
the operation of power over the human body. Fourth, as part of wider culture, religion functions 
as a system of power. Finally, Carrette points to Foucault’s account of the role religion plays in 
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the government of the self. Foucault argues that practices such as confession constitute the form 
and transformation of the self. In this way, the individual is governed by a religious self at an 
individual level as well as at an institutional level. In this way, through ‘technologies of the self’, 
discipline is no longer simply an external process of surveillance, but is internalised and self-
enacted. Individuals thus police their own actions in order to conform to expectations of good 
behaviour. This also implies a significant difference from Marxist or even Freudian conceptions 
of religion: while Foucault shares their belief in the oppressive and constructed nature of religion, 
he does not foresee liberation through the rejection of religion. For Foucault, religion is but one 
knowledge regime and its absence would only be filled by another.  
 
The post-structuralist perspective on the self that Foucault advances, and that emerges through 
the genealogy of discourses on religion, sexuality and discipline, is in direct contrast to the 
rational, reflexive and autonomous self of Giddens’ modernity. Foucault (1970, 1977) argues that 
there is no ‘transcendental self’ but that, instead, the self is the site of an exercise of power over 
the individual. For Foucault, this power is exercised through language and ‘discursive practice’, 
leading to a concept of identity as ‘discursive acts’ performed through ‘technologies of the self’. 
Foucault’s technologies of the self are described by Redman as the means through which 
individuals ‘perform’ identity and self-police under the disciplinary gaze of discourse (Redman 
2000). Foucault illustrates this disciplinary function of discourse by referring to Bentham’s 
Panopticon – a circular prison in which inmates, unsure if they are being watched by invisible but 
all-seeing guards, self-police themselves by exercising practices and technologies that allow them 
to perform as ‘good prisoners’ (Foucault 1977). 
 
Foucault’s significant move is to ‘evacuate’ the subject of the interiority and ‘reflexivity’ of the 
Enlightenment-inspired notion of the self on which Giddens’ ‘self-reflexivity’ thesis is built. As 
Hall puts it, ‘the subject is produced as an effect… and has no existence, and certainly no 
transcendental continuity or identity from one subject position to another’ (Hall 1996, 23). While 
this is the theoretical challenge to the focus on the individual and refocuses attention on the 
operation of power, Hall outlines how Foucault’s theorisation of identity as subject positions 
created by discourse has been challenged for ‘revealing little about why it is that certain 
individuals occupy some subject positions rather than others’ (Hall 1996, 23). This creation of 
subjects as ‘docile bodies’ is addressed in Judith Butler’s further theorisation of the individual as 
a ‘desiring subject’. 
 
Others argue that the post-structuralist conception of a totalising domination by pervasive power 
diminishes power conceptually; without introducing normative grounds for resistance to 
submission, Foucault is unable to argue why anyone would choose to resist in the first place 
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(Fraser 1981). The post-structuralist perspective, and Foucault in particular, is also criticised for 
being located in its own cultural context. Foucault’s conception of history and religion has been 
critiqued as being grounded in the European history and discourses of Christianity (Said 2001, 
196; Carrette 1999, 113).  
 
3.1.2 Religious Identity as the Performative Subject 
Poststructuralist philosopher and queer theorist Butler (1990, 1993) provides a theorisation of 
identity as ‘performativity’. This also challenges the ontological foundation of the liberal, 
sovereign subject. Butler builds on Foucault’s notion of discourse, but expands the theorisation 
of his evacuated subject by drawing on theories of ‘speech-acts’ and ‘desire’ to develop a more 
comprehensive conception of individual identity. 
 
Like Foucault, Butler theorises identity not as something pre-existing, innate and essential, but 
rather created ‘through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic social sign’ (Butler 1988, 
519). Butler draws on speech-act theory and particularly the work of language philosopher J. L. 
Austin to argue for the individual’s role in (re)constructing discourse through speech-acts that 
produce, rather than represent, meaning. In Butler’s words, performativity is ‘that discursive 
practice that enacts or produces that which it names’ (Butler 1993, 13). Importantly, these speech-
acts are not singular utterances, but rather gain power through repetition and consistency (Hall 
and Du Gay 1996). Through this repetition, ‘the illusion of the ‘“doer”/subject is created and 
maintained by a series of performed deeds’ (Morison and Macleod 2013, 568). Butler explains 
identity as a performance acted out to identify with – and in so doing, to reproduce – aspirational 
social norms. Thus, rather than a constrained expressive self, identity ‘is always a doing’, though 
not ‘a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed’ (Butler 1990, 33). 
 
Butler provides Foucault’s ‘docile subjects’ with interiority by drawing on psychoanalyst Lacan’s 
theory of the ‘desiring subject’ (Lacan 1981). A key figure in post-structural postmodernism, 
Lacan argued that identity formation was driven by the individual’s search for a coherent sense 
of self; this came about by identifying with idealised ‘images’ that constituted a patriarchal 
Symbolic Order to which one could aspire but never attain (Lacan 1977). Unlike Giddens’ self-
reflexive self, Butler’s desiring subject identifies with, and aspires to, the idealised subject 
positions constituted by the hegemonic order. In other words, individual behaviour and choices 
are motivated by the desire to conform to established social norms and thus be recognised and 
accepted by the social order in which individuals are located.  
 
In contrast to Foucault’s totalising discourse, Butler introduces the possibility of change through 
failure to successfully enact the regulatory regime to which one aspires – failures that can ‘trouble’ 
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the seeming naturalness of hegemonic regimes (Butler 1990). She describes how, through these 
performative failures, which are created by incorrect or parodic performances (such as men 
dressed in drag), ‘gaps and fissures are opened up’ (Butler 1993, 10). Trouble is, of course, 
contextual and ‘must be considered contextually in relation to where and when it occurs and how 
it is interpreted’ (Bordo 1992). In other words, not all ‘trouble’ troubles hegemonic regimes.  
 
The performative account of individual identity and the challenge it presents to notions of the 
liberal subject have been applied by Butler and others to religion and religious identity. Butler’s 
approach to religion is grounded in her work on subjectivity, ethics and bodies, language and 
cultural norms. Her work is of significance for religion ‘given the role of bodily practices 
(including linguistic ones) in the production of religious identities’ (Armour and Ville 2006, 10). 
In this sense, then, her submission of the subject is linked to individuals’ submission to the sacred 
and to religious discipline. While Butler’s work addresses the issues of individual subjectivity, 
divine sovereignty and the use of religion in politics, it is grounded in her experience of religion 
as textual interpretation. Religion and religious identity are, for her, rooted in the formation of the 
discursive subject and the ethics introduced through the discourse that constitutes the subject. 
Mahmood (2006) extends Butler’s notion of performativity beyond simply citation to active 
subject formation. In her study of Muslim women’s piety practices in Egypt, Mahmood 
emphasises the potential for subject formation in piety practices that go beyond ‘subversion or 
resignification of hegemonic norms’ (Mahmood 2006, 180). In other words, she emphasises the 
importance of allowing a form of subject enactment through submission to practices of modesty 
such as veiling and purdah.  
 
Butler’s psychoanalytic model is critiqued for advancing a universalism that is redolent of the 
totalising claims of modernisation and modernity. Social anthropologist Ewing argues that 
Lacan’s theorisation of a universal hegemonic order as the object of the subject’s desire presents 
a challenge when transported to a postcolonial setting: ‘it becomes difficult to locate a single 
Symbolic Order without presuming the total hegemony of Western colonial discourse’ (Ewing 
1997, 30). In her theorisation of identity to support an analysis of Sufism and modernity in Lahore, 
Pakistan, Ewing draws on Deleuze and Guatarri’s theorisation of desire and Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony in place of Lacan’s desiring subject. Where Lacan argued that identification was 
motivated by a desire to reconnect with a universal symbolic order, Deleuze and Guatarri argue 
that identification is motivated by the desire for available, not universal, ideological formations 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 24).  
 
This is an important departure from Lacan’s desiring subject because it avoids the totalising 
universality of modernism and allows other forms of modernism to act as symbolic orders (Ewing 
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1997, 30). Ewing also draws on the Gramscian notion of fragmentary hegemonic orders to counter 
Lacan’s universalist tendencies, describing the subject as ‘a complex site of conflict desires and 
multiple subjective modalities’ (Ewing 1997, 35). This subtle, but significant, adaptation of 
Butler’s theorisation of the desiring subject is important because it accommodates the multiple 
and fragmentary nature of hegemonic discourse and the subject while retaining the theory of 
performative enactment.  
 
Butler’s theory of performative enactment is also critiqued for being exclusively linguistic and 
reducing identity solely to language (Barad 2007; Bordo 2004, 291; Vasquez 2010). Scholars 
argue that her notion of performativity renders the material a passive subject that signifies 
discourse and fails to account for its active role in the enactment of subjects. Bordo argues that, 
for Butler, ‘language swallows everything up’ and instead urges attention to everyday practices 
of ‘real bodies (Bordo 2004, 291). Barad argues that Butler’s grounding of performativity in 
linguistic discourse fails to account for the role of matter ‘as an active agent participating in the 
very process of materialization’ (Barad 2003, 822). To this end, Hollywood emphasises the 
importance of understanding ritual not just as citation, but also as constitutive without being 
representative (Hollywood 2006, 253).  
 
3.1.3 Religious Identity as Material Performativity 
Sociologist of religion Manuel A. Vasquez (2010) draws on both Bordo and Barad, and argues 
for a ‘materialist’ reading of religion. His account of religion emerges from his study of religious 
practices among American immigrants, responding to acknowledgements that religion continues 
to be significant in conditions of modernity and the globalised nature of religious discourse, 
practice and mediation. As such, this account of religion recognises the interplay between 
multiple forms of materiality (Vasquez 2010, 155). Eradicating the subject-object divide favours 
a sense of agency that ‘allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming’ and 
in which ‘Agency is not aligned with human intentionality or subjectivity’ (Barad 2007, 235). 
Vasquez also draws on philosopher Margolis’ notion of ‘cultural realism’, which recognises that 
‘the emergent world in which our cognising competence takes form… is quite real, as real as the 
physical world from which it “must” have evolved’ (Margolis, 2003, 3 in Vasquez 2010, 6). For 
Vasquez, individuals and culture – including religion – are material and emerge from the social 
practices that mediate the experience of the world.  
 
The materialist account of religion that Vasquez describes is thus a ‘fully somatocentric theory 
of religion’ (Vasquez 2010, 157) that goes beyond a genealogical analysis of the textual, 
discursive, cultural and social components of religion. The task that follows from this perspective 
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is, first, to recover the evolutionary, ecological and psycho-cognitive conditions for religious life 
and, second, to understand the complex and diverse ways in which these conditions interact with 
sociocultural dimensions (Vasquez 2010, 157). He argues that traditional perspectives of religion 
– the dynamics of human solidarity, put forward by Durkheim, or the view of culture as symbols, 
presented by Geertz, or as Marxist economic conflict – all locate religion firmly on the human 
side of the human-material divide, thus reinscribing the problematic Cartesian dualism.  
 
Instead, Vasquez’s account of ‘non-reductive’ materialist religion opens up the analytic 
framework to ‘naturalcultural zones of contact’ (Vasquez 2010, 171). In this materialist account, 
the primary task is ‘to study the logics of religious ways of being in the world and to elucidate 
how these logics are inextricably connected with other (nonreligious) ways of being in the world’ 
(Vasquez 2010, 8). This perspective emphasises the everyday practices of individuals and 
recognises the possibility of ‘seeing religion everywhere, in everyday life’ (Vasquez 2010, 8). 
Vasquez also emphasises the potential of applying this materialist account of religion to the role 
of the Internet. He asks, for example, ‘does cyberspace engender its own form of materiality, its 
own forms of being-in-the-world’ that interact with age-old practices of subjectivation and 
panoptical control? (Vasquez 2010, 327). As such, this materialist account is a way of engaging 
with the role of ICTs in everyday life. It further theorises phenomena such as Teusner’s (2013) 
observation of the way the Internet structures and organises so as to demand that users enact 
particular forms of identity. This performative account, incorporating both discursive and material 
aspects, conceptualises religious identity as the performative enactment of fragmentary 
hegemonic discourse through discursive and material means.  
 
3.1.4 Summary  
This section has described how Butler’s Foucauldian notion of performativity reveals the 
operation of hegemonic discourse articulated through language and imprinted as subject positions 
on the body. The analysis of discourse through the content of mass media reveals the operation of 
power and the constitution of subject positions that individuals desire to perform. Incorporating 
Gramsci’s notion of fragmentary hegemonic orders avoids the universalising tendency of Butler’s 
Lacanian desire; it allows the subject’s desire to be contextual rather than normative. Similarly, 
drawing on Barad to incorporate the ‘materiality’ of discourse helps address the limitations of 
conceptualising discourse in purely linguistic forms. Although Butler’s notion of identity creates 
a space for analysing religious identity that departs from processes of secularisation driven by 
individual, sovereign subjects, her conceptualisation of the material renders materiality and 
technology passive and neutral. Drawing on Barad’s account of performativity, Vasquez’s 
material conceptualisation of religious identity offers a theoretically rich approach to alternatives 
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to the problematic hegemony of the liberal, sovereign subject.  
 
Accounts of religion and identity that reject the underlying Cartesian dualism of individuals and 
the social world in which they live describe how the operation of power through discourse serves 
to constitute the subject; these accounts dismiss the idea of the rationalist, sovereign subject. 
Materialist accounts counter the linguistic emphasis of social constructionist accounts of 
performativity to further dissolve the dualism between the human and material. The materialist 
account of performativity shows how the material is always an entanglement of the social and 
material – an assemblage of agencies that, together, constitute particular phenomena.  
 
3.2 Theorising Technology 
This section develops a conceptualisation of ICT that complements the non-dualistic ontology of 
a performative conception of identity. This is achieved by outlining a ‘sociomaterial’ account of 
technology that moves beyond social and material dualism; it is operationalised through the mid-
level theory of affordances and concluded by a theorisation of Facebook as a sociomaterial 
technology. The section ends with a summary of the value of this approach for addressing the 
study’s central questions. 
 
In Chapter 2, the review of the development and ICTD literature illustrated the commonality of 
determinist stances in which technologies were viewed in instrumental, causal terms, leading to 
changes in economic development as well as cultural values (Lerner 1958; Lerner and Schramm 
1967). These ideas also characterised the early media and communications literature, emphasising 
how particular effects were achieved (Lasswell 1948; Shannon and Weaver 1949). The 
technological determinist perspective was critiqued for its ontological dualism, which views 
technology as an independent variable linked to society through uni-directional, deterministic 
causal relationships and deeply rooted in the philosophy of modernity (Orlikowski 1992).  
 
Like the social constructionist movement in the religion and identity literature, studies of 
technology – particularly in the field of science and technology studies – explore how shared 
interpretations shape how technologies are developed and used (Bijker 1987; Pinch and Bijker 
1987; Law and Bijker 1992). Similarly, in media studies, scholars emphasise the active role of 
audiences in appropriating content for their own needs and gratification (Orlikowski and Scott 
2008; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). The social constructionist turn in media studies has been 
critiqued for conflating channel and content, and blurring ‘the relationship among the 
technological devices and the messages and meanings they convey’ (Lievrouw 2014, 35). In the 
study of technology, social constructionist perspectives are critiqued for advancing an implicit 
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‘social determinism’ (Barley 1988) and failing to theorise the technological artefact, rendering it 
one-dimensional as the technological determinist’s portrayal of the user (Orlikowski and Iacono 
2001). 
 
3.2.1 Beyond Duality: Sociomateriality 
The attempt to resolve the dualities of agency versus structure, individual versus social and human 
versus non-human has come to be at the cutting edge of social theory. Giddens’ structuration 
theory explicitly sets out to address this, but maintains the duality through the centrality of the 
self-reflexive individual and the duality of structure. A growing number of perspectives offer 
theoretical frameworks and conceptual tools to help resolve the original Cartesian sin of 
separating man from nature and the sovereign subject from their social and material context.  
 
The media and communications literature has long theorised a separation between the material 
and the social, characterising the media as ‘the intervening variable that explains a measurable 
change, the historical catalyst that explains a social shift, or the tool with which passive audiences 
can finally succumb to or resist the tyranny of mass culture’ (Gillespie 2014, 3). Recently, 
however, communications scholars have drawn increasingly on the insights generated by the 
materialist turn in sociology, anthropology and the philosophy of science to focus on the 
entanglement of the material, practice and politics and to conceptualise ‘sociomaterial ensembles 
as situated historically and in specific social and political contexts’ (Gillespie 2014, 4).  
 
Similarly, in the field of IS, Orlikowski and Scott (2008) argue that focusing on the causal function 
of technologies limits attention to specific instances of technology use and obscures how all forms 
of organising are always technologically mediated. This results in a search for uni-linear (such as 
social or technological determinism) or mutually interacting (such as structuration) causal effects 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 454). The authors argue that a ‘sociomateriality’ approach ‘moves 
away from focusing on how technologies influence humans, to examining how materiality is 
intrinsic to everyday activities and relations’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 454). Like a materialist 
religious identity, this approach makes no ontological distinction between the social and the 
material; it ‘does not presume independent or even interdependent entities with distinct and 
inherent characteristics’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 455–56).  
 
There is growing interest in sociomateriality within the IS and organisational literature 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2008; Leonardi 2012; Thompson 2011). Orlikowski and Scott, for 
example, demonstrate how the sociomaterial lens of agential realism reveals anonymity in social 
media travel review sites such as TripAdvisor, where anonymity is ‘dynamic and materially 
enacted and thus dependent on specific practices’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2014, 29). This 
 59 
challenges the ‘taken-for-granted assumptions of separation, independence, and essentialism’ 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2014, 36).  
 
Within the field of ICTD, an emerging body of work draws on the sociomaterial lens of actor–
network theory (ANT) to examine ICTs in developing countries (Barrett and Walsham 1999; 
Stanforth 2007; Heeks and Seo-Zindy 2016). These studies of development programmes show 
how ‘Technology is just one of a number of heterogeneous sociotechnical elements that must be 
considered and managed in the design and implementation of a successful information systems 
project’ (Stanforth 2007, 57).  
 
Although ANT has had limited application in media studies (Gillespie, Boczkowski, and Foot 
2014), a growing number of studies have applied it successfully to analyses of the political 
economy of the media (Couldry 2008). This has produced alternative theorisations to the 
traditional ‘transmission’ function of the media (Teurlings 2013, 105). Despite these insights into 
the political economy of the media, there is a need ‘to think about how people’s cognitive and 
emotive frameworks are shaped by the underlying features of the networks in which they are 
situated’ (Couldry 2008, 103). In other words, the individual must be theorised further.  
 
As Gillespie et al. note, most media and communications research has adopted a deterministic 
understanding of technology. Ignoring the design of communication technologies, particularly 
those such as interactive social network sites, marginalises the role of the structure, the ideas 
behind it and the operation of ideology that exists in the design of technologies. In other words, 
viewing media technologies as ‘the residue of societal ambitions’ leads us to view technologies 
as ‘social relations by other means, an engagement of people through information and through 
things, that happens to use words, sounds, and images as social currency’ (Gillespie 2014, 1). 
While the analysis of discursive formations in mass media content has helped reveal the operation 
of authority, there is a need for greater attention to the materiality of the media as an actor in the 
functioning of hegemonic discursive regimes. 
 
Communications scholars have drawn effectively on the sociomaterial lens, particularly ANT, to 
develop innovative ways of accounting for technology, social practice and their inter-relationship. 
ANT is employed by communication theorists to describe the interrelated nature of the global and 
local: Chesher (2007) gives the example of the network relations involved in the use of mobile 
phones at a U2 concert that create local attachments to global networks. Mobile phones 
themselves have been described as assemblages of handset technologies, intellectual properties, 
cultural norms and human actors that help reshape publics, communities and collectives (Goggin 
2010).  
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The ANT lens has also been used to show ‘how teenagers, cell phones, socio-spatial relations and 
discourses exist within a hybrid and interdependent network’ (Thompson 2008). Similarly, Burrell 
(2012) draws on ANT to describe the use of the Internet in Ghana. Among the insights that emerge 
as she traces the network of relationships revealed in exploring this, is the manner in which the 
immaterial, such as rumours, are made material through their circulation in legible artefacts. As 
Burrell says, the use of ANT entails distinguishing between a rumour’s material aspect and 
material effect, and ‘a notion of the material that extends beyond the manmade or technological, 
including the natural world and the corporeal as material domains’ (2012, 2).  
 
While early research described the Internet as a space for individual exploration and liberation 
(Turkle 1995, 2004), studies that employ post-structuralist Foucauldian and Butlerian 
perspectives emphasise a more nuanced account of the Internet and, particularly, of social media. 
Cover (2012), for example, presents a theorisation of performatively enacted identity on social 
media. He draws on Butler’s theories of performative identity to describe how identity is enacted 
through the construction of narrative and through social interaction. Specifically, Cover describes 
how the use of social networking profiles – including information pages, taste selections and 
biographies – serves as a tool for performing, developing and stabilising identity to achieve 
coherence, intelligibility and recognition. He also emphasises the importance of performative 
enactment in interaction, highlighting why communication is key to elements such as wall posts, 
tagging and commentary in order to describe ‘how identity is reconfigured within a network 
morphology’ (Cover 2012, 177). 
 
While Cover describes the expressive possibilities afforded by social media, others emphasise 
how mobile technologies and the Internet can act to enforce specific behaviours and circumscribe 
particular actions. Licoppe (2012) describes how technologies such as electronic notifications can 
‘demand’ the performative enactment of particular identities. He gives the example of a telephone 
ring tone, which results in a ‘crisis of the summons’ emerging from the technological mediation 
of the tension between the desire for interaction on the one hand and the desire for privacy on the 
other. The event of the summons is one that is distinctly ‘material’ and he notes the ‘hybrid 
network of humans and artefacts bound by conventions and “translations”’ (Licoppe 2012, 1089). 
Importantly, Licoppe’s framework illustrates how a material performative framework is able to 
counter the limitations of a purely linguistic approach to discourse and performativity, that ‘such 
events are treated as performative even though they are not strictly linguistic’ (Licoppe 2012, 
1089).  
 
Doron’s (2012) account of mobile technology use among low-income users in India also employs 
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a Foucauldian and Butlerian perspective to counter the narrative of new technologies as inherently 
empowering. Doron draws on the Foucauldian notion of ‘technologies of the self’ to describe how 
the mobile phone is understood as a threat to the household because it destabilises traditional 
authority and social roles by challenging the household division of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. He 
draws on this conception of the mobile phone as a technology through which identity can be 
enacted to show how it is used to perpetuate established subject positions, such as a women 
reinforcing control over her daughter-in-law by replacing a parental visit with a phone call. Doron 
concludes that studying technologies such as the mobile phone provides insight into notions of 
identity by highlighting various aspects such as age, class, caste, gender and place. He notes that 
these are ‘influencing everyday practices and destabilising social structures’ and through them 
can be revealed ‘the dilemmas and anxieties arising from the tensions between the promises and 
challenges of modernity’ (Doron 2012, 431). 
 
The following section outlines two theories in the literature that ‘move away from focusing on 
how technologies influence humans, to examining how materiality is intrinsic to everyday 
activities and relations’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 455). The section outlines ANT and agential 
realism as theoretical frameworks that reflect this line of enquiry. This is followed by an outline 
of how the concept of affordances is formulated in light of this reworking of the relationship 
between humans and technologies. The section concludes by showing how these literatures have 
been applied in the research and analysis of communication technologies.  
 
3.2.2 Agential Realism 
The theory of agential realism and its associated conceptual toolbox, although drawn on by 
Vasquez (2010) in his materialist theory of religion, is less well known in the media and 
communications field, but is the subject of growing attention in IS (Leonardi 2013; Mutch 2013; 
S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2013). The theory was developed by feminist theorist Barad who 
draws on her training as a theoretical physicist to integrate theories of matter with social theory. 
The theory is based on a similar ontology to ANT, in that it collapses the distinction between the 
social and material and, instead, describes reality as the ‘entanglement of matter and meaning’ 
that is enacted through practice within specific phenomena (Barad 2007).  
 
As Orlikowski and Scott (2014) describe, this means that, rather than a separate bounded entity, 
the primary ontological unit is the phenomenon, thus resolving the Cartesian subject–object split. 
Rather than the interaction of two objects, Barad proposes the neologism ‘intra-action’, arguing 
that ‘Individuals do not pre-exist their interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as part 
of their entangled intra-relating’ (Barad 2007, ix). This emphasis on intra-action also highlights 
the importance of understanding how lines of difference are enacted to cut through processes of 
 62 
intra-action. In other words, the constantly entangled nature of things achieves definition through 
cuts made by the kinds of relations between entities. The following sections outline three aspects 
of Barad’s work that are important for this project: her idea of performativity, apparatus and 
diffraction.  
 
Technology as Performative 
Barad’s concept of performativity is a materialist account of how certain lines of differences come 
to be (Barad 2003). It is distinct from Goffman (1959) and Butler’s (1993) account of 
performativity because it expands this to include material actors in processes of enactment. One 
of the implications of this is to expand the realm of actors that possess agency. Indeed, for Barad, 
everything possesses agency, as one can only distinguish between human and material agencies 
if one assumes the existence of qualities prior to their interaction – a notion the concept of intra-
action rejects.  
 
Agency for Barad is thus enacted inter-subjectively rather than being located in technology or in 
humans as argued by technological or social determinists. In her words, ‘Agency is a matter of 
intra-acting, that is, agency is an enactment, it is not something someone has’ (Barad 1996, 182). 
In this way, social practice and the categories through which practice is understood, such as 
identities, are ‘performatively enacted’. The equal weighting granted to the human and material 
in the intra-action of agencies in Barad’s theory reflects a significant departure from the discursive 
nature of Butler’s conception of performative enactment.  
 
Like Butler, Barad challenges the representationalism that accompanies descriptions of pre-
existing entities, rejecting ‘the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent pre-
existing things’ and ‘shifts the focus from questions of correspondence between descriptions and 
reality (e.g., do they mirror nature or culture?) to matters of practices/doings/actions’ (Barad 2003, 
802). However, unlike Butler’s account of the material as passive recipients of enacted 
inscription, the material is understood as ‘a doing, a congealing of agency. Matter is a stabilising 
and destabilising process of iterative intra-activity’ (Barad 2003, 822). In Butler’s account of 
performative enactment, matter plays as important a role as language in the constitutive formation 
of phenomena, including the subject positions that constitute identity.  
 
Technology as Apparatus of Diffraction 
Conceptualising technologies as apparatus allows an acknowledgement of their active role in 
producing phenomena and as active agents in diffracting change. That is, the apparatus through 
which scientific facts are ‘discovered’ are directly implicated in the production, rather than 
discovery, of the facts. The concept of apparatus as entities that produce phenomena reflects 
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Foucault’s notion of the ‘dispositif’ (1979), which describes the network of relations through 
which what can be said, what is taken for granted and what is real is established. The dispositif is 
the ‘various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures, 
which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body’ (O’Farrell 2005, 129). 
While Foucault’s account of the dispositif is largely discursive, Butler’s notion of apparatus 
explicitly addresses the ‘relationship between discursive practices and material phenomena’ 
(Barad 2007, 73). In other words, Barad’s notion of apparatus expands Foucault’s notion of 
dispositif beyond the discursive to incorporate the material.  
 
Apparatus are not just entities that generate phenomena but are, like Silverstone’s (1994) notion 
of ‘double articulated’ media, both a method and an object of study. As Barad puts it, ‘diffraction 
phenomena will be an object of investigation and at other times it will serve as an apparatus of 
investigation’ (Barad 2007, 73). They can be both objects of enquiry in their own right as well as 
tools of scientific discovery. This is particularly evident in the account Barad gives of the ‘light 
slit’ apparatus through which the wave-particle duality of light is revealed. It is instructive to 
quote her description of the two-slit experiment:  
‘This result is nothing less than astonishing. What this experiment tells us is that 
whether or not an entity goes through the apparatus as a wave or a particle can 
be determined after it has already gone through the apparatus, that is, after it has 
already gone through as either a wave (through both slits at once) or a particle 
(through one slit or the other)! In other words, it is not merely that the past 
behaviour of some given entity has been changed, as it were, but that the entities’ 
very identity has been changed! Its past identity, its ontology, is never fixed, it is 
always open to future reworkings!’ (Barad 2010, 260). 
 
Technologies can thus be transformative of identity and fundamental of ontology as well as 
providing insight into phenomena. Approaching technologies as apparatus reveals how specific 
entanglements of matter and meaning, of technologies and discursive formations, can enact 
particular (re)-configurations of intra-acting agencies.  
 
Technology as Diffraction 
As apparatus of diffraction, technologies are understood to play an active role in change. 
Diffraction is Barad’s term for phenomena that make differences evident or, as she argues, ‘a 
material-discursive phenomena that makes the effects of different differences evident’ (Barad 
2007, 88). Barad draws on feminist technology theorist Haraway’s idea of diffraction, quoting:  
‘Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions 
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do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form’ (1997, 273). In other words, 
diffractions are ways of describing change without relying singular causal entities with specific, 
deterministic qualities. The principle of diffraction is rooted in the phenomenon revealed in the 
‘two-slit experiment’, which demonstrates that light can be simultaneously a particle and a wave 
(the phenomenon at the heart of quantum mechanics).  
 
The value of diffraction as a way of understanding change is that it allows matter a proper place 
in reconfiguring performative enactments and thus processes of change (Barad 2007); it 
accommodates multiple differences to be diffracted through the use of apparatus. In other words, 
theorising the implications of Facebook for the performative enactment of subject positions 
allows for multiple enactments, and thus in principle the simultaneous existence of change and 
continuity, of liberation and tradition. Thus, in this research, Facebook is considered a diffraction 
apparatus through which the effect and implication of the entanglement of different conceptions 
of identity are revealed. Facebook is analysed as an apparatus in which different conceptions of 
identity intra-act and are diffracted in the enactment of identity through use of the site. The ways 
in which identity is diffracted through Facebook will reveal the implications of entangling 
different approaches to being in the world. 
 
3.2.3 Technology, Domestication and Affordance 
The sociomaterial perspectives of Barad’s performativity are high-level theories that describe the 
ontological foundations of phenomena and can be challenging to apply (Mutch 2013; Leonardi 
2013). To mitigate this, we draw on the mid-level theory of affordances to bridge the theoretical 
gap between abstract theory and technology in use. Although the theory of affordances has its 
roots in different ontological traditions, its alignment with a non-dualist sociomaterial ontology 
is demonstrated below.  
 
In the study of technology, the concept of affordances describes how the interaction of 
technological features and user characteristics shapes user practices. It was developed by 
ecological psychologist Gibson (1977) to describe all the action possibilities in a particular 
environment, independent of individuals but dependent on their capability to be realised. This 
emphasis on the environment or artefacts was countered by human–computer interaction designer 
Norman (1990) to focus only on the action possibilities perceived by users. This shift emphasised 
not all the possibilities for action, but rather those perceived by users, based on their own physical 
and cognitive capabilities.  
 
This relational, rather than intrinsic, formulation of affordance reflects the turn towards the user 
in media studies. It was further developed by Gaver (1991), who describes false, hidden and 
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perceptible affordances as a way to bridge the intrinsic and subjective account of the relationship 
between technological design and use. This bridging effort is explicitly addressed by sociologist 
Hutchby (2001), whose notion of affordances aims to reconcile ‘the view that worldly objects 
have inherent properties that act as constraints on observational accounts’ and constructivism, 
‘the view that the very “reality” of objects is itself an outcome of discursive practices in relation 
to the object’ (Hutchby 2001, 443). Thus, Hutchby describes affordances as ‘functional and 
relational aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities for agentic action in 
relation to an object’ (Hutchby 2001, 444). 
 
Although the concept of affordances has been hugely significant in the study of technology in 
multiple disciplines, it has historically struggled to support new analytic insights. Sociologist of 
technology Ling (2004) notes that the use of affordances in many studies of technology has often 
seemed more descriptive than analytical, focusing on the features of technology and less on users 
and their social context. IS theorists Azad and Faraj (2012), for example, argue that many 
applications have struggled to deploy the concept such that it offers ‘a qualitatively different 
representation than a product/features in use’.  
 
 
3.2.4 Theorising Facebooks Affordances for Subject Enactment  
A sociomaterial theorisation of social media affordances for the enactment of identity 
must consider the kind of subject that is embodied in the design of social media 
technologies. In other words, to understand the ways in which the use of Facebook 
shapes the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan requires an understanding of the 
kinds of enactment that Facebook, as a sociomaterial apparatus, affords. To this end, 
this section describes three forms of subject afforded by Facebook: the singular and 
authentic subject, the archival subject and the subject of value.  
 
Facebook constitutes a ‘singular, authentic’ subject by stipulating in its terms of service that users 
must use their real name, through statements by company representatives and official 
documentation. Haimson and Hoffmann (2016) analyse the rhetoric and design of Facebook and 
show that the site affords and demands a particular form of ‘singular authentic’ identity, which 
reflects specific, Western conceptions of identity while marginalising others. For example, the 
site’s policies and design emphasise the use of real names as ‘authentic’ names and do not allow 
unusual names, such as those with unusual combinations of numbers, capital letters or multiple 
words (such as Native American names). The discourse of singular authenticity is justified by 
framing anonymity as a security threat, thus also marginalising those who might find value or 
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safety in privacy, such as transgender people or victims of abuse (Haimson and Hoffmann 2016, 
7). The authors conclude that Facebook’s emphasis on and affordances for authenticity are 
paradoxical because the demand for authenticity forces those for whom authentic identities are 
problematic to be inauthentic. As Haimson and Hoffmann conclude, ‘On Facebook, users are 
asked to present themselves authentically, but for some this requires modifying their “authentic 
self” to fit the demands of Facebook’s real name policies and restrictions’ (Haimson and 
Hoffmann 2016, 7).  
 
Facebook also affords an ‘archival subject’ through its automatic ordering of a user’s activity into 
a curated timeline. Facebook’s timeline reflects a belief in the world that being transparent and 
sharing more makes the world a better place. As Zuckerberg puts it: ‘People sharing more – even 
if just with their close friends or families – creates a more open culture and leads to a better 
understanding of the lives and perspectives of others’ (Facebook 2012, 67–70). Facebook’s 
timeline is constructed through a selection of the items that are posted, shared or otherwise 
interacted with by the user. Thus, the newsfeed, and by extension the timeline, exists ‘along a sort 
of spatial axis’ (Mitchell 2014). Importantly though, only a limited amount of the information that 
Facebook tracks is selected for inclusion on a user’s archival timeline, as Facebook selects items 
that its algorithms determine to be most relevant or important to the user. Although users can 
select to view further information on their activity log, even this is a small selection of the 
information Facebook holds about a user.  
 
The significance of this is that Facebook plays an active role in the construction of the archival 
subject that is built on a user’s timeline and is the visible identity of the user. Facebook’s timeline 
affords a browseable archive of the user, creating narrative coherence based on an automatic 
ordering of the items that users post and share. Facebook’s subject is thus a transparent, archival 
self. This sense of a transparent, archival subject reflects a particular view of the individual as a 
single, enduring entity that connects to other single entities. As such, Mitchell concludes, it is a 
version of ‘the classical liberal, economic subject, atomistic, rational, and self-interested’ 
(Mitchell 2014). One of the consequences of this is to fix the subject as a static, or at least 
accountable, entity, as past activity can be turned to in the present. For the archival subject 
afforded by Facebook, the past is always in the present and users are always accountable for their 
past.  
 
In addition to the subject as singular, authentic and archival, Facebook affords the enactment of 
the ‘subject of value’. This recognises the aspects in which Facebook structures a user and his or 
her experience according to metrics of value. Skeggs and Yuill (2016) explore how Facebook, as 
a business, consolidates users as data points to constitute subjects of value that are then sold to 
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advertisers. They describe how Facebook encourages sharing as much authentic information as 
possible, and carefully selects the content to which individuals are exposed to stimulate further 
sharing. In constructing users as ‘subjects of value’, Facebook influences ‘how your network is 
shaped over time, shapes how you interact – with whom, when, how’ (Skeggs and Yuill 2016, 
383). They show how the algorithms that select the content that appears in a user’s newsfeed 
respond to the nature of the user, with more active engagement and structuring of content for more 
active, ‘high-value’ users. Thus, Facebook rewards subjects of value with greater amounts of new 
information, more regularly updated newsfeeds and further opportunities for interaction. These 
processes of algorithmic newsfeed manipulation therefore affect what content – what issues, 
causes, people and politics – people are exposed to, and thus the online social life that users 
experience on Facebook.  
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework Summary 
This section summarises the theoretical framework built out of the conceptual scaffolding of the 
preceding chapters. The theoretical framework includes conceptualisations of identity and 
technology that are ontologically congruent and theoretically robust alternatives to the essentialist 
accounts of the liberal, sovereign subject and deterministic accounts of technology.  
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
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Religious identity is conceptualised as the performative enactment (Butler, 1990) of the 
discourses that are hegemonic in the context of the user, and are always both discursive and 
material. ICTs are conceptualised as sociomaterial entanglements of matter and meaning (Barad, 
2007), with particular material discourses that structure specific formations of the subject.  
 
Reading the theoretical framework in diagram form clarifies the structure and process through 
which it explains how Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan. 
Hegemonic discourses such as Pakistan’s religious nationalism are understood to be constituted 
through the operation of power and to be always contingent, contested and fragmentary (Asad, 
1993, 2003). These multiple, competing discourses produce subject positions (Butler, 1990) such 
as religious identity, which in Pakistan is characterised by a Deobandi form of Sunni Islam that 
‘others’ Shia, Ahmadis and other religious groups (Metcalf, 2002; Iqtidar, 2012). Individuals, 
desiring recognition as authentic, legitimate subjects (Butle, 1990), attempt to enact these subject 
positions through everyday practices, including the use of material and technological artefacts 
(Vasquez, 2010). These material artefacts are themselves constituted by discourses that shape their 
design and use. Facebook’s design is shaped by Zuckerbergs discourse of singular authenticity 
and the platform affords the enactment of a singular, authentic and archival subject of value 
(Haimson and Hoffman, 2016; Mitchell, 2014; Skeggs and Yuill, 2016). 
 
The performative enactment of religious identity through Facebook’s affordances is diffracted 
(Barad, 2007) through the intra-action of artefact and subject from which emerge multiple patterns 
of practice; these include practices that conform to the dominant, hegemonic discourse while other 
transgressive practices ‘trouble’ the hegemonic discourse and present new possibilities. In other 
words, enacting religious and gender identity through the interaction between Facebook and its 
users in Pakistan yields multiple practices, which constitute identities that constantly try to 
conform to – but are always at risk of transgressing against – what is considered acceptable and 
‘correct’. 
 
Although the diagram appears circular, the discourse–subject interaction is not one of iterative, 
linear circularity, as in the subject–structure relationship of structuration. Rather, the discourse–
subject relationship is one of constant emergence. In other words, people are constantly enacting 
and ‘emerging’ rather than constantly trying out what works, reflecting and recalibrating, as that 
reintroduces the black box of reflexivity.  
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4. Methodological Framework 
This chapter presents the ontology, epistemology, research design and methods used to explore 
the relationship between the use of Facebook and the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan. 
To do so, I first present the ontological perspective of agential realism adopted by this thesis, and 
situate it within the positivist and interpretivist perspectives. I then present the mixed methods 
approach and sequential explanatory research design as a strategy to collect and analyse data in 
order to answer the research question. I then introduce the three research locations, namely 
Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. This is followed by a description of the research 
methods, namely a survey followed by focus groups, interviews and document collection, and an 
account of the challenges involved in the conduct of fieldwork and data collection. This is 
followed by a description of the analytical strategy, followed by the considerations of the 
researchers own position and the ethics of research. The chapter concludes with a restatement of 
the research objectives, scholarly contribution and limitations of the research.  
 
4.1   Philosophical Standpoint: Agential Realism 
This thesis adopts an agential realist perspective that informs the research methodology and 
design. Chapter Two highlighted the issues associated with the assumptions in the development 
and ICTD literatures that technologies are self-contained entities and hold inherent, causal 
properties and identities as independent, sovereign and rational actors. It was argued that this 
positivist account leads to problematic assumptions about the relationship between the two, 
assumptions that when unpacked can be found to have roots in problematic theorisations of social 
change as modernization and concepts such as modernity.  
 
Positivist or realist accounts rest on an ontology that assumes there is an objective, knowable 
physical and social world. It assumes that this world exists separately from what is known about 
it by human beings and that it can be known about through sufficiently objective research 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Creswell 2014). As such, sufficiently objective and impartial 
research can reveal insights that form the basis of theories that transcend time and context. 
However, positivist accounts are critiqued for distinguishing between facts and beliefs and a 
reductionism (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) and a dualistic ontology that artificially separates 
subjects from objects, man from nature (Barad 1996, 2007). This positivist approach dominates 
the quantitative economics research tradition that characterizes much of the research on the 
relationship between technology and economic growth in the development literature.  
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By contrast, interpretivist or constructivist perspectives assume an ontology in which there is no 
world external to that created by human beings. Thus interpretivist studies focus on ‘subjective 
meanings and social-political as well as symbolic action in the process through which humans 
construct and reconstruct their reality’ (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, 13). This hermeneutic 
approach thus emphasizes a focus on the interpretation of texts, in which texts are all manner of 
language, practices and technologies (Crotty 1998). Interpretivists also reject the positivist notion 
of cause and effect in favour of subject descriptions, leading some interpretivists to argue that it 
is ‘naïve’ to believe it is possible for researchers to theorise using technologies for ‘potential 
impact’ through ‘informing correct choices of action’ (Avgerou, Ciborra, and Land 2004, 4). 
Instead of universal claims, interpretivists thus emphasise a focus on context. This emphasis on 
interpretation and context forms the object of criticism as it leaves researchers in a relativist 
position that some describe as a ‘paralysing ‘anything goes’ attitude’ (Avgerou 2002, 65). In the 
information systems field the focusing on the social at the expense of the material has been 
critiqued for failing to theorise the technological artefact (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001).  
 
A critical perspective addresses the relativist position by acknowledging the historical and 
political forces in play in a specific context (Crotty 1998). Informed by the Marxist thought and 
critics of development (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994), a critical perspective is attendant to the 
forces the inhibit and control with a view towards addressing oppression and exploitation. As 
Crotty puts it, the difference between the interpretivist and critical perspectives is the ‘contrast 
between a research that seeks merely to understand and a research that challenges... between a 
research that reads the situation in terms of interaction and community and a research that reads 
it in terms of conflict and oppression... between a research that accepts the status quo and a 
research that seeks to bring about change’ (Crotty 1998, 113). Critical perspectives are of course 
limited by the perspective and interpretation of the researcher, who if insufficiently reflexive of 
their norms can introduce their interpretation of oppression and liberation (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi 1991), a characteristic that critics make of Western notions of development as ‘liberation’ 
(Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994).  
 
A sociomaterial perspective offers a way of resolving the polar positions of positivism and 
interpretivism. It suggests that ontologically there is a material world but that epistemologically 
our knowledge of it is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather than representational (Barad 
2003, 2007). Although the sociomaterial perspective has a number of forms (Orlikowski and Scott 
2008; S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014), this thesis follows Orlikowski and Scott’s adoption of a 
relational ontology. A relational ontology assumes that ‘relations are more fundamental than 
entities’ and that entities are ‘not first self-contained entities and then interactive. Each thing, 
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including each person, is first and always a nexus of relations’ (Slife, 2004:159 in S. Scott and 
Orlikowski 2014). Relations exist and are constituted through enactment and practices, with 
practices understood as ‘recurrent, situated activities informed by shared meanings’ (S. Scott and 
Orlikowski 2014, 10). As discussed in the theoretical framework, these practices are understood 
as performative enactments which become durable through repetition. Importantly, the relational 
ontology responds to the interpretivist’s emphasis on the social by considering the relation 
between social and material entities as together constituting specific phenomena. For Barad then, 
'reality is composed not of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but of things-in-
phenomena. The world is a dynamic process of intra-activity' (Barad 2007, 140). Thus agential 
realism rejects the objectivism of realism, but does not renounce objectivity, transforming it from 
a measure of an external reality to instead a particular act of measurement under specific 
conditions. It also rejects the pure subjectivity of constructivism, replacing the argument that there 
is no reality independent of cognition with the case that observing subjects are part of the reality 
they observe. 
 
A final note on the issue of criticality in social material perspectives. Sociomaterial perspectives 
have been charged, like interpretivist perspectives, with being descriptive, relativist and lacking 
the resources to make moral or political judgements (Winner 1993; Whittle and Spicer 2008). The 
response to this, and the position taken by this thesis, is that before one can take a moral position 
one must first understand the understand the network. As Latour notes, ‘In order to make a 
diagnosis or a decision about the absurdity, the danger, the immorality, or the unrealism of an 
innovation, one must first describe the network’ (Latour 1991, 130).  
4.2 Research Design and Strategy   
This research adopts a sequential explanatory mixed methods design (Creswell et al. 2003; 
Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006, 11) that consists of two distinct phases of data collection, 
namely a quantitative survey followed by interviews, focus groups and document collection (see 
Figure 1). The sequential explanatory design was selected because it supports identification of 
both the types of participants to be purposefully selected for the qualitative research and also the 
types of questions and areas of investigation. In other words, the qualitative data explains the 
quantitative results. This allows the identification of mobile phone and social media usage 
patterns as they relate to religious identity and attitudes, relationships that can be explained 
through the qualitative research.  
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To respond to the research question a multiple case study research strategy was adopted (Gerring 
2004; Yin 2003). Mobile data users from three locations were selected, specifically people who 
had used mobile data within the last month in Mandi Bahauddin, Gujrat and Gujranwala.  
 
The priority in this research design is on the qualitative research because this reflects the most 
substantial data collection and analysis, focusing on in-depth explanation of sixteen maximal 
variation cases. The role of qualitative methods in this project is thus more profound than the 
quantitative methods, as within subtle realist approaches such methods are 'epistemologically 
valid' (Tsoukas 1989, 556) and 'more capable of describing a phenomenon, constructing 
propositions and identifying structures and interactions between complex mechanisms' 
Follow up with:  
Quantitative Data Collection: 
- Survey Data Collection 
- Survey Data Analysis 
- Outcome: social media patterns, demographics, participants 
- Timeframe: May – August 2014 
Analysis: 
- Inductive, iterative analysis of Qual Data 1 + Qual Data 2 
- Timeframe: May – July 2015; November 2015 – June 2016 
Inductive Formative Research Phase 
 
- unstructured interviews (Karachi, field sites), pilot and iteration of survey 
- Outcome: research agenda, themes, questions 
- Timeframe: March – May 2014 
Qualitative Data Collection: 
Qualitative Data 1: 
- Data collection: interviews, Focus Groups, Observation 
Qualitative Data 2: 
- Data collection: newspaper articles, analysis of Millatfacebook 
Timeframe: September 2014 – May 2015; August 2015 – September 2015 
Iterative 
Iterative 
Figure 2 Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods Design (adapted Creswell, 2013 
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(Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett 2013, 863). The smaller quantitative component is the first in the 
sequence and employed to illustrate who the users are and their experiences. 
 
The implementation strategy that was adopted was to conduct a telephone survey first to identity 
patterns followed by qualitative data to explain those patterns and explore further the practice 
enacting religious identity through Facebook.  The purpose of the survey was to identify patterns 
of mobile phone and social media use patterns linked to various demographic user data, and also 
identify respondents for further qualitative research. The subsequent qualitative phase consisted 
of two concurrent components. The first component is a discursive analytical approach based on 
the collection of textual data from newspaper accounts that describe the banning of Facebook in 
May 2010 for hosting blasphemous cartoons related to the Everybody Draw Muhammad Day 
event. This component forms the basis for an account in Chapter Six of the hegemonic discourses 
that constitute both religious identity and Facebook in Pakistan. The second component was a 
multiple case study approach that collected data through individual interviews and participant 
observation notes of mobile internet usage. This second component forms the body of empirical 
data in Chapter Seven and Eight the analysis of which contributes to explaining the relationship 
between the enactment of religious identity and Facebook.  
 
The quantitative and qualitative methods are integrated at two points. Firstly, as part of the 
implementation strategy the findings helped to produce interview guides and also were intended 
to select participants for case study research – though this was less successful in practice than had 
been anticipated, as is outlined in more detail below. The second point of integration was at the 
end of data collection when the findings from the survey formed part of the analysis and 
discussion of research findings. 
 
Finally, the case selection describes the individuals selected from the survey to be part of ongoing, 
in-depth qualitative research. The initial plan was to recruit sixteen young mobile internet and 
social media users to establish a balanced mix of users according to gender and religious identity. 
This plan was less successful in practice as few people were willing to be interviewed after the 
survey. This is explained further below. 
 
 
Data Collection Process 
The field work consisted of eighteen months in three phases conducted between March 2014 and 
September 2015. This included a first phase between March 2014 and August 2014 in which the 
survey was conducted; a second phase between September 2014 and May 2015 in which field 
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research was conducted in Mandibahudin, Gujrat and Gujranwala followed two months of 
reflection and a third phase between August 2015 and September 2015.  
 
The first phase began in March 2014 and included an initial field visit to Karachi, which resulted 
relocating the field site to the Punjab due to security concerns. This was followed by a period of 
negotiation with a mobile operator to obtain its support for a telephone survey conducted through 
their database. This was followed by the design, piloting and implementation of the survey and 
subsequent initial analysis. The results of the analysis and limited respondent identification 
necessitated a visit to the Ahmadi headquarters in London in August 2014 followed by a visit to 
their Pakistan headquarters in Rabwa in order to obtain support in facilitating interviews with 
Ahmadi social media users.  
 
The second phase between September 2015 and May 2015 saw the qualitative field work begin 
in earnest, with focus groups and interviews conducted every week in Gujrat, Gujranwala and 
Mandibahudin, followed by a week of reflection and planning for the next field visit. Further 
fieldwork in June 2015 was prevented by a heatwave made respondents hard to access and 
research difficult to conduct. This led to two months of reflection and initial analysis.  
 
The third and final phase was two months of intense fieldwork between August and September 
2015. This involved focus groups and interviews in Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandibahudin, 
motivated in party by the questions, themes and gaps identified in the reflection and initial 
analysis. For example, the initial analysis of the survey and interview data highlighted the 
significance of gender in social media usage practices, and led to a focus on interviewing female 
respondents.   
 
Table 1 Respondents by location, gender & sect 
 Mandi 
Bahudin 
Gujrat Gujranwala Other 
locations  
Total:  
Total:  44 32 20 11 107 
Male  30 27 12 9 81 
Female 14 5 8 2 29 
      
Sunni 19 16 12 5 52 
Shia 10 11 5 4 30 
Ahmadi  7 2 3 2 13 
 75 
No Sect/Not 
asked 
8 3   11 
Total:  44 32 20 11 107 
 
 
The individuals and locations were selected on the basis of a combination of pragmatic and 
theoretical reasons. Pragmatically, the individuals were users of a mobile operator that had agreed 
to facilitate the conduct of a survey, thus enabling initial access to research respondents who it 
was known used mobile data. Furthermore, limiting the selection of subjects to the three locations 
limited travel time between research locations and made the fieldwork manageable. Theoretically, 
limiting the survey to users from the three locations strengthened diversity between cases in terms 
of mobile data penetration and adoption, demographics and urban development (as a marker of 
modernisation). This allowed the study of the use of Facebook and enactment of religious identity 
in three similar yet diverse locations.  
 
A multiple case study strategy was selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, one of the values of 
case study research is the ability to generate new knowledge and theory, and thus whilst not 
statistically generalizable may be analytically generalizable (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Yin 2003; 
Flyvbjerg 2011). Thus the purpose of the case study research is not to establish the frequency or 
prevalence of phenomena, such as particular mobile internet practices that relate to religious 
identity formation, but rather the mechanisms by which it is brought into being, sustained or 
changed (Yin 2003). As Flyvbjerg states, ‘social science may be strengthened by the execution of 
a greater number of good case studies’ (Flyvbjerg 2011, 316). Given the still developing nature 
of the technology, there are only a few studies of the relationship between Facebook and religious 
identity, and none of the relationship between Facebook and religious identity in Pakistan, thus 
strengthening the case for case study approach.  
 
4.3 Research Location  
This section outlines the rationale for the selection of Gujranwala, Gujrat, and Mandi Bahauddin 
as the three research locations (field sites) and presents a brief description of each. The location 
for this research could arguably have been anywhere in Pakistan with mobile signal coverage, as 
the use of mobile phones to access the internet and social media was growing rapidly. Indeed, the 
strategy of conducting the telephone survey through the mobile phone operator meant that an 
absolutely random selection could have been possible. Although random selection could have 
contributed to generalizability (Creswell 2014), this research is focused on exploring the nature 
of the relationship, not proving the universality of insights gathered. Furthermore, at a more 
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pragmatic level, a truly random selection through the mobile network operator would have led to 
a selection of respondents located across the country, presenting a logistic challenge for 
subsequent qualitative research. A selection had to be made, and criteria for the selection 
developed. The criteria that informed the selection was informed by the phenomena of the 
relationship between religious identity and mobile internet use and the use of 3G mobile internet.  
 
Gujranwala was selected as a primary research location because it met the two criteria in specific 
ways. It had been the location of the 2010 attack against Ahmadis linked to the posting of 
blasphemous content on Facebook, and it was part of the first wave of locations where 3G internet 
services were rolled out. A second location was also identified in order to explore the adoption of 
mobile internet services in a smaller urban location. In consultation with a mobile network 
operator, the location of Mandi Bahauddin was selected because it was the smallest urban area 
where 3G networks were being rolled out. The third location of Gujarat was selected in order to 
avoid a polarized comparison between two poles and thus expand the diversity of data of gathered. 
The detail of these locations in terms of location, population and internet access is outlined in 
Chapter Seven where the results from the survey are presented.  
 
Figure 3: Map of Research Locations 
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4.4  Data Collection  
This project adopts a mixed methods approach to data collection (Creswell 2014; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 2003; Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013). Venkatesh et al. argue that a mixed methods 
approach is particularly appropriate when exploring 'a phenomenon for which extant research is 
fragmented, inconclusive, and equivocal (Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013, 36). The mix of 
quantitative and qualitative methods in a mixed methods approach is often adopted for its ability 
to bridge the positivist and constructivist ontological positions. As such, Venkatesh et al 
(Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013) note that mixed methods approaches are suitable for use by 
studies that take subtle realist perspectives, while Zachariadis et al (2013) emphasise that 
quantitative correlations alone are unable to uncover the causal mechanisms of the phenomena at 
hand (Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett 2013, 862).  
 
The data collection methods included, in sequential order, surveys; focus groups, semi-structured 
interviews and observation; document collection.6 The survey targeted seven hundred and fifty 
respondents from the three locations to explore patterns of mobile phone use; patterns of social 
media use; experiences of social media use; and demographic information including age, gender, 
religious identity. The focus groups and semi-structured interviews interviewed a total of one 
hundred and seven individuals in the three locations exploring the experience of using social 
media and specifically Facebook in relation to the enactment and practices of religious identity 
(See Table 1 Interview Guide). The interviews and focus groups lasted between 15 minutes and 
one and a half hours. The document collection involved the identification of one hundred and 
seventy-eight news articles, editorials, opinion pieces and letters to the newspaper. 
 
Table 2 Interview Guide 
Interview Guide:   
1. Introduction – research context, purpose, consent, rights, process. Who I am. 
2. Introductions – interviewee introduction  
3. Mobile use: explore mobile internet usage: where, how long, devices 
4. Social media usage: explore which sites, why – especially Facebook 
 
Facebook usage:  
5. Explore Facebook usage: where, how often, what for 
6. Explore social network: friends (how many, who, closest); chatting 
7. Explore interaction: status updating, share, comments, liking 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1 for full details of methods, data collection challenges and the process of data analysis, 
and Appendix II for a full list of interviews carried out for this research, and documents collected.  
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8. Explore consumption: Newsfeed, updates, groups, pages 
9. Explore personal expression: feelings, emotion, boundaries of expression 
10. Explore context management: different parts of life (family, friends etc.)  
11. Explore audiences: imagined audience, expectations 
12. Explore controversies: politics, religion, personal 
13. Probe on fake / multiple accounts, sectarianism,  
14. Explore religion: what content, practices, importance, debates? 
15. Is there anything else you want to tell me? 
 
 
The interviews, focus groups and observation notes provided empirical accounts of the 
relationship between the use of Facebook and the practices of performatively enacting religious 
identity. Remember though that identity, including religious identity, was conceptualised as 
subject positions in discourse, and that technologies were conceptualised as sociomaterial entities, 
assemblages of matter and meaning. Data about the construction of Facebook in discourses of 
religious identity is thus collected in the second qualitative component in the form of newspaper 
accounts of the banning of Facebook in 2010 and documentation of the design of Millatfacebook.  
 
Table 3 Linking Conceptual Framework to Interview Questions 
Conceptual Framework Questions 
Hegemonic discourse  
- Trouble   
- Diffraction  
- Repair 
- What can you (not) talk about on social media / Facebook?  
- What are controversial topics on social media / Facebook?  
- What kind of / how much religious content do you see on 
Facebook? 
- What do other people expect you share?  
- What do other people criticise other people for on Facebook? 
- Have you ever been criticised for your Facebook activity?  
 
Enactment of identity  
- Desire 
- Subjects 
- Identities 
 
- How often do you use Facebook? 
- Who are you friends with on Facebook (family, religious, gender)?  
- How would you describe how you use Facebook? 
- Why do you use Facebook, what do you get from it? 
- What things do you like, share, post? 
- What kind of religious content do you share? 
- What kind of religious debate do you have on Facebook?  
- How is religious practice on Facebook different to everyday life? 
 
Apparatus / Facebook:  
Affordances:  
- Authentic, Singular, 
Archival 
- Invisible audiences 
- Context collapse 
- Public / private   
- What do people learn about you from your profile? Is it the ‘real 
you’? 
- Do you share all of yourself? What do you not share, why? 
- What are the implications of only having one account? 
- Do you review your own or other people’s profiles? Why? 
- Who sees your profile / posts / activity? 
- What happens if the wrong person sees it? 
- How do people manage privacy? 
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Data Collection Process 
The field work consisted of eighteen months in three phases conducted between March 2014 and 
September 2015. This included a first phase between March 2014 and August 2014 in which the 
survey was conducted; a second phase between September 2014 and May 2015 in which field 
research was conducted in Mandibahudin, Gujrat and Gujranwala followed two months of 
reflection and a third phase between August 2015 and September 2015.  
 
The first phase began in March 2014 and included an initial field visit to Karachi, which resulted 
relocating the field site to the Punjab due to security concerns. This was followed by a period of 
negotiation with a mobile operator to obtain its support for a telephone survey conducted through 
their database. This was followed by the design, piloting and implementation of the survey and 
subsequent initial analysis. The results of the analysis and limited respondent identification 
necessitated a visit to the Ahmadi headquarters in London in August 2014 followed by a visit to 
their Pakistan headquarters in Rabwa in order to obtain support in facilitating interviews with 
Ahmadi social media users.  
 
The second phase between September 2015 and May 2015 saw the qualitative field work begin 
in earnest, with focus groups and interviews conducted every week in Gujrat, Gujranwala and 
Mandibahudin, followed by a week of reflection and planning for the next field visit. Further 
fieldwork in June 2015 was prevented by a heatwave made respondents hard to access and 
research difficult to conduct. This led to two months of reflection and initial analysis.  
 
The third and final phase was two months of intense fieldwork between August and September 
2015. This involved focus groups and interviews in Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandibahudin, 
motivated in party by the questions, themes and gaps identified in the reflection and initial 
analysis. For example, the initial analysis of the survey and interview data highlighted the 
significance of gender in social media usage practices, and led to a focus on interviewing female 
respondents.   
 
Sampling and Respondents:  
The selection of research respondents derives from the research approach, questions and design 
and plays an important part in research outcomes (Creswell 2014; Flick 2014). The mixed method 
sequential nature of the research design was selected because it allowed both quantitative as well 
as in-depth qualitative research but also because it allowed the identification of research 
respondents through the conduct of the survey.  
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The selection of respondents from the sample of mobile data users was purposive and pragmatic 
(Creswell 2014). The selection of respondents was intended to select a maximal variation 
(Creswell and Clark 2006)  in terms of the central phenomena (Miles and Huberman 1994), with 
maximal variation determined by religious identity, time spent online and attitudes towards 
talking about religious identity online. It was intended to be pragmatic in the acknowledgement 
that there might be a limited variety of respondents who agreed to take part.  
 
In total, thirty respondents agreed to be part of further research, a number that was felt to be 
sufficiently strong to allow for the anticipated number of people who would drop out. In the event 
however, subsequent to initial agreement only five people agreed again to be part of further 
research, with the rest saying they weren’t interested, didn't have time or didn't want their 
telephone number to be shared outside the mobile operator. From those five, only two people 
actually agreed and eventually met. In other words, the survey as a tool to identify respondents 
failed in its purpose. Furthermore, from the completed surveys no respondents had identified as 
Ahmadis. Whilst this was not statistically significant, given the number of Ahmadis in the country, 
it meant that this also had to be addressed.  
 
Instead of purposive sampling, a snowball sample strategy was employed (Flick 2014). This 
snowball approach started out from multiple entry points, including those survey respondents who 
did agree to meet and through research assistants from each of the three research locations. 
Through these entry points we sought out people who used mobile phones to access Facebook, as 
well as people who might have something interesting to say about religion and Facebook. This 
process usually involved a focus group of three to eight people from which individuals were 
purposively selected and requested to participate in further interviews and discussion. Reaching 
Ahmadis was harder, and involved having to contact their headquarters in London who facilitated 
a meeting in Rabwa with their community leader who in turn arranged introductions to their 
district youth leaders in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandibahudin. These three individuals became 
critical entry points as they arranged meetings with both male and female Ahmadis.  Furthermore, 
the snowball strategy was guided by the focus on lower and middle class respondents7, with key 
contacts guided to include those respondents from families headed by those employed in 
professional occupations, service sector or salaried occupations (Durr-e-Nayab 2011), who had at 
least completed college, and who at most owned the home they lived in, but not more than one 
home.  
  
                                                 
7 The discussion of class is a complex one, and of middle class especially so – particularly in terms of it 
as an absolute or relative measure, See Nayab, 2011 for a useful review of the literature and of its 
application to Pakistan. 
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In total, seven hundred and fifty respondents were interviewed through the telephone survey and 
one hundred and seven were interviewed through focus groups and interviews.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Respondents by location, gender & sect 
 Mandi 
Bahauddin 
Gujrat Gujranwala Other locations  Total:  
Male  30 27 12 9 81 
Female 14 5 8 2 29 
      
Sunni 19 16 12 5 52 
Shia 10 11 5 4 30 
Ahmadi  7 2 3 2 13 
No Sect/Not 
asked 
8 3   11 
Total:  44 32 20 11 107 
 
 
 
4.5   Data Coding and Analysis 
 
4.5.1 Quantitative Data Analysis   
In sequential explanatory mixed methods designs, the quantitative data is analysed prior to the 
qualitative data collection, indeed the results of the quantitative informs the direction of enquiry 
(Creswell 2014).  In other words, the findings from the quantitative data inform the kinds of 
questions that are explored in the qualitative data collection. Analysis was conducted using simple 
descriptive statistics to explore responses according to specific demographic categories, with 
particular attention being paid to religious identity, gender and location. 
 
In this case, the analysis of the survey findings was focused on identifying patterns in the 
relationship between mobile internet use and religious identity and practices. In this sense the 
results of the survey help plan who to speak to as well as what themes to explore in more detail.  
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For example, the survey found no respondent who identified as Ahmadi and thus emphasised the 
potential in focusing on exploring how Ahmadis experienced the relationship between social 
media and religious identity.  
 
In addition to informing the questions and demographics that the qualitative research phase would 
explore in greater depth, the quantitative phase was also intended to identify specific individuals 
to participate in the qualitative research. In practice however this proved to be problematic. 
Despite increasing the sample size, only thirty respondents agreed to take part in further research, 
and as the section below on data access outlines, few of these were either actually from the 
research locations or in the event actually willing to meet.  
 
4.5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis   
This research is exploratory and thus the analysis was inductive and iterative, with several rounds 
of turning from the data to the literature and back to the data. This ‘constant comparison’ of the 
emerging data emphasises the contrasting of new, notable observations with previous ones for 
similarities and differences (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:9). The process and practices of data 
analysis are understood to be as much about method as they are about art (Flick 2014) and indeed 
the intra-action between literature, theory, findings and researcher was experienced as an 
entanglement (Barad 2003) from which findings are performatively enacted. For this reason, then 
it is important to be explicit about the process and practice through which analysis is conducted. 
It is also important to note that whilst many studies of social interaction in electronically mediated 
spaces follow a grounded theory approach (Vaast and Walsham, 2013), this research project drew 
on the grounded theory approach but rejected a strict interpretation of the methodology because 
it relies on an existing ‘paradigm model’ of causality (Sarker et al, 2001) that was felt to be at 
odds with the emergent nature of an Agential Realism ontology.  
 
The process of qualitative analysis began in the field and continued on return to London. The 
analysis of the survey findings informed the initial interview and focus group guides, and the 
processes of reflection in the research diary and the step-wise analysis of newspaper accounts laid 
the foundations for identification of emerging themes that were further explored through the 
coding of the interview data. 
 
Analysis of interview data 
The transcriptions of the interviews and focus groups were uploaded to the data analysis software 
NVivo, allowing flexible manipulation of the data. The interviews and focus groups were then 
coded through an iterative process of inductive open coding and deductive theoretical coding 
based on the theoretical framework and motivated by the research goals. As the data was coded, 
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it was analysed and related back to the survey findings, to the theoretical and empirical literature 
to identify themes that helped explain the relationship between Facebook and religious identity. 
 
The transcriptions were analysed individually and then comparatively for common themes, 
understood in narrative analysis as discourses (Taylor and Littleton 2006), that were identified 
through common elements that occur across several interviews as well as at different times within 
a single interview. Within these narratives close attention was paid to accounts of religious 
practices, moments of trouble and themes related to the concepts of liberation and conformity 
discussed in the literature review and theoretical framework.  
 
Analysing narrative from a Butlerian performative perspective (Morison and Macleod 2013; 
Peterson and Langellier 2006) involves exploring how individuals 'position' themselves in 
relation to the discourse, and their accounts of moments of 'trouble', attempts to 'repair' . Analysing 
performativity from a material perspective involved drawing on Barad’s (Barad 2007) notions of 
entanglement, material-discursive practices and performativity, and allowed the move from 
conceptualising phenomena such as religious identity as a social attribute, and instead view it as 
a material doing (S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014, 889). The form of subject that the structure of 
Facebook allows emerged as one of the most significant aspects in this analysis. This points 
towards the practices that make phenomena work (S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2014a, 890) part of 
an acknowledgement of the sociomaterial intra-action of Facebook and religious identity. The 
analysis concluded with accounts of how these practices of subject formation have implications 
for religious identity in Pakistan, as well as for the broader themes of development theory and 
modernity. 
 
Data Coding 
The development of analytic codes built upon the iterative nature of the research process, 
developing a theoretical sensitivity throughout, as recommended in inductive theory building 
approaches such as grounded theory (Straus and Corbin, 1990). This phase also involved the 
identification of theory and approaches that could be drawn on to theorise about the relationship 
between social media and religious identity in Pakistan. Yet as others have noted, this process also 
requires care to avoid becoming ‘captive to any literature’ (Sarket et al, 2001: 42). As such, the 
identification of these theories and approaches helped direct the further research and enquiry, and 
were noted down as tentative ‘selective’ codes to be drawn on in the analytic phase.  
 
Open, axial and selective coding  
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The initial codes were developed through reading of the data in NVIVO and the noting down of 
emergent codes, informed by a combination of the theoretical framework and the insights gained 
from the conduct of the interviews that were noted down in fieldwork diaries.  
 
Table 5 Illustration of Open Coding 
Transcript Interviewee Sample Open Codes (underlined) and  
Notes 
None of my family members 
(were on Facebook) and they said 
don’t accept any Ahmad friend 
request. So I just keep my friends 
in the Facebook and no family 
members in it. They know that I 
do have a Facebook account but 
they also knew at the same time 
that I don’t want any friend or  
family member on Facebook. I 
don’t want to communicate with 
them over there. I would rather 
communicate over WhatsApp or 
simple message.   
 
Saad, 
10/092014 
Male, 
Ahmadi, 
Mandibahudin 
1. Religious identity – silence / 
submission and conformity 
2. Managing different social contexts 
and maintaining separation.  
3. Facebook’s affordances for 
visibility over Whatsapp’s 
affordances for privacy 
4. Facebooks demands for 
authenticity and having to 
separate friendship groups in 
order to conform.  
Because on Facebook my brothers 
have their mostly male friends.  
So personal life gets shared from 
brothers’ timeline to others’. So 
one feels insecure therefore 
WhatsApp, Viber gives a kind of 
homely feel. On Facebook one 
feels insecure and the personal life 
gets leaked. I neither add nor 
answer any unknown person 
because I know it’s positive and 
negative points 
 
Zehra, 
09/03/2015, 
Female, 
Ahmadi, 
Rabwa 
1. Limiting Facebook use because 
design affords visibility and 
exposure to unrelated men.  
2. Choosing to limit interaction in 
order to conform to gender 
expectations. 
3. Choosing WhatsApp because of 
(perceived?) lack of control over 
Facebook privacy. 
4. Maintenance of purdah norms 
through active choosing of 
WhatsApp over Facebook, and 
resulting social constrain.  
 
Table 3 illustrates the process of open coding and how initial codes were developed. The two 
interview excerpts are from two Ahmadi respondents in Mandibahudin and Rabwa respectively. 
Open coding was initially done on a line by line basis, followed by open sampling and open 
coding at the level of transcription section. Over one hundred codes were generated during the 
initial open coding phase (see Table 4). Furthermore, a number of these codes were also linked to 
form axial codes.  
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Table 6 Open Codes List 
3g 
Adoption 
Ahmadi 
Algorithm 
Archival 
Authenticity 
Bid’at 
Browser 
Camera 
Chat 
Class 
Comments 
Connection 
Context 
Controversy 
Debate 
Defence 
Device functions 
Social media types  
Disconnected 
Echo chamber 
Email 
Expressive 
Fake accounts 
Family 
Forced use 
Foreign connection 
Free expression 
Freedom 
Friends group 
Games & entertainment 
 
Gender 
Generational 
Global 
Group minority as majority 
Gujranwala 
Gujrat 
Hidayat 
Home 
Identity 
Internet access 3g & WiFi 
Internet usage bad 
Internet usage good 
Liberation  
Local 
Management Identity  
Mandibahudin 
Methodology 
Money 
Multiple accounts female 
Multiple profiles 
Munāzarā 
Music 
Newsfeed 
Official use 
Parental authority 
Password 
Password parents 
Photos 
Politics 
Posting 
Privacy 
Profile photos 
Purdah 
References 
Relationships 
Religion 
Religious 
Safety & securit 
Sawab 
Sectarian 
Secularism 
Selfies 
Separate friend & family 
Separate male & female 
Shame & Honour 
Sharing 
Shia 
Singular 
Social change 
Submission 
Subversion 
Time using 
Tradition & Modernity 
Trouble 
Trust 
Urban and rural 
Usage affordance 
Passwords 
Religious merit 
Wahhabi 
 
 
The purpose of axial coding is to create links between sub-categories and their related categories. 
For Straus and Corbin this process was structured according to a causal ‘paradigm’ model of a 
chain from causal conditions to consequences (Straus and Corbin, 1990:99). Like Sarker at al 
(2001), the strict process of fitting sub-categories into the paradigm model was both too 
mechanistic in practice, as many sub-categories didn’t fit into one component of the causal chain, 
but the cause-consequence paradigm was also felt to be incompatible with the ‘emergent’ Agential 
Realist ontology. Instead, open codes, categories and sub-categories were linked and grouped 
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together through a process that involved revisiting and refining the open codes, drawing on extant 
knowledge of concepts and theory. These categories formed the basis for subsequent selective 
coding that formed the basis for the theoretical framework and analysis.  
 
The categories that emerged through this process included the following, and formed the basis 
for subsequent selective coding. These categories were established through the linking of sub-
categories created from the open codes and formed the core components of the story that was 
developed through the process of selective coding.  
 
Table 7 Categories developed through axial coding 
- Religious Identity  - Performance  
- Norms  - Context 
- Facebook usage practice 
- Diffraction 
- Digital Secularisation  
- Algorighmic Sectarianism 
- Mobile usage practices 
- Digital Purdah 
- Agency 
- Desiring Subject  
 
Selective coding is a part of the grounded theory approach in which an emerging story is 
developed through the identification of a core category and the linking of other categories to it. 
This is a complex process that involves the careful assessment of emerging themes and extant 
conceptual and theoretical knowledge to allow for a coherent story to emerge.  While Straus and 
Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach to this is through their paradigm model,  following 
Sarker et al (2001),  this research drew on broader , meta-theories to support  the development of 
a coherent narrative. In this research, the meta-theories of Butler and Barad’s theory of 
performativity (Butler, 1990; Barad, 2003). This meta-theory provided the means through which 
an account of the relationship between Facebook use and religious identity in Pakistan was 
developed.                          
 
This provided a helpful framework against which to reference the initial analysis of the 
respondent accounts of enacting religious identity. Comparing and contrasting the accounts by 
Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni highlighted how discourses of religious identity and technological 
discourses of singular authenticity intra-acted to structure and shape the relationship between 
Facebook and specific forms of religious identity. Expanding out beyond specific religious 
identity to explore the intra-action of social media practices and broader discursive formations 
highlighted the implications of these intra-actions for the performative enactment of religious as 
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well as gender identity. Indeed, the significance of gender as an aspect of the relationship between 
Facebook and social practice in Pakistan is one of the significant findings of this thesis.  
 
4.6 Conclusion:  
This research contributes to the existing literature through the presentation of a case study that 
explains the relationship between the use of Facebook and the enactment of religious identity in 
Pakistan. A mixed methods approach using a sequential explanatory research design was selected 
as a way to explain the relationship between practices of Facebook use and the enactment of 
religious identity by young people in three locations in Pakistan’s Punjab province. A survey was 
used to identify patterns of Facebook use, followed by the conduct of interviews, focus groups 
and document collection to explain the patterns and thus how the use of Facebook shapes the 
enactment of religious identity on Facebook. The nature of the approach means that these findings 
are contextually specific and not generalizable beyond the individual instances and phenomena 
that are described and analysed. As Flyvbjerg (2011) indicated, developing a body of case studies 
can contribute to developing insight in social science. It will be for further researchers to identify 
any empirical and theoretical generalisations that can be drawn from this research. It is to a 
contribution of further understanding of how technology and social entities intra-act in the 
processes of the world becoming, and of recognising the importance of how ‘matter matters’ 
(Barad 2007). 
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5. Survey Results: Mobile Usage Practices 
 
This first empirical chapter describes mobile phone and social media usages practices in the three 
field sites. This chapter draws on survey data to describe the results from a telephone survey of 
901 mobile internet users in Gujranwala, Gujrat, and Mandi Bahauddin. The results describe 
mobile device, internet and application usage practices, identifying significant differences in the 
usage practices of people who identify with specific religious categories, as well as between men 
and women. It concludes by exploring the implications of these practices for the normative claims 
that link ICT usage to processes of social change characterised by the liberation of individuals 
from traditional social norms and institutions. 
 
5.1 Mobile Internet in Pakistan 
Fast mobile internet arrived in 2014, years later than planned as a result of internal political 
debates between Pakistan’s bureaucracy and the courts (Symington 2016). Pakistan's Pakistan 
Telecommunications Authority (PTA) conducted an electronic auction on 23rd April in 2014 for 
the licensing of 3G and 4G spectrum, with four of the five incumbent operators - Russian-owned 
Mobilink, Norwegian-owned Telenor, Pakistan Government and United Arab Emirates jointly 
owned Ufone and Chinese owned Zong - winning licenses for the launch of 3G data spectrum 
and only Zong bidding on the 4G license, raising a total of $1.1 billion, significantly below the 
$2 billion (Bhatti 2014, 1) predicted by the Finance Minister Ishaq Dar.  
 
The market leaders, Mobilink with 28% of the market and Telenor with 26% of the market (The 
News International, Pakistan 2014, 1), adopted very different strategies in rolling out new 
telecommunication base stations to provide access to fast data services. Telenor purposefully 
pursued an 'ink-spot' strategy in which they placed one or two towers in as many cities as possible, 
in order to provide a 'taste' of fast mobile internet services, even whilst only a few would be able 
to access the services in each location. Mobilink on the other hand pursued a 'saturation' strategy 
in which they methodically covered target cities with full coverage, aiming to provide a quality 
and uniformity of service. Both companies initially offered free services as part of the network 
testing process and as a strategy to introduce people to the new service.  
 
5.2 The Field Sites 
This section provides a very brief description of the three field sites. It provides a brief description 
in order to present a context for the research, but avoids an in-depth description of each site as the 
focus of the study is the individual respondents who constitute the subject of this project. The 
descriptions are based on a combination of personal observation and sourced data. The description 
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focuses on the size, density, levels of migration and nature of mobile internet access. It focuses 
on these aspects because size and urban density reflect levels of urban development, whilst 
migration and internet access reflect potential exposure to social and cultural influences from the 
wider world.  
 
Gujranwala is the seventh largest city by population, with 1.132 million residents according to 
the 1998 census. Situated approximately 70 kilometres from Lahore on the Grand Trunk (GT) 
Road, it is a heavily industrial city with light industry and garment factories characterised by 
brick, concrete and an urban sprawl that bleeds into the surround fields and countryside. 
Gujranwala has comparably lower numbers of emigration, with a total of 271,400 registered to 
work abroad with the Pakistan Bureau Of Emigration & Overseas Employment between 1981 
and 2015.8 Gujranwala benefitted from almost immediate 3G internet coverage when services 
were launched in May 2014, giving the population access to fast mobile data services. 
 
Gujrat is approximately 50 kilometres from Gujranwala on the GT Road, though it now benefits 
from a bypass that means the centre of town is much quieter as the traffic routes around it. Lying 
between the Chenab and Jhelum rivers, Gujrat has a population of 251,792, according to the 1998 
census. Gujrat has a particularly high proportion of migrant labour, with a total of 302,404 
registered to work abroad with the Pakistan Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment 
between 1981 and 2015.  Although Gujrat has a significantly smaller population, it initially 
received first Telenor then Mobilink 3G internet services in May 2014, followed a month or so 
later by Mobilink and eventually Zong and Ufone. 
 
Mandi Bahauddin lies approximately 70 kilometres to the west of Gujrat, closer to the river 
Jhelum. It is a small town, with the population of the main city in 1998 only 99,496,9 and its size, 
smaller population and distance of the GT Road make it feel far more provincial. Mandi 
Bahauddin has very high levels of migrant workers, with a total of 93,048 registered to work 
abroad with the Pakistan Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment between 1981 and 2015. 
Nearly every family has at least one person working abroad, particularly in the Gulf countries but 
also in Europe and the United States. Mandi Bahauddin has very limited industry, and perhaps 
the biggest industrial operation is a sugar mill owned by an Ahmadi family and run mainly by 
Ahmadis who live in a big, highly secured compound. Mandi Bahauddin was a beneficiary of 
Telenor's 'ink-spot' strategy, and one of the smallest towns to receive 3G services. In the centre 
                                                 
8 Source: Bureau of Emigration, Islamabad. 
http://beoe.gov.pk/migrationstatistics/1971-2015%20(upto%20Feb)/Dist-wise-1981-2015.pdf 
9 Source: Population Census 1998, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/population_census/Administrative%20Units.pdf 
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of the town there were approximately three or four masts that provided fast mobile internet 
services.    
 
5.3 Survey Findings: Device and Application Usage - Religion and Gender  
The survey found that internet usage in the three cities is relatively high, with over 66% of 
respondents saying they used mobile internet for an hour or more per day, with 25% saying they 
used it for between two to three hours, and 21% saying they were always connected. Mobile 
internet users in these three cities are comparably higher than in other developing countries. A 
2014 PEW survey (Pew Research Centre 2014) of internet users in thirty-two emerging and 
developing nations found a median of 64% used the internet every day. Though Pakistani 
survey respondents were all mobile data users whilst the PEW respondents included both fixed 
and mobile internet users, Pakistan mobile internet use is marginally higher compared to 
regional figures, where 54% of Indian and 59% of Bangladeshi internet users say they use the 
internet daily. In other words, the average mobile internet use as reported by respondents from 
the three cities is relatively high. 
 
In line with app usage in other developing countries, the most popular apps identified by 
respondents were Facebook, with 83% of respondents indicating it as the app they used the most 
often, followed by WhatsApp at 14%. Only 1% said they used other popularly used apps such as 
Twitter, Skype or messaging app Line. This reflects similar findings from the PEW survey, which 
found that 82% of internet users in emerging and developing nations say they use social 
networking sites. 
 
Mobile internet users in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin also spend a significant 
amount of time on their favourite social media. 60% of respondents said they spent an hour or 
more on their favourite social media site, with 18% saying two to three hours and another 18% 
saying that they were always connected. However, a sizeable number, 35%, say they only use 
their favourite social media site for less than hour a day. Mobile devices are personal, and rarely 
shared with other people. In cities of Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin only 21% said 
they let someone else use their phone to access the internet. 
 
The amount of time that respondents from Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin said they 
spend on mobile internet is quite diverse but most respondents said that the majority of the time 
they spent using mobile internet was spent accessing Facebook. And for more than three quarters, 
this usage is a personal experience with few others seeing what happens on their device. But these 
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broad findings become far more revealing when we break down responses by religious affiliation 
and by gender.   
 
Religious Identity and Usage Practices 
The survey asked questions about religious identity, experiences of talking about religion online 
and attitudes towards issues such as inter-sectarian marriage. When asked to choose between three 
statements that reflected how respondents felt about sharing religious views on social media, 47% 
of respondents who identified as Sunni said they felt free to post and share religious opinions and 
thoughts, compared to just 29% of Shia and 10% of Christian respondents. In contrast, only 28% 
of respondents who identified as Sunni said they hesitated in sharing their religious opinions on 
social media, compared to 54% of Shia respondents and 30% of Christian respondents and 80% 
of respondents who identified as 'other'. 
 
In other words, Sunni respondents were more likely to feel able to express themselves freely on 
social media, and less likely to feel restricted, than Shia, Christian or other respondents who were 
less likely to say they felt free to express themselves and more likely to hesitate in expressing 
themselves on social media. 
 
In contrast, and also somewhat contradictory to the statements about expressing religious views 
on social media, respondents were more closely ranged on views of the inclusive nature of social 
media, with 49% of Sunni and 54% of Shia respondents saying they felt social media was an 
inclusive public space where they can say and post what they feel and think, compared to just 
10% of Christian respondents. Significantly, relatively few respondents said they perceived social 
media to be a private space, with only 24% of Sunni respondents, 21% of Shia respondents and 
20% of Christian respondents describing social media as a private space where they are free to 
say what they feel and think. 
 
Approximately half of Sunni and Shia respondents described social media as an inclusive, 
expressive space and most also described social media as a public rather than private space, 
though significantly, not one single respondent identified as Ahmadi. Although the statistics of 
actual Ahmadis in Pakistan mean this is not statistically significant, it remains the case that no 
respondents who identified as Ahmadi are reported in the survey.  
 
Gendered Usage Practices 
Mobile internet use also varied between male and female respondents. Male respondents 
described significantly higher levels of usage than women, with 22% of male respondents saying 
they were 'always connected', compared to only 14% of female respondents. 
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Female respondents also described using the internet for shorter periods than men, with 29% of 
female respondents saying they only accessed the internet on their phones for one to two hours, 
compared to 21% of male respondents, whilst 25% of male respondents said they accessed the 
internet for two to three hours a day, compared to 19% of female respondents. In short, male 
respondents accessed the internet on their phones for longer periods of time than female 
respondents. 
 
Facebook for men, WhatsApp for women 
Social media preferences are also distinctly gendered. Although the headline statistics indicate a 
significant preference for Facebook, analysis of the responses reveals significant differences 
between male and female preferences. 
 
When asked which social media platform they used the most, 85% of male respondents said 
Facebook was the most popular compared to only 45% of female respondents. In contrast, nearly 
half (47%) of female respondents said they used WhatsApp the most, compared to only 13% of 
male respondents. In other words, Facebook is particularly popular amongst male respondents 
whilst far more women than men prefer WhatsApp. 
 
Like internet usage patterns, male respondents also described much higher social media usage 
than female respondents. Nearly half of all female respondents (47%) said they accessed their 
favourite social media service for less than an hour a day, compared to 34% of male respondents. 
By contrast, 19% of men said they accessed their favourite social media service two to three hours 
a day compared to 10% of female respondents. 
 
Gendered Social Spheres: 
These different social media preferences also mean that male and female respondents described 
very different social networks. For a start, male respondents described much larger social 
networks than women. 64% of male respondents described having more than 50 friends or 
followers, compared to just 20% of female respondents. In contrast, 69% of women said they had 
less than 25 friends or followers, compared just 22% of women. In other words, male respondents 
described a much larger social sphere than women. 
  
It's not just size, but male and female respondents described social networks that were very 
different in their composition. Fewer male respondents have their parents or sisters in their social 
network but more have friends from school, college, university or work in their contact lists. Only 
16% of male respondents reported having parents in their social network, and only 19% reported 
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having their sisters in their social network contact list. Nearly all (94%) of male respondents said 
their male friends were in their contact list, but only 48% of their female friends were. Most male 
respondents also said they were connected to friends from education (84%) and work (76%). 
 
By contrast, female respondents described a family based social network with few connections 
to male friends or connections from education or work. Compared to the 16% of male respondents 
who said their parents were in their social network, just over a third (34%) of female respondents 
said they were connected to their parents on social media. Similarly, compared to the 19% of male 
respondents who said their sisters were in their social network, nearly three quarters of female 
respondents (72%) said their brothers were in their contact list. But comparatively few female 
respondents said they were connected to their male friends (33%) or friends from education (48%) 
or work (31%). 
 
The picture portrayed by survey respondents is for male social spheres to be larger than female 
respondent social spheres, and for male social spheres to be characterised by more non-family 
friends than female respondent social spheres. Indeed, the social spheres described by female 
respondent appear to be more family oriented than their male counterparts, and for more female 
respondents to have their brother in their social network than for male respondents to have their 
sister.  
  
Multiple Profiles 
My exploratory research had revealed that many people described having multiple Facebook 
profiles. This had been revealed when discussing the spate of newspaper reports on the arrest of 
men who'd posed as female Facebook users in order to befriend and then blackmail other women. 
Asking about this in exploratory focus groups and interviews prompted many to say that the 
blackmail of women was wrong, and very worrying because the practice of 'fake accounts' was 
very common. In order to explore how prevalent this practice was, the telephone survey included 
a question to probe this. Given the sensitivity of the issues - the young men who I first discussed 
this with were initially hesitant to talk about it, smiling and laughing when I mentioned it -  the 
survey question, 1 asked respondents to describe not their own but the number of their friends 
who had multiple Facebook accounts. The question asked: 
 
Question: Many people have multiple accounts on the same site (e.g. one person with 
multiple Facebook accounts). Approximately what percentage of your friends and family 
members on Facebook has more than one account/profile? 
 
 94 
When the question was asked in the survey, 34% of respondents said that at least one of their 
friends had multiple profiles, though 17% said none and nearly half (49%) gave no response or 
said they didn't know. Significantly, fewer female respondents said their friends had multiple 
accounts, with only 22% of female respondents compared to 35% of male respondents saying at 
least someone in their network had multiple accounts. Slightly higher number of female 
respondents also said that no-one in their network had multiple accounts (19% compared with 
16% for male respondents) or gave no response or didn't know 59% compared to 48% of male 
respondents. 
 
In focus groups and interviews the question of multiple accounts was often a sensitive topic and 
people were sometimes hesitant to talk about it. The reasons for that hesitancy might account for 
the high level of respondents who said they didn't know or want to answer the questions. 
 
The practice of multiple Facebook accounts raises questions about the numbers, gender 
proportions of people who are actually using the social network, and also broader questions about 
the intent. The practice breaks Facebook's Terms of Service, that stipulate a real name policy and 
the use of only one account, as well as a broader set of questions about the practice of identity, 
privacy and authenticity of users on the social network.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Mobile internet and social media usage practices in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin 
suggest a 'mobile first' pattern of technology use. This usage is dominated by the use of social 
media that respondents characterised as entertainment and social networking.   
 
The more detailed survey findings suggest that Pakistani Facebook have distinct religious and 
gender identity characteristics. Religious minorities and women describe lower internet and social 
media usage whilst female respondents also describe using Facebook less than men, and a 
stronger preference for the WhatsApp messaging service, suggesting a preference by female users 
to connect with close friends of the same gender. 
 
The survey also suggested that religious minorities do not see social media as a new space for 
public expression. Instead, respondents who describe themselves as Shia report using social 
media less and feel less comfortable expressing beliefs freely, whilst Ahmadis are not represented 
in the survey. The lack of Ahmadis in the survey could either be because there are so few of them 
that the survey failed to pick them up. However, it could also be that even if the survey included 
Ahmadi respondents they had declined to identify themselves as Ahmadis.  
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The same is true for the gendered use of social media in Pakistan. Female respondents described 
using the internet far less than men and when they do, they describe practices that suggest a social 
network that is smaller, less public and more concerned with privacy than male respondents.  
 
The survey provides a brief, tantalising description of how people use social media, but raises 
more questions than answers. It leaves us wondering why religious minorities and marginalised 
groups don't use technology to break free from cultural constraints and, through the sharing of 
authentic selves, challenge traditional, conservative social norms? Why are Shia and Ahmadi 
usage patterns so different from those of Sunni respondents? What accounts for the differences 
in responses to feelings about self-expression on social media, and why do no Ahmadi's identify 
themselves as Ahmadi in surveys? We might wonder whether women are prevented from using 
social media, and forced to conform online to offline norms, or do female usage patterns reflect 
preferences particular to Pakistani women from the three cities? Similarly, why do male 
respondents use social media so much more than women? And what are the explanations for the 
high levels of multiple social media accounts? 
 
In order to explain the meaning, purpose and implications of the social media usage patterns 
described by survey respondents, we first turn to the account of individuals who shape usage 
practices, namely mobile phone retailers in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. This is 
followed by two subsequent chapters that present the findings from interviews and focus groups 
with respondents in the three field sites.  
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6. Mediating ICTs – Facebook in Practice  
 
The previous chapter introduced the three field sites and presented the findings from the survey, 
describing basic mobile phone and social media usage practices. It described how these usage 
practices were characterised by distinct differences according to religious and gender identity, 
with religious minorities and women describing lower usage of mobile phones and social media 
and women preferring WhatsApp over Facebook and describing smaller, more domestic social 
networks than male users. In other words, this chapter described practices through which religious 
and gender identities are enacted. Although it establishes the first link between the macro 
hegemonic discourses and the practices through subject positions are enacted, this account doesn't 
explain the meaning of these practices, or the implications they hold for religious identity in 
Pakistan. 
 
This chapter presents another link between macro discourses and everyday ICT practices. It 
describes intermediaries that link the supply of technology and the translation of policy and 
hegemonic discourses to individual, everyday users of mobile phones and social media. It 
describes this by presenting the accounts of mobile phone shop retailers; two mobile phone shop 
retailers in one of the main markets in Gujranwala, a retailer and devout scholar in Gujrat and a 
local media mogul in Shahanalog. These three locations are presented because they reflect a 
diversity of geographic location and technological adoption. Whilst Gujranwala has had 
broadband for over five years it has only just arrived in Gujrat, and is not available in Shahanalog. 
Presenting these three accounts from diverse locations highlights the importance of physical 
geography in the distribution of digital skills and content. 
 
This chapter describes how intermediaries seek to shape the consumption of media content and 
the nature of individual media practices. These efforts to shape social media behaviours are efforts 
to translate discourse into practice, and sees those who have the opportunity to influence the 
consumption of content and the use of technologies such that they enrol users and consumers into 
broader hegemonic discourses. In other words, this chapter describes how intermediaries seek to 
shape the way new technologies are used so as uphold dominant discourse of religious identity.  
 
 
6.1 Gujranwala: The Mobile Market – movies, music and porn 
The mobile markets in Gujranwala are, as might be expected, larger and more established than 
the markets in smaller cities and towns. Ammara Mobile Market is one of the largest mobile 
markets in Gujranwala, a large multistory block on a what used to be the main Grand Trunk Road 
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before they built the flyover that towers above. Now the rush of traffic echoes off the concrete 
block that almost touches the concrete supports that hold the flyover up. Ammara market is not 
the most upmarket mobile phone market, but it is the one that people on the street direct you 
towards when you ask for directions to mobile phone repair and for downloading movies and 
music. Instead of car parking, in front of the market there is a sea of red Honda motorbikes and a 
forklift truck that picks up and removes any cars  that risk being parked in front of the market or 
adjacent restaurants.  
 
The market itself is on two floors. On the first floor, a few concrete steps up from the street, are 
stores selling mainly new phones, computers and other big box electrical items. The shops are 
quiet, dusty with few people in them. Their owners sit at the back, behind big desks under whirring 
fans. Downstairs, open to the front street, is the basement. Here there is loud Indian film music 
playing, despite it being Juma, Friday, which is the day of prayer and rest in Pakistan. The shops 
downstairs are open into the basement, and are dusty, with old posters of phones that are long 
obsolescent in the West. These stores don’t have the same polish as the ones upstairs – they are 
at the lower end of the market and consequently far busier. Each shop has a glass cabinet with 
second hand phones that also serves as a counter. At the back most have a workbench where 
phones are repaired. At the front of most is a computer and screen where software, movies, music 
and other kinds of ‘entertainment’ content can be bought and ‘side loaded’ to phones using cables 
or memory cards. The basement is thronged with young men in groups and individually, looking 
at the phones in the glass cases or clustered around the screens at the front of each shop.  
 
6.1.1 Hassan: “the porn business is good business” 
Hassan works in one of the shops halfway back in the basement, and is sitting at the computer 
screen at the front. The shop is open to the front, but is empty and Hassan is the only person there. 
Because it is empty, and the boss was away at prayers, he was happy to talk. He explained that 
he has been working in the shop for about eighteen months, before this he was fixing mobile 
phones in a smaller shop in another market. To be here in the Ammara market, selling content 
rather than repairing phones, is a promotion.  Hassan reveals a lot about how people in his position 
shape the kind of content that people consume.  
 
 
Hassan: “Maybe fifteen, maybe twenty come each day. I know most of them, they come one or two 
times every week. Most people who come are just wanting films and music. Mainly 
Bollywood or Hollywood. I charge fifty rupees for two gigabytes, and people want it put 
straight on the phone, but sometimes they have a memory card” 
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In addition to movies and film, Hassan explains that people also ask for pornography, and 
describes how in contrast to requests for particular films or music, people who request porn are 
much less specific. As he describes it, “Yaar, some people also ask for ‘thota’, which is porn in 
Punjabi. Maybe fifty per cent of them ask.  They ask for porn and so I give them it. Sometimes 
they want Sunny Leone [a popular Canadian-Indian adult actress] but mostly they don't ask. They 
ask for a high definition movie, maybe one or two. I give them what I have. I just download it 
from torrent sites. I don't look at it or know what it is mostly.” 
 
For Hassan, selling content is simply a business. Yet in his role as a content mediator, he reveals 
how he functions as both a ‘transparent’ mediator of peoples desires, and an intermediator with 
greater influence over specific kinds of content. Hassan wasn’t particularly interested in the 
content he sold, and took no moral position on what people chose to buy. Yet whilst he provided 
the specific movies and music that people asked for, functioning as an invisible agent in the 
mediation of their requests, customers had far less agency over the kind of porn that they 
purchased.  Hassan explained that it was not like looking at a porn site with all the different kinds 
of porn available. Instead people “they just buy it, then they are happy”. Unlike the consumption 
of porn through websites that cater to diverse interests, Hassan’s’ customers had to make do with 
whatever content Hassan had downloaded for them.  
 
In part, this mediator function reflects the geographic distance from or cost of accessing the 
internet. The further from or more expensive the cost of access, the greater power an intermediary 
has to shape the kind of content that people consume. Hassan described how other intermediaries 
bridge the distance between himself and customers in more remote areas.  As he puts it, “Hassan: 
“one customer comes from the village and buys ten, twenty even one time thirty-two gigabytes of 
thota!! He buys it and sells it, just like he buys movies. He buys from me for twenty-five rupees 
for one gigabyte and sells it in the village for fifty rupees per gigabyte. Porn is good business!!   
 
Hassan was also clearly aware of the content value chain, describing how the cost of content 
increased the further from the city one went. This value chain describes how intermediaries create 
links between different actors, and can serve to shape the kind of content that people consume. 
To the extent that the consumption of content has influence over the consumer’s attitudes and 
desires, Hassan’s account shows how his mediation of the consumption of pornography 
influences the sexual aspirations, preferences and desires of those who consume the porn he sells.   
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6.1.2 Summary:  
Hassan’s account describes firstly how the geographic differences between speed and cost of 
internet access introduce a value chain in content distribution, and how actors in the value chain 
serve as mediators in the access to content. His description of the bulk purchase of content, 
including porn for resale points towards a value chain of digital content as it is purchased and 
resold by various agents. By his account this value chain is defined by the distance from fast and 
cheap internet access and scarcity of alternative content, downloaded in a large provincial city 
and transported by hand to a smaller village.  
 
Hassan also describes the influence mediators in his position have over the content people 
consume. In Hassan’s account both his customers and also the customers of the reseller have a 
limited choice of content. For Hassan, customers can choose the movies that he has available but 
exercise very limited choice over the kind of porn they consume. For the resellers customers these 
choices are limited even further as he only buys a selection of movies and music for resale. Both 
Hassan and the reseller are thus active players in shaping the information and content that users 
have access to and consume.  
 
 
6.2 Gujrat: The Mobile Mediator – Faith in Facebook  
This account presents an insight into the ways in which mobile phone sellers serve as 
intermediaries between discursive regimes and practices. It shows how some individuals who 
teach others technological skills attempt to translate these according to religious norms and 
values. Yet whilst these norms are drawn on to rationalise particular ways of using technology, 
the emphasis is on individual responsibility for the enactment of these practices.   
 
The mobile market in Gujrat runs along both sides of one of the main roads that runs into the 
centre of the town from the old Grand Trunk Road. Its less busy than it was before the bypass 
was built, but it’s still full of bicycles, three wheeled motor rickshaws and cars that push through 
traffic and people like slow moving boats. The road is lined with shops selling mobile phones and 
though many also sell other electronic items billboards, posters and cardboard cut-out mobile 
phones dominate. The shops are diverse and range from large, single brand show room stores – 
the newest one was a Chinese brand called Oppo, mid-sized shops selling a range of brands from 
Samsung to local brand Q-Mobile and finally to shops selling second hand phones. Although 
nearly all shops had a repair counter at the back with a self-taught engineer hunched over a pile 
of broken phones, it was only the smaller ones that also had a counter with a computer screen 
and, usually, a group of young men looking at a movie or music video. In one tiny shop I entered, 
the two buys behind the counter were so engrossed they didn't see me enter, but blushed and 
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rapidly minimized the window, hoping I hadn’t seen that they were watching popular Indian - 
Canadian adult actress Sunny Leone in a movie the name of which they didn’t know.  
 
6.2.1 Kamran: “My responsibility is hidayat”  
Kamran runs a mid-sized mobile phone shop that sells mainly second hand phones as well as a 
brisk trade in repairs and content for mobile phones. There are two or three people waiting at the 
counter to speak to Kamran and his assistant, and a huddle of people waiting by the repair counter. 
On the bench against the wall sit two women, both fully covered in black chadors (the shawl that 
covers the entire body and head), waiting for their phone to be fixed. 
 
After a while Kamran sat down and explained that he had been running the shop for ten years, 
since he’d left being a Maulvi (religious teacher) when he was thirty to look after his family. He 
explained that he continued to teach and saw no incompatibility between selling mobile phones 
and content for mobile phones and his religious beliefs. Mostly, he said, people either wanted to 
fix a broken screen or have new software installed on their phone. He explained that people rarely 
asked for content like movies or music as they could tell from his beard and white lace skull-cap 
that he was religious and therefore unlikely to sell that “haram” content. Although Kamran had 
strong views about the relationship between technology and Islam he emphasised the importance 
of taking individual responsibility for one’s actions.  
 
Kamran explained that when people came to him to ask for new software they often requested 
help in how to use set up Skype, WhatsApp or Facebook accounts. Although most people didn’t 
have emails, he helped them set one up or sometimes used an account he set up specifically for 
the purpose. He explained that he saw it as really important for people to understand technology, 
and described how without understanding people could easily be misled. As Kamran put it, Here 
no proper working is done on Islam and technology. The Maulvis and Islamic scholars have never 
used this technology.   
 
Kamran went on to describe a story in which a maulvi had pointed to a light in the sky as an 
indicator of doomsday, to which Kamran asked the religious teacher to accompany him, and 
showed them that the light in the sky was in fact a searchlight advertising a marriage hall. In this 
account, Kamran reveals a belief in the importance of understanding technology and a common 
Wahhabi disdain for the informal religious teachers common amongst the Barelvi.  For Kamran, 
teaching the truth of technology, like teaching the truth of the Quran and the way of the prophet, 
was a religious obligation. As he put it, “hidayat [guidance or instruction] is a duty, and the way 
of the prophet is a whole life, not only reading or praying but everything. Technology also.” 
When I asked Kamran how people who struggled to recognise a spotlight from a sign of 
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impending doomsday could cope with something as complicated as Facebook, he explained how 
most people viewed the technology in overly simplistic terms.  
 
 For Kamran, religious practice and the ‘correct’ way to engage with technology was to take 
individual responsibility. This became apparent in his discussion of both Facebook and the 
caricatures, as well as the association of Facebook with immoral use. Although Kamran 
immediately linked Facebook to the caricatures of the Prophet, unlike others he pointed to the 
importance of individual discipline rather than the imposition of a ban. As he said,  “That ban on 
Facebook, ban on YouTube, ban this ban that. This is technology, you should simply use it in a 
positive manner. If they have uploaded caricatures over it, so you reply against it in a positive 
manner....we banned their products to damage them, but only we have damaged ourselves.” 
 
Kamran’s translation of religious norms into individual use of technology was also apparent in 
his views on the claims that Facebook was immoral. As he said, “When people are asking 
about Facebook, I am saying that they need to be responsible. Yes, vulgar things are there. Yes, 
it is possible for boys and for girls. But they have their responsibility, to follow the path of the 
prophet, to do the right thing.” For Kamran, the correct location for understanding the relationship 
between technology and behaviour was in the individual. This extended to the belief that women 
should also be allowed to use technology.  
 
Kamran described how he believed the principle of individual responsibility also applied to 
women’s use of technology, unlike those who argued they should be prohibited. As he said,   “Yes. 
I don’t deny the right of women to use Facebook. They should use. Technology should be used 
but while doing so they should keep that thing in mind that I am a daughter of Islam. They should 
ask themselves ‘what is the need of posting your picture? Instead just write their name and then 
work on it.   
Finally, it’s important to note that for Kamran, his own religious practice was understood in terms 
of how it shaped the beliefs and behaviours of others. He described how his position in the 
institute and ability to impart Islamic knowledge and how these could be manifest in the use of 
technology was ‘hidayat’ – religious instruction. As he said, “the imparting Islamic values and 
teachings to these students is my responsibility here given to me by Islam. My responsibility is 
hidayat, taking people to a higher level.” 
 
6.2.2 Summary  
Kamran describes his efforts to guide students and customers to use technology according to 
Islamic injunctions and norms. He emphasises the importance of personal responsibility over 
strict enforcement by others, in contrast to those who argue for the banning of technologies.  
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Kamran’s efforts to translate the discursive regime of religious norms and values into individual 
behaviour and practices reflect an attempt to enrol technology use into the dominant religious 
regime, yet to frame this as individual responsibility. For Kamran himself, the enactment of a 
good Muslim is manifest in the inculcation of religious norms into all walks of life, including the 
use of technology.    
 
 
6.3 Mandi Bahauddin: The Content King – Faith and the profane 
This account describes a similar case in which content access is intermediated. Although the intent 
of the disruption to the smooth flow of content is grounded in religious practice, it reflects 
personal religious observation rather than Kamran’s practice of hidayat. Shahanalog is a small 
village just outside Mandi Bahauddin. It was one of the smallest villages to get 3G to be part of 
Telenor’s ‘ink-spot’ network roll out strategy. This strategy of positioning one or two towers and 
offering a limited network was intended to stimulate demand before comprehensive network roll 
out. They targeted villages such as that Mandi Bahauddin that had high average revenue per user 
(ARPU), which in Shahanalog's case was a result of the high levels of manual labour migration 
to the Gulf states. Thus although small, rural and separated from Mandi Bahauddin by a thirty-
minute drive, it is a relatively wealthy village.  
 
The village sits alongside a colonial era canal, a red brick bridge spanning the slow moving water, 
and a large pipal tree overhanging the bridge and the road. The centre of Shahanalog itself clusters 
on both sides of a single road that joins the main canal-side highway that links Mandi Bahauddin 
and the Grand Trunk Road an hour and a half drive away. Although the canal road is busy with 
brightly painted buses, trucks, cars and motorbikes, the road through Shahanalog is a smaller 
road, flanked on both sides by a dusty collection of single story shops, tailors, food stalls and 
houses.  
 
6.3.1 Tahir: “we are closed in Ramadan completely” 
Tahir Shah’s account describes how in small towns the control over mobile phone shops and cable 
networks allows high levels of influence over the consumption of information content, and the 
important role that religion plays in the nature of this influence. Tahir is the Rupert Murdoch of 
Shahanalog, because his family have fingers in all the villages communications networks. They 
own the cable network, which includes about twenty national and international channels as well 
as private five channels streaming pirated movies, music videos and religious content. They own 
the DVD shop that rents and sells the latest pirated DVDs, as well as three brands of local 
cigarettes. They own the only mobile phone repair shop from which they also sell digital content. 
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And finally the only mobile phone mast is located on the backyard of the mobile phone shop. 
Tahir and his family control the digital communication in the village.  
 
As the owner of the village’s only mobile phone shop, Tahir is able to describe in detail the kinds 
of services customers come for, and the kind of content they seek to buy. He describes how people 
come to seek help with using social media, to buy content on mobile data cards and the role of 
religion in the provision of services. Like the mobile phone shops in Gujrat and Gujranwala, 
Tahir’s also teaches people how to use the internet as well as selling movies and music. As Tahir 
describes, the most common requests for help are for the use of phones and social media. As he 
says, “Mostly they ask about settings, what button to press to call and this to end the 
call...Otherwise they come here, ask us to log in to their Facebook and then they see the uploaded 
pictures of their sons … We are connected to the entire village, so we can see all their pictures. 
Maybe not all their pictures. Family pictures are private, so we can’t see them”. 
 
Tahir describes how people in Shahanalog come to his shop for help and guidance about accessing 
the internet and accessing and using social media. He describes how parents commonly log into 
their or their sons account on Tahir’s phone, either because they don't own an internet enabled 
phone or they don't know how to use it. Tahir also reveals how close knit the village is, describing 
how he is connected to everyone.  
 
In addition to helping people access social media, Tahir also provides customers with content, 
and like Hassan and Shahed, the content people watch is determined by what Tahir has available. 
As he notes, even if he doesn’t have the movie that people ask for, “They still take something. 
They just want to watch. Out of 100 only 5% ask for a specific movie otherwise mostly ask for 
anything we have.”In this account, Tahir describes how customers from the village come to the 
shop to buy movies, but don't usually have a particular movie in mind, they just want to be 
entertained.  
 
Tahir’s faith as a Shia Muslim has a significant influence over the way he provides access to 
content, yet unlike Kamran’s practice of Hidayat, this is not the intent that shapes Tahir’s practice. 
Tahir describes how he marks the religious festivals of Ramadan and the Shia festival of 
Muharram, periods of time when most Muslims fast and Shia Muslims mourn the death of Ali, 
by limiting access to the content that forms the basis of his business. As he described it, our 
business is closed only on 9th and 10th days of Muharram but otherwise we even open on Eid as 
well. If someone asks us for something even at 3am we are supposed to provide them. Same as 
Ramadan. But we are closed in Ramadan completely… even the cable network, the only thing is 
the na’ats [na’ats are religious songs that praise the prophet]. We stop selling the movies and the 
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music, stop the drama on the television. Only the religious things. It is our responsibility. It is like 
sawab. A prayer.” Tahir describes how during religious festivals he stops selling and broadcasting 
entertainment content as part of observing his religious beliefs. Importantly, for Tahir, not selling 
entertainment content is a form of religious observance that earns him religious merit, not an 
attempt to shape others’ behaviour.  
 
6.3.2 Summary 
Tahir’s account describes the role of a rural information and technology provider. It describes 
how low levels of digital literacy mean customers ask for greater help in accessing and using their 
phones and social media services. This leads at times to greater intimacy in the lives of his 
customers as they access their family Facebook accounts through his phone. Although Tahir’s 
account suggests that he doesn't take a moral position on the content that his customers ask for, 
and he is happy to provide entertainment and porn, his personal religious beliefs do impact on the 
content that his customers can access. His description of the way the family stops selling and 
broadcasting entertainment suggests that it is personal behaviour rather than a judgement on what 
others should or shouldn't be accessing or watching. In other words, Tahir doesn't stop selling 
music because he thinks people should stop listening to it during Ramadan and Muharram but 
because stopping selling it is a religious act that earns him and the family religious merit. . In 
other words, stopping the selling of content is a practice of sawab, not hidayat. Nonetheless, the 
result is that Tahir’s enactment of religious belief and practice enrol his customers into the 
discursive regime of Shia Islam by marking certain forms of information and content outside of 
what is acceptable during religious festivals.  
 
6.4 Translating Discourses into Practice  
This chapter has described four accounts of people in three locations who provide access to 
technology, software and content. These individuals all play a role in enabling access for new and 
established users to get online and consume digital content. As such they play an important role 
in linking broader policy discourses to individual everyday practices. The shops thus serve as 
important sources of technology, skills and content, a place that has significant influence in 
customers means and ability of accessing the internet.  This section analyses the discourses 
revealed in the interviews with mobile phone intermediaries. The analysis describes how 
hegemonic discourses of religious identity are translated into practice through the mediation of 
content and behaviours.  
 
The analysis is conducted using the theory of translation advanced by Callon and Latour (Callon 
1986; Latour 2005). Specifically, the concepts of mediators and intermediaries as outlined by 
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Latour (Latour 2005) are used to analyse the role of the mobile phone retailers in translating 
Facebook into user practices in Pakistan. It draws on ideas of intermediaries and mediation to 
analyse how discourses inform social media use in the everyday practices of ordinary Pakistanis. 
This section, therefore, analyses the role of mobile phone retailers as a bridge between the 
circulation of discourse in circuits of communication and the enactment of discourse in everyday 
practice. This is achieved through analysis of the discourse in the accounts of those who function 
as intermediaries or mediators who attempt to shape the use of Facebook in everyday practice, 
showing how use is linked to concerns about religious practice.  
 
6.4.1 Translating Discourse into Practice: Intermediaries and Mediators 
The actors who shape ICT use play an important role in translating discourse into practice through 
teaching people how to use mobile phones and social media translate discourse into use practices. 
This section analyses the role of mobile phone retailers in influencing how people use ICTs.  
 
The theory of translation includes an important role for these entities, terming them intermediaries 
or mediators. The nature of networks is determined by the chain of associations, and the nature 
of these associations is determined by intermediaries and mediators (Latour 2005, 39–42). An 
intermediary serves to transport the meaning or interest of an actor without transforming it. Thus, 
‘defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs’ (Latour 2005, 39), which is of little analytic 
interest. By contrast, mediators ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the 
elements they are supposed to carry’ (Latour 2005, 40). Latour describes a well-functioning 
computer as an intermediary, but points out that, when it breaks, it may become a complex 
intermediary altering the outcome of the actor’s intent. Intermediaries are thus inscribed with 
meaning, faithful or otherwise, and as such both describe and constitute their networks by giving 
them form (Callon 1991).  
 
The concept of intermediaries also plays an important role in the ICTD literature, where it 
describes individuals whose task it is to make ICTs such as internet centres accessible to the 
public (for a comprehensive review, see Bailur and Masiero 2012). A study of intermediaries in 
telecentres in India emphasises the importance of recognising that intermediaries exist within 
networks, and shows how their identities within a network shape their function as translators who 
‘straddle networks’ and influence use practices (Bailur and Masiero 2012, 38).  
 
The emerging literature on mobile Internet use also describes how friends and families play an 
important role in teaching people the technical skills required to go online (Donner, Gitau, and 
Marsden 2011; Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2013; Rangaswamy and Arora 2015). Rangaswamy and 
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Cutrell, for example, describe how friends ‘initiated … subjects to the features, usages and thrills 
of mobile internet’ (Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2013, 58). In other words, there are many actors 
who come between the way designers and owners intend a device to be used and the way users 
appropriate it into their own practice.  
 
Reading Hassan, Shahed, Kamran and Tahir as intermediaries or mediators between discursive 
formations and sociomaterial practices reveals how Facebook is translated through discourse into 
practice. Both Shahed and Hassan see themselves as service providers, there to supply what their 
customers demand. Shahed describes his role as being an effective employee and keeping his 
customers happy. Similarly, Hassan has no interest in disrupting the desires of his customers and 
operates like a well-functioning computer in the operation of the market. He gives his customers 
the movies, the music and the porn they ask for.  
 
As such, Hassan functions as an effective intermediary, almost as an invisible link between his 
customers’ desires and preferences and the world of available content. The one area in which he 
does play an influential role is the selection of porn that his customers get to watch. Although 
studies have explored the relationship between exposure to porn and sexual preferences (Nash et 
al. 2016; Marston and Lewis 2014), it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the implications 
of Hassan’s porn preferences for his customers’ lives. In the main though, Hassan functions as an 
effective intermediary for his customers and employers’ interests and desires.  
 
In contrast, Kamran and Tahir function as mediators who seek to introduce religious values and 
attachments to the way mobile phones and the Internet are used in Pakistan. Kamran identifies 
the people who come to him as possible students as much as they are customers, and as an 
opportunity to practice hidayat and performatively enact his identity as a religious teacher. 
Kamran’s attachment to this identity means that he functions as a mediator between the discourses 
of purely capitalist relations and religious ethics. In seeking to transform the technological use 
practices of his customers/students, Kamran attempts to function as an intermediary for the 
discourses of religious ethics, such that they are transported through him to shape individual 
technological use. Yet, in emphasising individual autonomy and responsibility for use, Kamran 
demonstrates the alignment between discourses of singular individualism, as embodied in 
Facebook’s design, and the modernist individualism embodied in Sunni Wahhabism’s articulation 
of the individual’s relationship to God. In other words, Kamran’s attempt to mediate the way 
individuals use Facebook aligns with the way Facebook demands that its users behave.  
 
Like Kamran, Tahir mediates the information consumption practices in the village outside Mandi 
Bahauddin. His control over the information consumed by the village means that, when he decides 
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to limit access to entertainment and porn, it affects the whole village. Unlike Kamran, this 
mediation is intermittent and only enacted during times of religious observance such as Ramadan 
and Muharram.  
 
Tahir describes this mediation role as a function of attachment to his religious identity as a Shia 
Muslim. At these times, Tahir’s religious identity is stronger than his identity as a businessman, 
and he willingly forgoes profit for the sake of religious merit. Yet, unlike Kamran, Tahir’s role 
as an intermediary is not intentional; it is a function of his desire to performatively enact his 
identity as an observant Shia Muslim, rather than to shape other people’s ICT use. Tahir stops 
trading in entertainment and porn because dealing with this content conflicts with his identity as 
a Shia Muslim, not because he wants to mediate other people’s behaviour or their access to movies 
or porn.  
 
This account of mobile phone retailers shows the role of identity in determining whether they 
function as mediators or intermediaries in the chain of associations that link hegemonic discourse 
and practice. I have shown how actors with a strong religious identity function as mediators and 
attempt to mediate how users incorporate technologies or content into their everyday practices. 
Of course, this account is the diffraction produced through the agential cut enacted by looking 
through the lens of religious identity. There are, no doubt, other forms of mediation taking place 
that would emerge if other agential cuts were enacted.  
 
6.4.2 Summary: Problematising Technological Discourse in Pakistan 
This section has shown how technological practices are shaped by mediators and intermediators 
that translate hegemonic discourse in ways that shape both the consumption of content and ICT 
usage behaviours. In Pakistan this translation is commonly characterised by the reinforcing of 
hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism. Technologies do not simply arrive in a particular 
context, nor is their adoption a simple process of interaction between a user and a technology. 
Normative accounts of the way technologies shape identities and societies in conditions of 
modernity (Giddens 1991; Castells 2000) fail to incorporate these processes of translation and 
describe how technologies are constantly constructed and mediated. This section has shown how 
technologies are not simply introduced, but are entangled with discourse and material practice. 
Intermediaries enrol technologies into their own networks of interest and teach users to interact 
with technologies in particular ways. Technologies and practices are linked through chains of 
association – technological discourses of singular, authentic subjects of value that are embodied 
in the design and coding of Facebook in California, the entanglement of these technological 
discourses with those of religion and nationalism in Pakistan.  
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7. Performing Faith on Facebook 
 
“I have never used Facebook for religious purpose. Never. I haven’t even shared a single 
religious status.” 
Saad, Ahmadi, Mandi Bahauddin 
 
“Yes, you know, Facebook I use it for publicity. If there is some special event related to Imam 
Bargah I posted it on Facebook.” 
Hammad, Shia, Gujranwala 
 
“Islamic pages are there. I like very much Islamic pages, Hadiths pages. After two or three hours 
they post a new Hadiths there with proper reference. So if you want to share, share it.” 
Mustafa, Sunni, Gujranwala 
 
In contrast to the previous chapter, which described the role of intermediaries in translating 
hegemonic discourses to technological practices, this chapter describes how Ahmadi. Shia and 
Sunnis enact religious identity on Facebook. While the previous chapter showed how individuals 
play either active or passive roles in the way content and technologies are incorporated into 
practice, this chapter highlights the role of technologies as actors. It highlights how the 
technological discourses, embodied in the design of Facebook, influence how religious identities 
are enacted in practice. It shows how these technologies reinforce dominant norms, rather than 
opening up space for minority groups as the ‘technological liberation’ thesis argues. Similarly, it 
also demonstrates how religious practice is incorporated into the use of technologies linked to 
processes of secularisation.   
 
This chapter presents accounts of how different religious groups, namely Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni, 
use Facebook to enact religious identity. The three quotes reflect the very different relationships 
with Facebook that Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni respondents describe, and echo the discourses 
described in Chapter Five. Specifically, they reflect the positioning of Sunni conservative Islam 
as hegemonic discourse and Shia and Ahmadi as marginalised subjects.  This chapter  presents 
descriptions of individual practices that will help explain the findings from the survey results 
recounted in Chapter Six. It thus presents a further focusing down in the exploration of how the 
subject positions described in Chapter Five are enacted in practice, thus providing empirical data 
to help explain how the use of Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity 
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In order to achieve this it presents accounts of everyday usage practices given by young Ahmadi, 
Shia and Sunni Pakistani Facebook users. It shows how Facebook’s demand for authenticity, the 
way it allows traversing of social contexts and it’s push towards making information public 
complicates the enactment of authentic religious identity and the sharing of personal and religious 
views and information. It shows this through descriptive case studies of how young Pakistani 
individuals experience using Facebook and expressing religious beliefs and practices. It presents 
three sets of case studies for Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni Facebook users, with an extended 
introduction to the context of Ahmadis in Pakistan to illustrate the extent of their marginalisation. 
Each case describes the pattern of technology usage, showing the patterns and near ubiquity of 
mobile internet access and Facebook usage, followed by accounts of their experience of using 
Facebook and other social media platforms. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
findings and key themes to be picked up for detailed analysis.  
 
 
 
7.1 Ahmadi 
The Ahmadi’s are amongst the most persecuted minority in Pakistan, and as such show how 
Facebook reinforces hegemonic norms rather than providing a platform for marginalised voices.  
This section describes the context of Ahmadis in Pakistan through an account of researching an 
attack against Ahmadi’s that was claimed to be a response to a blasphemous post on Facebook. It 
then presents two case studies of young Ahmadi Facebook users. It describes how these young 
users negotiate the sites tendency to share information and make it accessible to others, and how 
this complicates their ability to enact authentic Ahmadi identities. It first describes the difficult 
of engaging with the Ahmadi community in Pakistan through a narrative account of attempts to 
investigate an attack against Ahmadi’s blamed on an alleged Facebook post. It then presents the 
account of one young person caught up in the incident and how it has affected their Facebook 
usage. This is followed by the presentation of an Ahmadi’s experience of transitioning from 
college to university and how complicates his ability to manage this transition.   
 
Trouble with Facebook 
This section describes how a persecuted minority experiences threats and insecurity from the use 
of Facebook. It shows how Facebook is implicated in the deaths of innocent Ahmadis. Nearly a 
year after an attack that left three female Ahmadis dead, including a five month old baby and a 
seven year old girl (Gillani 2014; McCoy 2014), the second floor of the three story house is still 
blackened by soot, and a police barrier blocks the entry to the narrow lane and the row of houses 
on both sides. My research assistant explained that the attack took place on the 28th July 2014 
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following the alleged posting of blasphemous content on Facebook. Reports suggested that a 
young Ahmadi had uploaded a picture of the Kaaba – the holy shrine in Mecca – that featured a 
naked woman on top (Gillani 2014). A friend of the Ahmadi youth discovered the picture, alerted 
people within the community and a crowd that included religious leaders gathered and urged the 
police to register a blasphemy case. Newspaper reports described how at the same time a larger 
mob gathered around the Ahmadi houses, and obstructed fire, police and ambulance services from 
attending the scene (Gillani 2014; McCoy 2014; Dearden 2014). The mob set eight houses on fire 
which led to a grandmother and her two granddaughters, who were locked in their home, burning 
to death. Although the police subsequently registered cases against four hundred people, 
representatives of the Ahmadi community were reported saying that they had done nothing to 
stop the mob, the looting and attacks against the Ahmadis. Zohra Yusuf, chairwoman of the 
independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, was quoted as saying, “The people who 
were killed were not even indirectly accused of blasphemy charges. Their only fault was that they 
were Ahmadis,” (in Gillani 2014).   
 
After the event, there were conflicting reports about the Facebook posts. Although there was 
consensus that someone had seen blasphemous content on the Ahmadi youths account, a 
spokesperson for the Ahmadi community said that someone had stolen his password and 
‘someone had offensively edited the picture’ (in Gillani 2014). Others claimed that the event was 
tied up with a fight between the two former friends that had spiralled out of control. But all agreed 
that Facebook had played an important role.  
 
Meeting with the Ahmadi community is complicated however, as they are cautious about allowing 
strangers into their community and wary of sharing information that might be used against them. 
They have a strict protocol of approvals based on a hierarchical structure that requires approval 
from the head of their community in Pakistan, who are based in a town called Rabwa, gave their 
permission. Without this approval the community members in Gujranwala refused to talk to me. 
In order to get this permission, I had to take an overnight trip to Rabwa, a four-hour drive from 
Islamabad, and be interviewed by the national head of external affairs, the media advisor and 
three representatives, one each from Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. It was through 
these representatives that my entry into the Ahmadi community would be facilitated.  
 
Troubling Practices 
The process of arranging meetings with the Ahmadi community is rigidly controlled because of 
the threats against the Ahmadi community. But these threats, and the risks posed by social media 
and particularly Facebook had also changed the way the community communicated and 
coordinated internally. Shakir, the head of the Ahmadi youth wing for Gujranwala, explained that 
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following the attack in Gujranwala the head of their community, the current Caliph Mirza 
Masroor Ahmad had issued guidance that Ahmadis in Pakistan should stop using Facebook and 
instead rely on WhatsApp for communication. Indeed, the weekly religious message he sent out 
would now also be distributed via WhatsApp message, and Shakir and the other youth leaders set 
up WhatsApp groups to coordinate their community and provided guidance on how to best use 
social media. As he explained, “We have made a group and whatever information we are giving 
to him we will share to him through WhatsApp. I tell people the danger of Facebook, how it can 
be misused, and how to use WhatsApp instead. It’s what our Caliph has said. And it is what we 
should do”.  
 
 Shakir explained that although some people still used Facebook it was now much less, and much 
more carefully. This included one of the young people involved in the Gujranwala attack, who he 
promised he would introduce me to. Although the boy whose Facebook account had been 
implicated in the cause of the attack had emigrated and was now safely in another country. Shakir 
explained that Iftikhar, a good friend of his, had been very close to the whole story. This account 
shows how contexts shape the use of technology, and that the use of technologies, and indeed 
even their adoption, are not predictable. It suggests also that technologies are not necessarily 
liberating or platforms that enable marginalised views to be articulated.   
 
 
7.1.1 The survivor – or how ‘if it causes anarchy we prefer silence’ 
The previous section described the context of the attacks against Ahmadis in Gujranwala as a way 
of illustrating the everyday environment in which Ahmadis live in Pakistan, and introducing some 
of the challenges that Facebook has presented for the community. The following section describes 
Iftikhar’s account of how he uses Facebook and the kind of religious debate that is 
possible, and his account of the attacks and the role of Facebook.  
  
Iftikhar is one of the young boys from the mohalla that was burnt in the attacks on the Ahmadis 
in Gujranwala. The Ahmadi Jamaat arranged a meeting, but insisted that it take place in one of 
their mosques, though of course they emphasised that they couldn't call it a mosque, rather it was 
a community meeting place. The building was in the centre of Gujranwala down a side street, 
with closed circuit television cameras just visible on the edge of buildings, and plain clothes 
private security posted at the entrance to the lane. Behind the high metal gates was a large garden, 
with an undecorated brick building on the two sides. The room that we meet in is clearly the 
community meeting room, with chairs on the three sides, and on the wall images of the founder 
of the faith, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, dressed in his full ceremonial regalia and turban.  
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Iftikhar is twenty-one years old, articulate and keen to talk despite the presence of the Ahmadi 
Jamaat’s youth movement leader in the meeting. He is currently in the last year of a bachelors in 
finance, but after the attack on his home is waiting for a visa to Canada to come through. He will 
leave Pakistan before we are able to meet again. For Iftikhar, faith is important but he is not 
particularly devout, and even though his youth leader is present he says that he looks forward to 
being somewhere where he is not defined by his beliefs.  
 
Iftikhar explains that he uses both a laptop and mobile phone to access the internet, but that the 
laptop is mainly for school work and watching movies whilst the phone is for everything else. He 
shows me his phone, a year-old Q Mobile 8552. Q Mobile is a Pakistani handset brand that sells 
cheap Chinese made sets to the mid and lower end of the smartphone market. Their branding is 
everywhere and for many, it is their first smartphone. For Iftikhar, it is a means of communication 
and a source of entertainment, as well as being a fashion or status symbol. He is proud of his 
phone. He describes how he uses Facebook, WhatsApp and plays games on his phone. He looks 
at his youth leader for permission, who nods and so Iftikhar continues. For him, WhatsApp is how 
he stays in touch with family, with the Jamaat and the youth movement whilst Facebook is for 
chatting with friends. With WhatsApp, he chats with his family, including brothers, sisters and 
both male and female cousins, though his parents don't have smartphones. When I ask him why 
his sisters or female cousins aren’t on Facebook he says “because our Jamaat has prohibited 
girls from using Facebook”. His Facebook account is much more for his male friends, particularly 
friends from outside the Jamaat.  
 
Iftikhar uses Facebook for around an hour a day, using it as part of his studies, “I share things 
regarding any project that has been given to me in my studies” but very rarely posts things about 
personal matters.  He explained that there were some things that were safe to talk about, and other 
things that they had to be careful about, particularly religion. As he said, “You can easily talk 
about sports but if there is some picture which is related to Jamaat then we are very careful.. 
Usually I make no likes and no comments on religion related things. I mean, as Ahmadis, we 
want, we want to tell our point of view but it is prohibited.  
 
Iftikhar went on to describe how it was better to be silent than to speak out if it causes 
problems, “if it causes anarchy then we prefer silence” but that this was difficult as There are a 
lot of people who try to distort our faith distort the image of our respectable personalities. Mindful 
of the consequences, Iftikhar described how after the attack, his use of Facebook changed.  
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Iftikhar: “We kind of left Facebook. Like prior to that we updated things and posted things but 
after that if we did that 90% now we are reduced to 30% or even less than that. Now we 
just check that what is the update. It’s like that there are things that previously we liked 
and posted things but now we don’t. Now I have locked my profile.”  
 
Iftikhar’s account describes how Facebook is a social space for interaction outside the family, 
particularly with friends from college outside his religious community. Yet despite this link to a 
wider social network, for Iftikhar this is not a space where he can speak freely, and especially not 
following the attacks against his family and other Ahmadis in Gujranwala. Because the attacks 
are associated with the sharing of information on Facebook Iftikhar has followed the advice from 
his community to be careful about the way he uses Facebook.  
 
Although Iftikhar and the Ahmadi community describe Facebook as playing an important role in 
the attacks that took place, Facebook is linked to attacks against Ahmadis in other ways too. 
Iftikhar explains that there are many people who criticise and attack the Ahmadis, and that people 
even create fake Facebook accounts to cause problems and stir up trouble for the Ahmadis. As he 
said, “some people make a fake Facebook ID under the name of the Jamaat, and try to create 
anarchy within us. “Now we don’t hardly use Facebook. We use WhatsApp and Viber. I have 
Facebook on mobile but I am hardly not using it. Under the guidance of Jamaat now we not 
supposed to use it.” 
 
For Iftikhar, like so many other Ahmadis, being online is fraught with difficulty and danger. The 
risk presented by people pretending to be Ahmadis is that if they make statements that appear to 
be blasphemous they can mobilise people to attack the community.   
 
The Attack 
Iftikhar explained how the attack had taken place. He described how there had been a cricket 
match between some of his friends and friends from another school. His friend had won and 
announced it on Facebook, but the captain of the other team, whose father was a Maulvi [religious 
leader] refused to accept their loss, and went online to challenge what the other captain had said. 
When he started looking at the Ahmadis Facebook page, he saw that a few weeks ago he had 
made a comment on a picture showing someone urinating on the Kabah at Mecca. He showed 
this picture to his father, who immediately declared it blasphemous and issued a fatwa [religious 
edict] against the Ahmadi’s family. What neither his son nor his father realised, or conceded, was 
that in fact the comment on the picture had been a statement of condemnation against the image.  
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Iftikhar described how, following the announcement of the fatwa, “we rushed home.  We stayed 
indoors, closed our doors and switched off all the lights. And at 3.30 am in the night we were 
rescued from there by the police. Then the people set all the property on fire. There were about 
17-18 of our houses in which 10 were burnt completely and  in all this four of our people died.”  
   
Iftikhar’s account shows how prevalent social media use is, particularly mobile. Yet despite its 
ubiquity it is carefully differentiated amongst the different social circles to which he belongs. He 
describes how for his close family and religious community, WhatsApp is preferred over 
Facebook, which is limited to friends outside the community, such as from college. On Facebook 
Iftikhar describes feeling stifled and unable to express himself freely for fear of being targeted, 
particularly after the attack on his family and neighbours. This sense of being silenced is 
particularly difficult given that there is so much online that he would want to correct, and also 
because whilst he doesn't comment, he can see Ahmadis from other countries where they don't 
face the same persecution commenting and debating freely. Indeed, in later meetings with 
Iftikhar’s friends some mentioned that they created fake accounts through which they were able 
to talk about and debate religious matters, including countering those that challenged and attacked 
Ahmadis. But it was difficult for them to describe these fake accounts because the meeting always 
took place under the watchful eye of the Ahmadi Jamaat youth leader, who watched over for the 
young people’s safety. 
 
Iftikhar’s description of the attack and the role that Facebook played also highlighted it was not 
simply caused by Facebook, as there were conflicts that preceded the perception of the content. 
Furthermore, the understanding of the content itself as blasphemous was based on a 
misunderstanding that was, perhaps, willingly exploited. Yet Facebook’s design as a static 
platform that is presumed to be authentic meant old information was presented in a fixed manner 
and enabled the misinterpretation and helped provide material that justified an attack on an 
already persecuted and vulnerable minority.  
 
 
7.1.2 The Pretender – or how I stopped posting because I’m an Ahmadi  
The previous section described one young Ahmadis account of using Facebook, and his 
perspective on the role that Facebook had played in an attack against his community. This section 
presents the case of another young Ahmadi from Mandi Bahauddin that describes how Facebook 
challenges the ability to negotiate and manage social boundaries.  
 
Saad lives in the walled off, guarded compound of an Ahmadi owned flour mill factory on the 
outskirts of Mandi Bahauddin. The compound, past the guards and double gates, is a haven of tall 
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palm trees, brightly coloured flowers and neatly manicured lawns. It is an oasis of tranquillity 
from the busyness of life outside. We sit drinking green tea in the guest house for visiting factory 
staff and dignitaries, and Saad explains the complications that Facebook has caused in his life.  
 
Saad returned from Lahore where he graduated earlier this year with a degree in computer science, 
and is now waiting for his American visa application to come through so that he can go on to 
continue his studies in Boston. The separation of these different parts of his life are a central 
theme that runs through Saad’s description of his experience of Facebook. Saad is, of course, very 
computer literature, and owns a fast laptop, that is used for work, watching movies, sport and 
playing games as well as a new iPhone. He has an Apple iPad, but “it's a bit useless, except as a 
book”. In the compound, Saad explains that he mainly uses Wi-Fi, as 3G signals don't yet reach 
the factory compound and 2G “it’s too slow, it just makes you frustrated”. Despite this, Saad 
recounts how the internet has been an important part of how he negotiates a conservative father 
and restrictive family life.  
 
Saad explained that at first, the internet had been a technology through which he had been 
able to find new spaces for expression. He described how his father ‘was always so much 
restrictive. He did not like music, so everything was silent. When I got my first computer in tenth 
grade it was a sudden change in life and now in my family there is like my small my younger 
brother only he and myself use Facebook, but I have used WhatsApp a lot.   
 
When Saad describes his transition from school to college and then to University in Lahore, he 
reveals firstly the levels of persecution that the Ahmadi community experience, and secondly the 
way Facebook plays a role in silencing debate. Facebook is revealed as a threat to Saad’s well-
being and indeed safety as a result of features that allow the traversing of friendship groups and 
collapse of social contexts. Saad explained that growing up, he had been fairly isolated in the 
factory compound and surrounded by close friends in the town. He explained that growing up, he 
hadn’t know about the persecution experienced by the Ahmadis, and that ‘most of my friends in 
the college knew that I was Ahmadi but they were my very very close friend, so they did not do 
anything. But it was in his description of moving to University that Saad revealed how Facebook 
complicated the management of different social contexts.  
 
Saad explained that when he left for University he had cut contact with his friends from Mandi 
Bahudin because he was afraid that his friends from home might inadvertently reveal his Ahmadi 
identity to his University friends. And he had good reason to be afraid, as his brother had been 
hounded out of the same University when his religious identity was revealed. His father made 
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him promise not to tell anyone, and to keep that promise and protect himself he cut contact with 
his childhood friends. As Saad described it, “I just like left this place and made friends over there. 
Not one of them knows that I am an Ahmadi. I have to act like I am a Non-Ahmadi. And I never 
talked about my religious life over there, I never talked about this. And whenever they say let’s 
go to namaz [prayers] I will stay at home. I pretend I have an injury or something like that. And 
I did not keep much communication with the Ahmadi Community at home because I knew that if 
they commented or posted things, my friends in University would see, and ask if I am Ahmadi. So 
I completely stopped communication with them.” 
 
After describing how he attempted to separate his home and university life, Saad, went 
on to describe how Facebook had made the effort to manage social contexts much harder, 
and that the only way to cope was to stop communicating. “I always keep thinking should I 
post that here, should I post that there? The difference is very much difficult you can’t make that 
distinction between both the sects. You can’t say that ok this belongs to the Ahmadi community I 
should post that on this profile and this belongs to this community I should post that on.   I am 
using a single Gmail account, a single Facebook account but I stopped communication that could 
cut my life or stop that from happening. I stopped communication I stopped posting things. It’s 
just a part of being an Ahmadi.”  
  
Saad’s description highlights how the design of social networks sites and Facebook in particular 
can pose real dangers to the safety of marginalised groups and identities like the Ahmadis in 
Pakistan. Saad went on to describe how the implications of Facebooks design extended into 
broader public debate, preventing him from participating in conversations about religion and even 
forcing him to pretend to hate Ahmadis for fear of being killed as one.   
 
Saad described how he avoided talking about religion on Facebook, even when his 
community was attacked. Indeed, even when he posted a link to a story about the attack 
in Gujranwala, his friends responded by asking him  “why are you sad for them. They are 
not Muslims, they are allowed to be killed, so why are you sad for them”. Saad described how 
this silenced him completely. In fact, as he went on, he shared how he had to pretend he shared 
the same feelings of his friends towards Ahmadis. As he said, “So if one of my friend talks like 
they [Ahmadis] should be killed I will just say ok ok ok. I had to pretend to protect myself from 
other students. But You get angry within yourself, you know, I am friendly to a person who has to 
pretend to believe that I should be killed. Because he thinks that I should be killed. 
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Saad’s account of how he has to hold back from discussing religion and even pretending to hate 
and want to kill people from his own community emphasises both the level of persecution that 
Ahmadis experience on a day to day basis. It also highlights how technologies are entangled in 
this persecution. Saad’s account of how he is forced in person and on Facebook to make 
statements against his own community only highlight the extent to which he has to hide his own 
identity. As he went on to describe, he has particular strategies that he uses to avoid putting 
himself in the limelight and limit his visibility:  
 
Saad described how he had to actively manage his use of technology, and be aware of 
how others used technology in order to avoid his identity being shared and religion 
revealed. He descrbed how he untagged himself from events he was invited to on 
Facebook, and that “I remove any comment that says he was there, so people don't know. In 
some cases, I block that person so the comment or update would not appear at all.” Saad describes 
conscious management strategies to limit public, visible sharing of his movements. Indeed, he 
went further to describe how he was conscious whenever anyone took a photo, as he had to avoid 
being seen and identified. As he said, “whenever they take pictures I will be the one holding the 
camera. I will say let me take the photo or I have to go to the bathroom or the like. Facebook is 
always watching!”. For Saad, the way Facebook affords the sharing of information caused him 
anxiety and forced him to be vigilant, watching every action and word he said. Indeed, he 
described how Facebook “I never post anything about my personal life, anything about my 
religious beliefs, anything about where I am at the moment and what I am doing with the friends 
because I know that it might harm me in some way or another”. For Saad, Facebook was active 
threat to his wellbeing and personal safety.    
 
Saad describes the chilling effect of Facebook on his ability to speak freely, having to participate 
in denigrating his own community and constant fear of the surveillance of social media. This 
description highlights how social media and Facebook in particular far from disrupting social 
patterns of discrimination and oppression are entangled in and reconstitute the same norms and 
values. And they shape how individuals such as Saad see the world, and the see the future. Saad’s 
case presents a study in how Facebook’s demand for authenticity and the way it allows users to 
traverse friendship groups causes immense suffering and social difficulty. He described how 
although the internet presented a real opportunity to break free from a conservative family, it then 
caused problems when he needed to establish social barriers between his identity Ahmadi and his 
new life at university. Facebook’s demand for authenticity meant that he had to work hard to 
enact an authentic identity that included pretending to want to kill members of his own 
community.  
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This section has described how Facebook presents challenges to marginalised minorities for 
whom enacting authentic identities are complicated and present real dangers. It highlights the 
power of a hegemonic discourse that demands conformity, even to the extent that people pretend 
to hate that who they really are.  
 
 
7.1.3 Discussion and Analysis: Authenticity and Hegemony  
This section analyses the empirical findings that describe Ahmadis’ experience of using 
Facebook. It explains how Facebook’s demand for ‘authenticity’ translates into a demand for the 
enactment of Sunni Islam, which results in further marginalising and alienating the Ahmadis’ 
‘authentic’ identity, placing them at greater risk.  
 
It explains this by showing how, when Facebook collapses contexts and makes content available 
to invisible audiences (Davis and Jurgenson 2014; Marwick and boyd 2010), it is harder for 
Ahmadis to control who sees them. This forces them to moderate how they are perceived. In other 
words, Facebook’s affordance for authenticity makes it harder for Ahmadis to enact their own 
authentic identity, strengthening the hegemonic discourse of Sunni Islam and the definition of 
Ahmadis as non-Muslims and blasphemous. It thus shows how Facebook’s demand for 
authenticity reinforces the hegemonic discourse as the only legitimate form of authenticity. 
Paradoxically, this results in the enactment of ‘fake’ identity as a form of ‘authentic’ identity.  
 
The attacks against Ahmadis in Gujranwala demonstrated the danger of enacting an authentic 
Ahmadi identity and led to instructions from the head of their community to stop or limit the use 
of Facebook and turn instead to WhatsApp. This demonstrates the fallacy of ‘digital dualism’ 
(Jurgenson 2011) and the idea of the Internet as a separate space to enact ‘second selves’ (Turkle 
1984). The inseparability of online and offline identities means that, for Ahmadi Facebook users 
in general, and Iftikhar in particular, the risks associated with enacting an authentic Ahmadi 
subject on Facebook are the same as they are in real life. Indeed, Facebook’s technological 
discourse of the authentic (Haimson and Hoffmann 2016) and archival (Mitchell 2014) self 
includes a tendency towards sharing and storing information. This means that the audience for 
enactments that ‘trouble’ the hegemonic discourse in which Ahmadis are marginalised is 
potentially much larger and, therefore, the risks much greater.  
 
Analysing Iftikhar’s narrative account through a performative lens reveals how Facebook’s 
technological discourse of authenticity serves to silence and further marginalise Ahmadi identity 
from public discourse in Pakistan. Iftikhar describes how, although he is technically proficient 
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and able to comprehend Facebook’s privacy settings, the potential risk of revealing his ‘authentic’ 
identity is so great that he chooses not to use the platform. Instead of feeling ‘liberated’, Iftikhar 
feels “frustrated” and that “it’s better to remain silent”. Thus, some users who face real threats if 
their authentic identity is revealed respond to Facebook’s demand for the enactment of authentic 
identity by simply holding back, resisting the desire to be known and recognised. As Iftikhar 
concludes, “if there is a danger of anarchy, then it’s better to control oneself.” If Ahmadi voices 
self-censor on Facebook because they are afraid of the consequences of revealing their authentic 
selves, then the site serves to further their marginalisation and to strengthen Sunni Islam as the 
hegemonic discourse of religious identity. 
 
Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity means that marginalised users sometimes have to 
fake authentic subjects, even when this conflicts with, and serves to reconstitute, the 
marginalisation of their ‘authentic’ self. Saad’s account of having to disconnect from his college 
friends when moving from Mandi Bahauddin to Lahore, and then having to pretend to be an 
Ahmadi-hating Muslim, demonstrates how Facebook’s technological discourse of authenticity 
intra-acts with hegemonic discourses of context to discipline marginalised subjects.  
 
Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity is exercised through its singular timeline and 
traversable friends’ list, and the resulting affordance for the collapse of social contexts.   This 
demand forces Saad to go along with his friends when they post things on Facebook such as ‘They 
[Ahmadis] should be killed… so I will just say ok, ok, ok. Yeah, I had to pretend to join him.’ Saad 
is forced to conform to the very hegemonic discourse of Pakistani religious nationalism that 
marginalises his own community and identity. As he puts it, ‘I have to develop an image. So I 
have to act that I am a non-Ahmadi.’ As with any performative enactment, the disciplinary power 
of hegemony demands conformity and sanctions deviation.  
 
In Butler’s account, gender identity is ‘produced and destabilized in the course of reiteration’ 
(Butler 1993, 10) and destabilising deployments of gender identity, such as drag, are opportunities 
for change through the ‘bending of citations’ (Lenning 2004).  Reading Saad’s narrative account 
through Butler’s (1990, 1993) notion of performative identity reveals the rhetorical (Morison and 
Macleod 2013; Bamberg 2004) work involved in enacting a ‘fake’ authentic identity. The 
disciplinary power of the hegemonic narrative forces Saad to enact the idealised normative form 
of identity – Sunni Islam. This disciplinary power is exercised through the surveillance 
technology of Facebook’s demand for authenticity and the public understanding that identity on 
Facebook is authentic. Like Foucault’s Panopticon, Facebook demands conformity.  
 
 120 
Reading Saad’s account through a sociomaterial lens highlights how the discourse of authenticity 
is enacted through the site’s design. Saad’s enactment of religious identity is not ‘mediated’ 
through Facebook – this would imply an already existing religious practice, but rather it is a 
‘process of materialisation that configures reality’ (S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2014b, 885). The 
intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourse and performative enactment of religious 
practice enacts an agential cut that establishes a causal structure of the components of the 
phenomenon, diffracting through the apparatus (Barad 2003, 815). In other words, the discourse 
of authenticity intra-acts with the discourse of religious identity through the apparatus of 
Facebook, which diffracts the enactment of authentic religious identity in a specific form. 
Religious identity on Facebook is as real as it is in the mosque or on the street.  
 
Religious identity on Facebook is as ‘real’ as it is in the mosque, and it is framed within the same 
hegemonic discourses. The agential cut (Barad 2007) enacted by Facebook’s demand for 
authenticity reinforces normative Islam as the only form of legitimate authentic identity. In this 
sense, the agential cut enacted by Facebook reinforces the hegemonic discourse of Sunni religious 
nationalism. Making an ‘agential cut’ (Barad 2007) from the perspective of Ahmadis through the 
entanglement of Facebook and religious identity in Pakistan reveals how the liberal secular 
conception of a singular, authentic individual is not a neutral thing, but the product of hegemonic 
discourse. The sovereign, ‘liberated’ individual is as much a product of context as the norative 
religious subject enacted in Pakistan.  
 
As Butler argues, ‘there is no subject before the law’; rather, the law constitutes the subject as a 
means of justifying its legitimacy (Butler 1994, 9). Iqtidar points out that, in Pakistan, the state 
has appropriated ‘the right to declare not just who is a Pakistani citizen but also who is a Muslim’ 
(Iqtidar 2012, 1023). The law – quite literally in the case of Ahmadis in Pakistan’s constitution – 
defines Islam and the Ahmadis as illegitimate, inauthentic Muslims. The entanglement of 
Facebook with religious discourse in Pakistan has produced the non-Ahmadi, who against his/her 
will must enact that which oppresses him/her. Before Facebook, or without its ubiquity such that 
social and academic life demands he use it, Saad may have been able to avoid or limit situations 
where he had to hide his identity or assume a hegemonic one. Facebook, however, demands he 
enact that which marginalises himself and his people. Thus, Facebook’s demand for singular 
authenticity results in the demand for the dominant subject position – in this case, a Sunni 
Deobandi nationalism. As such, it reinforces the marginalisation of minority identities such as 
Ahmadis.  
 
For Ahmadi Facebook users such as Iftikhar and Saad, Facebook’s demand for authenticity forces 
them to silence their own enactment of authentic identity or to enact fake authentic accounts. In 
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both cases, the function of Facebook’s demand for authenticity strengthens the hegemony of the 
normative discourse in which Ahmadis are an illegitimate Pakistani subject.  
 
 
7.2 Shia  
The previous chapter showed how far from liberation from persecution, Ahmadi’s experience 
further marginalisation through Facebook’s reinforcing of the hegemonic discourse of Sunni 
nationalism. The accounts highlighted how the prejudice, marginalisation and attacks that 
Ahmadis experience in their everyday life are mirrored in their online experience, and indeed how 
Facebook can exacerbate the difficulties they face navigating a hostile environment in which their 
authentic identity is deemed illegitimate. This next section presents three case studies of how Shia 
youth experience using Facebook.  
 
The Shia community hold a legitimate, legally recognised Muslim identity in Pakistan unlike the 
Ahmadi whose identity as Muslims is denied. Yet the Shia also face discrimination, and it’s not 
uncommon to see the words ‘Shia Genocide’ graffiti’ed on city walls. This next section therefore 
explores how a legitimate yet nonetheless persecuted minority practice religious the enactment of 
religious identity through social media. The first case is Hammad, a young Shia religious leader, 
who uses Facebook as part of his strategy to engage with his burgeoning audience. The second 
case is Ahsen, a young unemployed Shia in Gujrat who asserts his identity in a defensive manner 
as both Shia and also Pakistani. The third case describes Qasim, a young Shia in Mandi Bahauddin 
who uses Facebook groups to meet people from new areas and engage in sectarian debate that he 
wouldn't otherwise be able to. These cases describe some of the diversity of how Pakistan’s Shia 
Facebook users experience life online and navigate the demands of the country most popular 
social networking site.  
 
7.2.1 The Prince – or how a Shia youth preacher enacts faith on Facebook  
The way Hammad uses Facebook provides an insight into the way a young aspiring Shia preacher 
uses Facebook to enact a religious identity that has been the subject of abuse and attacks. It also 
shows how he uses Facebook to present a constructed identity for public consumption that masks 
his personal life. For Hammad, Facebook is a platform for his identity as a conscious project.  
 
Hammad is the son of a prominent Gujranwala Shia family, a family who own and run a large 
Imam Bargah (congregation hall for Shia commemoration ceremonies), a mosque and two 
madrassahs, one for boys and one for girls. Getting to meet with the family is difficult, as they 
limit contact with outsiders to contact through trusted intermediaries and carefully vet all visitors. 
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Following a few days of tentative arrangements, one evening I’m finally sitting with the head of 
the household and his two elder sons under an idly turning fan in their betak in a narrow concrete 
house hidden away in a small backstreet. He explains that they have to be careful as their mosque 
has been attacked in the past and they continue to receive many threats.  
 
When I explained my research project in earlier telephones, they had said that I needed to speak 
to his nephew, Hammad. But it was only after over an hour discussing the troubled situation of 
the Shia in Pakistan, and the responsibility that their family feels for upholding the Shia 
community and protecting them from harm, this his nephew Hammad enters. He is dressed in a 
pressed black shalwar kameez and plays with a string of sandalwood prayer beads. “Ahh, the 
prince, the prince” his cousins announce as they stand up and move to make space for him on the 
ubiquitous red velvet sofa.  
 
They call Hammad the prince because he is an aspiring preacher with a gift for inspirational poetry 
and a growing reputation for his ability to hold a crowd with his recitals at majalis – Shia religious 
gatherings. They had earlier explained to me that an important part of Hammad’s work to establish 
his reputation is the way he uses Facebook as a platform to spread his profile and his message. 
Hammad explains that he has had a Facebook for the last four years, but it is only now, in the last 
year or so that he has really started to use it as an important part of his religious practice. The first 
part of this practice was building up a diverse friendship group on Facebook, as he explains, “ I 
have added everyone, and I only have a single account, I don’t have any fake account. So all my 
friends, my family members, my university fellows, my school fellows, my street fellows”. 
Hammad’s Facebook integrates his many social contexts into one space.  
 
Although diverse in terms of social context, Hammad’s Facebook friends are uniformly male. 
And in describing how he shares his account with this mother, Hammad reveals the degree to 
which for him Facebook is a public rather than private platform.  He described how he shared his 
password with his mother, and that when she wanted to use his Facebook, he said  “I say ok, but 
don’t message anyone (laughs). Yeah, they can use my account, there is no such thing 
personal in that. Facebook isn’t very personal”. Hammad shares his account with his 
mother – highlighting how his mother doesn’t have her own phone or Facebook account 
– and reveals that the platform for him is public, not personal.   
 
Facebook plays an important role in Hammad’s effort to enact his religious identity and 
communicate with his growing fan base. When he showed me his account, the profile photo was 
of him at a majalis, dressed in black speaking on stage into microphones. His background photo 
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was of him kneeling to kiss the flower bedecked grave of his teacher, who had been killed in a 
car bomb just over a year ago. Hammad also explained that he changed his profile photo to reflect 
significant events, such as a blank black image to mark massacres of Shia and commemorative 
events such as Muharram. For Hammad, his Facebook profile is part of performing his identity 
as a Shia teacher, and communicating his beliefs. As he explained he desire famed as a means 
through which to communicate his beliefs, and Facebook was a tool to achieve that aim. As he 
said, “Fame is important to get people to attend majalis – to have a famous name on posters that 
advertise the event. It helps spread the knowledge and the more persons who know, it’s right na”. 
Hammad’s Facebook account is a tool that he uses to further his commitment to spreading his 
faith, not a reflection of an inner, authentic self.   
 
In this sense Facebook serves as a means of religious practice, and through which religious merit 
may be accrued, yet it is also fraught with danger. Hammad described how “I am sharing 
something informative, and if you do it’s a Sawab”. Although Hammad acknowledges that prayer 
in a  Imam Bargah or Mosque is “is 70 times more than if we are praying in Facebook in our 
home”, for him Facebook remains a medium through which the religious word can be spread, 
religious merit earned and religious practice upheld. But although Facebook creates this 
opportunity for Hammad to reach out achieve a greater audience, it also means that he has a higher 
profile and is the target for abuse. He describes how although he tries to have a very positive 
message, he gets messages that threaten and abuse him. As he says, “They inbox me and say don’t, 
you don’t preach. You speak openly and we will kill you”. For Hammad, being accessible and 
sharing his personal information is part of his identity, and the reason people call him directly is 
because he has put his telephone number on his Facebook profile. Yet for Hammad there is a 
tension between wanting to be accessible and protecting his safety.  
 
For Hammad his Facebook profile is part of his public religious persona, a medium through which 
he enacts the religious preacher and teacher of the Shia faith. Hammad’s account describes an 
assertive enactment of Shia identity that draws support from his strong and powerful family. He 
uses Facebook to both for his religious practice and also the public nature of his religious path, 
enabling him to support his performance at majalis and have the confidence to put himself out 
there in the public eye. Despite threats and abuse, Hammad’s main concern around privacy is 
protecting his videos and photographs from the prying eyes of his mother. In other words, 
Hammad shows how a  young Shia is able to resist the expectation of conformity to a dominant 
hegemonic discourse. It shows how despite many Shia facing attacks and criticism Hammad 
asserts a distinctly Shia identity. This reflects his offline identity and background, with a strong 
supportive family and a readily available platform from which he can assert his identity as a Shia 
preacher. By way of contrast, the next section describes a young Shia Facebook user who has 
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none of this supportive background and indeed is both unemployed undermined by his father. 
This serves to echo the situation that many young people find themselves in, searching for a job 
and personal affirmation.  
 
 
7.2.2 The Eagle – or enacting Shia patriotism   
The previous section presented an example of how Facebook was used by Hammad to assert his 
faith in a conscious intentional manner, articulating his beliefs as well as responding to and 
dealing with anti-Shia abuse. In contrast to Hammad’s use of Facebook as a self-conscious 
platform for his religious identity, this section describes how Ahsen, engages in less self-
conscious and more personal performative enactments of identity. 
 
Ahsen graduated from a college in Gujrat but like so many young people, he is currently 
unemployed. His father works in the local court and through his biraderi (kinship) network he 
has taken and successful passed an interview for a trainee position in the court (he doesn't know 
what he will be in training for). Unfortunately, the presiding judge who approves appointments 
has retired and they are currently waiting for a replacement. Ali has been waiting for nine months. 
He is frustrated, feels stuck and far from the person that he aspires to be. Ahsen lives with his 
parents, elder brother and his wife, his unmarried sister and cousin from a nearby village in a 
second floor three room apartment in a concrete block in the barricaded court complex. The 
grounds are overrun with marijuana plants and while the concrete is solid enough that it blocks 
out the noise of the street, without air conditioning the air is hot during the day. There is daily 
‘load shedding’ (electricity cuts) and the generator only works intermittently.  
 
Because he doesn't have a job, Ahsen can’t afford a smartphone and only uses Facebook on the 
laptop he shares with his brother. He has asked his father for money for many things, including a 
new phone, but his father has said his support only goes so far as opening the door, he can help 
his son get a job, but he won’t pay his way. Indeed, when his father enters in a subsequent meeting, 
he castigates his son for not being independent enough, to which Ali responds with a resigned, 
humiliated “Ji, Baba” [yes father]. In short, Ahsen feels stuck and demoralised. 
 
Religion is an important part of Ahsen’s life, yet it doesn't define his identity in the way that it 
does Hammad’s. Ahsen, and his family, are all Shia. On the wall, in addition to the picture of the 
Kabah [the building at the centre of Islam’s most sacred mosque Al Masjid al-Haram] that is 
common in nearly all Muslim households regardless of sect, there are images of a horse, that 
signifies the animal that carried Ali from the battle of Karbala and of a sword, that signifies 
Zulfiqar, the sword of Hazrat Ali. Yet Ahsen is not particularly observant, doesn't pray five times 
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a day and by his own admission only rarely makes it through the full month of fasting during 
Ramadan. Yet although he proclaims an inner commitment to his faith, he describes how his 
father pushes him, saying “I should be more Muslim, I should pray more. He pushes me, always”. 
Ahsen describes a strong feeling of expectation, a sense that others demand he express his 
religious identity in a stronger manner.  
 
In the face of these expectations, Ahsen describes Facebook as a place where he can exercise 
control and enact a sense of self that has meaning for him. Although he only uses facebook three 
or four times a week, it is important to him, “I’m not an addict, but I’m myself”. He has been on 
the site for nearly two years, has nearly eighty friends, mostly family and college friends. All of 
them are male.  When Ahsen first shows me his Facebook profile and describes his profile picture 
and the meaning behind it, religion is not really mentione. Instead, he describes an image of the 
Pakistan Pakistan Air Force eagle. “it’s a kind of patriotism and I am quite patriotic Pakistan. In 
Pakistan but we all are very aggressive about it”. For Ahsen, the first thing he describes in his 
Facebook profile is an image that articulates his patriotism and commitment to the Pakistan 
military. He also described the background image, an picture of Al Pacino as Scarface, and 
explained that he liked it because “He’s like a gangster. He started from nothing, just like a 
worker”. In this description, Ahsen links qualities that he feels he lacks to qualities embodied in 
Al Pacino, using Facebook as a platform to highlight the kind of qualities that he feels are lacking 
in his own life.  
 
The second time we meet, his description includes an account of the religious aspects of his 
Facebook profile. I asked him to explain the profile photo that he had had before the Pakistan 
Airforce eagle and of Scarface, which he had mentioned was a plain back one. He said that it was 
“Black and a quote that said, ‘If I am not Muslim then what? Kill me?. He went on to describe 
how he experienced many people saying that Shia are not Muslim, but that he was proud to be 
Shia, “ I am not trying to hide myself, what I am. In Muharram or specific days, I have uploaded 
a few photos about religion, ‘Ya Hussain’ or something like that ‘matam’ [the Shia practice of 
self-flagellation to commemorate Hussain]”. For Ahsen, unlike Hammad, his experience of his 
religious identity was one of persecution and defense, coupled with the need to assert his 
patriotism as a Pakistani.   
 
This account by Ahsen of the way he uses Facebook profiles as personal, national and religious 
expression highlights the performative aspect of the multiple identities that Ahsen holds. It also 
highlights how for Ahsen it’s important to emphasise his sense of being Pakistani as well as to 
defend his identity as a Shia Muslim. Ahsen struggles with his situation in life, and seeks to enact 
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a sense of self that reflects various aspirations that are articulated in the broader narrative of 
individual empowerment, national belonging and the defensive assertion of religious identity.  
 
This section has described how difficult it can be for some Shia  Facebook users to assert their 
identity and sense of ‘authentic’ self, as they look for affirmation and a sense of meaning and self-
worth. For Ahsen this is in submitting to the forms of identity made available by dominant 
discourses, such as Pakistani nationalism and the masculine identities of Hollywood gangsters. In 
contrast, the next section describes a young Shia Facebook user who navigates the new social 
spaces created by Facebook and the sectarian debates he finds there.  
 
 
7.2.3 The group leader – or how Shia users navigate new friends and old enemies  
This section presents the case of Qasim, a young Shia Facebook user in Mandi Bahauddin. It 
describes how the way he uses the technology reveals clearly stratified gender divisions as well 
as the way Facebook groups connects him to people he wouldn't otherwise meet and to sectarian 
debates that he struggles to navigate.  
  
I meet Qasim in his uncle’s house in a backstreet of a Mandi Bahauddin suburb. The street is too 
narrow for a car, paved with brick and has open sewers running along both sides. The corner plot 
is undeveloped, and filled with rubbish that a lone buffalo noses around in. The children kicking 
a football in the street point out his house, which is opposite a small shop with well-worn wooden 
counter. Qasim’s uncle was one of the few telephone survey respondents from Mandi Bahauddin 
who had identified as Shia, and although he didn't want to be interviewed he had agreed to arrange 
an interview with his nephew.  
 
Qasim is 18 years old, and studying civil engineering in Mandi Bahauddin. He’s wearing the 
traditional shalwar kameez, but sports a baseball cap with ‘boom boom’ on it, a reference to 
‘boom boom’ Shahid Afridi, Pakistan’s most famous cricketer. He is keen to talk, excited about 
his new phone – a Samsung Galaxy S3 that was a present from his brother who lives in Germany. 
Qasim explains that he is very happy with the phone, it’s very fast especially with the 3G that 
Telenor launched six months ago. He describes how when Telenor launched 3G services they had 
some weeks when data usage was free, and then he used to use the internet all the time, watching 
movies, streaming music and browsing the internet. Now he has a weekly package for Rs75 a 
week, that gives him one gigabyte of data, three hundred minutes and three hundred text 
messages. He doesn't normally use up his entire allowance.  
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Facebook groups are an important and revealing part of Qasim’s description of the way he uses 
the site. He describes how they have enabled him to meet people that he would never have been 
able to meet before, but also reveals the limits to the issues that are discussed on Facebook. Qasim 
first explained how the ability to add friends of friends allows groups to grow and thus to connect 
to people in completely different places. He described how he had joined a poetry group with 
over a thousand members,, and allowed him to meet new people when he travelled to other parts 
of the country. As he said,  if we are travelling to Mirpur, we post ‘we are travelling to Mirpur’. 
People from Mirpur would ask you are coming to our city so welcome to you. So they somehow 
manage to meet us. Or if someone posts, ‘we are travelling to Mandi’, we ask which point if park, 
or canal point so we go and meet them.” For Qasim, this meant that Facebook had enabled him 
to meet people he would not otherwise have met, expanding his social horizons and his social 
network. But though this expanded world offered new opportunities, Qasim also explained how 
the topics of conversation in these groups was limited to safe topics. As he said,  “we can’t be 
frank with Facebook friends; we are frank only with our real life friends.  
 
In contrast to the limited conversations that take place amongst Facebook only friends, Qasim 
also described how there were some specific Facebook groups that focused on controversial topics 
such as religion. In these groups, as Qasim explained, there were lots of very frank and 
controversial debates that take place. He described how he was part of nine or ten groups that 
were dedicated to discussing Shia related issues, including Sunni vs Shia issues. He explained 
that he never chose to be part of any Sunni groups, but that sometimes if one of his friends gets 
added or mentioned in a comment, he gets notified as do all his friends, drawing them into what 
can often turn into sectarian debates. As he put it:  
 
“someone will get added like a Satan, post something wrong and then drop off. And so 
there if someone tags my friend I get a notification too. Whenever my friend posts 
something and others comment on it, then he tells something then he tells something, he 
comments and then he comments.  Both side criticize each other.’   
 
In this account, Qasim describes how Facebook’s design that affords the sharing of 
content and the interaction of users leads to boundaries between different identity groups 
being broken, leading to arguments and conflict. Yet Qasim described how participating 
in this sectarian debate was also understood as a religious practice. He said that  “by telling 
someone who is ignorant, It could be happening that he would agree and get benefit. It is like 
‘hidayat’ [Arabic for ‘guidance’, used in the Quran to describe divine instruction], and we get 
‘Sawab’ [religious merit] for this.” 
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 Qasim describes how ‘frank’ and controversial debated do take place on Facebook, but in in his 
experience in specific Shia Facebook groups dedicated to Shia-Sunni debate. Importantly, he 
describes these as being Shia groups that are separate from Sunni groups, but the walls between 
them are easily overcome through Facebook’s affordance for content sharing and interaction. 
Qasim described how he gets involved in these debates because friends tag him, and thus enrolled 
he feels he has to correct what he understands as errors in other people’s thinking.  This sectarian 
form of debate of course reflects the broader sectarian divisions in Pakistan, but I wanted to know 
the extent this kind of debate was part of his experience of Facebook. When I asked him to 
explain, he said to me that he only engaged a few times, but saw these kinds of debates every day.  
 
 The case of Qasim presents a description of how a young Shia navigates the new social spaces 
created by Facebook. It highlights how although it allows him to meet people he wouldn't 
otherwise meet, the kind of conversation that takes place between people online is superficial and 
avoids divisive issues. Substantive debate about issues such as religion rely on trusted 
relationships and in-person conversation, as conflict and division can be easily caused when 
people post content that aims to inflame tensions. Yet sharing religious content is viewed as a 
good thing, and one that earns religious merit.   
 
This section has presented three cases of how young Shia Facebook users experience life online 
and specifically religious debate. It has shown how the offline context of users plays an important 
role in how they present themselves online, and the kind of debate they engage in. it has shown 
that sectarian debate is generally avoided though some users do respond to attacks against Shia 
beliefs. It has also shown how users experience outsiders deliberately inflaming sectarian tension 
by posting anonymous posts and content. Finally, it also showed how whilst Facebook opens new 
spaces for debate, debate about contentious issues relies on trust and established relationships.  
 
 
7.2.4 Discussion and Analysis: Authenticity and Hegemony  
Analysis of the experiences of Shia Facebook users shows how they are able to enact their 
‘authentic’ identity as Pakistani Shia Muslims, yet these enactments reveal the workings of 
hegemonic discourse and the way debate is shaped by the structure of Facebook.  
 
In Pakistan, the Shia are recognised as legal citizens, unlike the Ahmadis who are constitutionally 
defined as ‘minorities’ and non-Muslims. Yet, the growing anti-Shia rhetoric and violence (K. 
Ahmed 2012; Kalin and Siddiqui 2014; Nasr 2007) mean that being Shia in Pakistan is occupy a 
marginalised subject position. The survey results emphasise that Shia respondents are less 
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comfortable speaking out about religious matters: 29 percent of Shia respondents said they felt 
free to post and share religious opinions, compared to 47 percent of Sunni respondents; 54 percent 
of Shia respondents said they hesitated to share their religious opinions, compared to only 28 
percent of Sunni respondents. Shia respondents have a very different relationship with social 
media compared to Sunni respondents.  
 
The empirical accounts, however, demonstrate a diversity of experiences, from Hammad’s 
confident articulation of his identity as a Shia preacher to Ahsen’s more complex portrayal of 
multiple subject positions. Indeed, these two accounts highlight again the fallacy of digital dualist 
accounts of technology and the importance of recognising that performative enactments of 
identity on social media are sociomaterial entanglements of the social and the material.  
 
A sociomaterial reading of Hammad’s account emphasises that online enactments are inextricably 
entangled with the offline context of identity and hegemonic discourse. Hammad is secure in his 
sense of self and supported by his family, who recognise and respect him as both an individual 
and an aspiring preacher. When he says, ‘I want to be famous and I want to preach’ and 
‘Facebook, I use it for publicity’, he indicates that the recognition he seeks through his enactment 
of himself as a Shia preacher is consciously, narrowly defined. Hammad’s family grant him 
security in his religious identity and thus give him confidence to enact performatively.  
 
It is thus a subject position that exists in an offline discursive framework as much as (if not more 
than) an online one. Arguably, it is the strength of his position offline, in terms of both personal 
and institutional support, that allows Hammad to enact his Shia identity with confidence. The 
‘agential cut’ (Barad 2003) enacted through the intra-action of Facebook’s technological 
discourse of authenticity with Hammad’s articulation of the authentic preacher has a completely 
different diffraction to Saad’s enactment of authenticity. Where Saad’s enactment is diffracted as 
a ‘fake’ authenticity, Hammad’s enactment is diffracted as an authentic self that aligns with the 
authenticity demanded by Hammad’s family and allowed by the wider hegemonic discourse of 
religious nationalism.  
 
In contrast to Hammad, Ahsen’s enactment of subject positions through Facebook can be read as 
the performative constitution of the nationalist, patriotic subject. Posting images of the Pakistan 
air force golden eagle is explained as ‘a kind of patriotism, and I am quite patriotic about it, about 
Pakistan.’ Analysed as a performative act, Ahsen’s citation of military references as patriotic 
nationalism produces himself as a patriotic subject, an ‘authentic’ Pakistani. Although it is beyond 
the scope of this project to make psychological assessments, one could speculate that, while 
Hammad is confident in articulating his religious identity because his family is so supportive, 
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Ahsen’s lack of support and confidence could explain his enactment of patriotism as a counter to 
marginalisation as a Shia.  
 
What can be said is that Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity portrays Ahsen’s multiple 
identities as a single, coherent identity. In Barad’s (Barad 2003) terms, the agential cut enacted 
by the intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourse of singular authenticity with Ahsen’s 
multiple identities serves to structure or diffract these multiple, fragmentary identities into a 
single, coherent enactment.  
 
Facebook’s discourse of authenticity intra-acts with discourses of religious identity to diffract the 
enactment of Shia identity in different ways. For some, such as Hammad, Facebook allows the 
enactment of curated authenticity and the presentation of an assertive Shia identity. Others, such 
as Ahsen, seek to emphasise their patriotism as Pakistani subjects in addition to their Shia identity. 
These accounts also serve to counter claims of digital dualism and highlight how online identity 
is intimately entangled with identity offline. 
 
 
7.3 Sunni 
In contrast to Ahmadi and Shia Facebook users, the majority Sunni Facebook users describe very 
different experiences of enacting religious identity through Facebook.   This next section presents 
three cases studies of how Sunni Facebook users use Facebook and their experience of religious 
debate. It highlights how, as members of the dominant discourse of religious identity, they reveal 
latent sectarianism even by ‘moderate’ believers, and experience greater freedom in sharing 
information and engaging in religious and sectarian debate. It first presents the case of Hamid, a 
young scrap metal dealer who engage in sectarian debate, but only amongst Sunni Muslims. The 
second case describes how a young apparently moderate Sunni Wahhabi describes using 
Facebook, revealing latent sectarian views and an experience of Facebook that is guarded yet 
inflected with religious practice. The final case describes a young Wahhabi user whose use of 
Facebook is characterised by sectarian debate that is understood as a form of religious practice.  
 
 
7.3.1 The assertive majority – or how a Deobandi perceives the external ‘other’   
For Hamid, Facebook is a social place that reflects his offline social world, within which sectarian 
debate is common. Hamid is a scrap metal dealer from Gujranwala, and we are introduced in the 
second floor office of his friend, the manager of a sewer drain construction company and a 
respondent in the telephone survey who identified himself as a Deobandi, but hadn’t wanted to 
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be interviewed. Instead, he had suggested we speak to his friend, Hamid. The room that we meet 
in is the ‘resting room’, with foam mattresses on the floor and a muted television tuned to the 
news on the wall. The fan turns slowly as we talk.  
 
Hamid is twenty-eight years old and was born in Gujranwala, though he has family in Mirpur. He 
wears a dirty and clearly well used shalwar kameez and his chappals (sandals) are well worn 
plastic ones. He explains that he only accesses the internet through his phone, a second hand 
Android smartphone that he constantly checks throughout our conversation. Both of the major 
mobile phone networks had launched 3G services in the country, and Hamid explained that used 
both mobile internet and Wi-Fi. He was on the internet “all the time”, mainly using WhatsApp 
and Facebook, with WhatsApp used mainly for work, “for sending snaps to clients, of metal and 
designs and things” and Facebook for fun. As he says this, his friend the manager interjects to 
say “he also gets sexy snaps, videos”. Hamid laughs in acknowledgement and goes on to explain 
that many people send him sexy videos, passing over his phone to show a video of a young woman 
doing an erotic dance in front of red velvet curtains.   
 
Hamid went on to explain that whilst he used WhatsApp for work, many friends used it for 
chatting and kept inviting him to groups, but he wasn't interested in using WhatsApp for chatting. 
For him WhatsApp was for work, and Facebook for fun. He described that although he had been 
on Facebook for about eighteen months and signed up when his brother had also joined, he only 
had about ninety friends on Facebook. He explained that all his Facebook contacts were “male, 
no females in my friends group, none of my sisters have mobile phones”. Hamid went on to 
explain that he spent many hours a day on Facebook, “ We spend maybe three, four hours per day 
just looking at Facebook”.   
 
For Hamid, Facebook is a social place where he has fun with his friends, but also one where there 
are limits to the kinds of things people share. This was particularly the case in the context of 
religious content, as Hamid explained that although there was a lot of religious material on 
Facebook, it was something that he was careful about how he engaged with. He explained that of 
the first ten items in his Newsfeed, religious posts and items made up between a third to two thirds 
the content he saw when he logged in.  
 
Hamid described how the religious content in his Newsfeed was dominated by posts from the 
three major sects of Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Barelvi. He explained that while he agreed with 
twemty percent the posts, there was more that he disagreed with, and when he disagreed with a 
post, he said, “if they are wrong then I tell them. I tell them straightly”. When I asked him to 
describe the kinds of things he would disagree with he, he said:  
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Hamid: “For example I saw a video of Tahir-ul-Qadri, in which he says that no one has 
the jurisdiction over the dispute or rafa-yaden (to let your hands stay loose 
instead of tying them on your chest or abdomen). Tahir-ul-Qadri said that 
everyone used to offer prayers this way but I no longer do so. So to send this 
video to someone who is an opponent of such views and make him realize that 
look! The scholars of your own sect are saying so, he is saying that I do not 
perform rafa yaden but all my Imams (prominent scholars) had performed this 
while offering their prayers. 
 
The issue of the correct posture for prayer is a divisive one amongst Pakistani Muslims, 
and this example demonstrates how pervasive it is within Hamid’s social circles. But as 
Hamid described, his social circle is almost entirely limited to Sunnis, as he said “I don't 
have any friends who are from Shia”. As a result of this social differentiation, Hamid revealed 
that he sees almost no content posted by Shia, and even when he does, “I don't comment”. He 
contrasted this reluctance to engage in debate on Facebook with his willingness to debate face to 
face, saying “I am in a face to face argument then I surely will prove my point Inshallah”.  
 
In this account Hamid describes how his experience of Facebook and the content of his Newsfeed 
has a significant amount of religious content in it, but that it is dominated by posts about Sunni 
Islam. Importantly, he describes how whilst he comments and engages with this content he 
refrains completely from engaging with any Shia related content. Although Hamid references the 
difference between the different sects, he made more of the tension between Muslims and non-
Muslims, and against Pakistan as a nation. In this account of how he shares content, and the 
example that he gave, he reveals how for him the threatening ‘other’ is one that challenges all 
Muslims.  
 
Hamid’s description of the references to Islam on Facebook characterised Muslims in 
general as victims and Pakistani Muslims as virtuous.  Hamid’s account of the portrayal 
of Muslims as victims was particularly apparent in his description of a photograph of the 
body of Syrian child who had washed in Greece, a photograph that had achieved world 
wide exposure. He described how he believed that the child “was a Muslim from Burma, 
where there are atrocities against Islam; his family was subjected to a number of atrocities all of 
his family members drowned.  They died because they were Muslim”.   
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This description of persecuted Muslims reflects way in which content can be appropriated to  
support existing narratives of threats against Islam. And for Hamid, this narrative was also part 
of a wider account of threats against Pakistan as well. As he talked about the growing number of 
violent militant attacks against other Muslims, he described this in a way that externalised the 
threat to be one that was threatening a unified form of Pakistani Islam. He described how “the 
militants hiding in Waziristan, Karachi and Quetta Balochistan are not Muslims. They have 
adopted our culture, our attire, they look like us. But they are not Muslims, as the blood of a 
Muslim is forbidden to be shed by another Muslim. It’s haram”. For Hamid, it was inconceivable 
that Muslims would kill other Muslims, and certainly not Pakistani Muslims.  
 
In this section I described how a member of Pakistan’s influential Deobandi sect experiences 
engaging with religion on Facebook. I showed how common the usage of mobile phones to access 
the internet was, and how users divided up services into categories of use, in Hamid’s case into 
work and entertainment. Facebook as an entertainment platform was characterised by high levels 
of gender division, with Hamid casually referencing that no female members of his family had a 
mobile phone, let alone a Facebook account. His account also presented  Facebook as highly 
divided along sectarian lines, and he only engaged with other sects from Sunni sects, ignoring 
comments and content about Shia Islam. For Hamid, the greatest threat was presented by those 
attacking Islam and Pakistan, with both being external and ‘other’, or in other words the threat 
came from non-Muslims and non-Pakistanis. This description of the threats against faith and 
country reflect the hegemonic discourse of Pakistani religious nationalism.  
 
 
7.3.2 The silent majority – or how a ‘moderate’ Wahhabi avoids debate  
Mustafa’s description of the way he uses Facebook shows how a member of Pakistan’s dominant 
religious community exercises restraint in avoiding online debate, yet simultaneously reveals how 
hegemonic discourses are upheld as normative religious identities. Mustafa teaches in Mandi 
Bahauddin ’s oldest college, a complex of old colonial buildings shaded by low hanging trees 
whose roots threaten to break their worn stones bases whilst their branches reach out to shade 
students from the sun. It is a public college and the electricity often fails. It is hot. We meet in a 
class room of worn benches and an intermittently slow turning fan. Mustafa is twenty two years 
old and has returned from Islamabad to Mandi Bahauddin to earn some money whilst he 
completes his masters in chemical engineering. He comes from a conservative Sunni family and 
follows the Ahle Hadith school of Islam, but is well educated and as my research assistant, who 
is a friend and introduced us, he is “a somewhat moderate Wahhabi”. Yet as this interview 
reveals, Mustafa’s views on religion and his description of religion and Facebook emphasise how 
different the experience of dominant religious groups.  
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Mustafa is very technologically adept, even though he has only had a smartphone for a year. 
Before buying an expensive Samsung Galaxy Note 1 he had a Nokia E71 that was internet enabled 
but had a much smaller screen, which he described as “better for writing, bad for looking”. He’d 
made the switch to the almost tablet sized Note 1 because he had come to read more than he was 
writing.  Danish still keeps the old phone, but uses it mainly for emails as he likes the keyboard. 
Internet connection is mainly through Wi-Fi at college and home, and although Telenor has 
launched 3G in Mandi Bahauddin , he is on rival network Warid and hasn't yet switched. He 
explains that he is very comfortable with social media, using most of the common platforms:  
 
Mustafa explained that he used social media a lot, mainly Facebook and WhatsApp but also with 
accounts on Viber, Tango and LinkedIn. He described how on social media, particularly 
Facebook, he felt ‘always connected’. Mustafa’s Facebook friendslist was also very big, with over 
a thousand friends, and very diverse, including friends from different University departments, 
college and school friends. He also explained that he had  family members including female 
cousins in his list, but that this was acceptable because “I add people who are sensible, who are 
decent a bit. So there is nothing that that you feel uncomfortable for your family. I am careful 
about what I say”. This control over self-expression was articulated in terms of what was 
considered acceptable to express publicly, as he said ““I don’t think we need to express our 
feelings on Facebook.  If you put emotions maybe you want to get some sympathy”.    
 
When Mustafa describes the religious use of Facebook, he reveals how the site enables sharing 
of religious quotations, as well as the earning of religious merit. The sharing of religious 
quotations, and the debates that take place are also linked to the prospect of sharing information 
that can help inform people and even persuade them to change their religious beliefs. Mustafa 
describes how although he he expresses prayers and good wishes through the use of Hadiths. 
These are usually in form of images, “painted pictures which we share, the kind of Hadiths or 
Quranic verses which are printed in pictures. You download that picture, you share that picture 
or you can say send a picture.” 
  
The sharing of religious images and quotations is very common, and many described how 
they would download them from specific websites or Facebook pages. Mustafa explained 
that he really liked the Hadith pages, and the sharing of the quotations from the Koran. 
He described how he believed that sharing them was a good deed in which he earned 
religious merit, though he wasn’t sure how to measure the merit that was earned. As he 
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said. “There is sawaab but if you offer prayer at home then that sawaab is seventy times lesser 
than that at mosque. Facebook is public, but it’s more like offering prayer at home.” 
 
Mustafa describes the kinds of religious content that he shares, and the religious merit that is 
earned from this sharing. Importantly, the content that he shares is commonly in the form of 
pictures, rather than text that is copied out and written. This is important because it means that 
the shared quote is taken as a whole without the possibility of editing it, reinforcing the literal 
translation or perpetuating bad translations. 
 
The importance of authentic religious knowledge is an issue that Mustafa emphasises in relation 
to the discussion of religion on Facebook. In particular, he argues that because people are not well 
educated, they shouldn't be involved in public debate.  Mustafa describes the religious divide in 
Pakistan as one between Sunni and Shia Islam, saying “These sects are Sunni and Shias. So if 
there is anything like this and that if there is one statement from Sunni scholar or person there 
would be a sectarian fight. So we try to avoid it”.  
Mustafa is a well educated and knowledgeable young man. He has travelled within Pakistan and 
studied with people from across the country. His friends, of whom my research assistant is one, 
view him as a moderate, tolerant Sunni Wahhabi. In this account Mustafa reveals a latent 
sectarianism that only revealed itself once trust had been established. In acknowledging the 
importance of trust and close relationships for the discussion of sensitive subjects such as 
sectarian differences, Mustafa also highlights how Facebook is not the place for discussion of 
these sensitive topics, both personal and religious.  
 
This section has described how a member of Pakistan’s Wahhabi sect experiences faith, Facebook 
and religious debate. It described how Mustafa is viewed by others as religiously literate yet 
moderate and tolerant. Indeed, he reveals a high level of religious knowledge, particularly 
differences between sects. Mustafa’s account of the way he uses Facebook also reveals how for 
him the platform is not a space of ‘authentic’ revelation. He has a large number of friends from 
the different aspects of his life, though he concedes to knowing perhaps only half of them and 
thus for him Facebook is a particularly public space in which his audience is both known and 
imagined. Sharing religious content is a common practice, and is understood to earn religious 
merit. This practice is characterised by the sharing of reformatted religious greetings. This 
characteristic is particularly important in the context of the veracity of religious content, narrative 
and discourse as the those sharing this kind of content are not able to edit the content before 
sharing. They rely on its veracity. Despite the importance of sharing religious content, for Mustafa 
Facebook is not a place where personal feelings or sensitive topics such as religion and 
sectarianism are shared.   
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7.3.3 Algorithmic sectarianism   
Hamid and Mustafa’s accounts of digital religious practice described how they enacted religious 
identities, but largely refrained from engaging in debate with people from other sects. This next 
account describes how the interaction of Umaids religious practice and Facebook’s design leads 
to intense sectarian interaction and debate.  
 
Umaid is a student at a Lahore University campus in Mandi Bahauddin. The campus is on the 
edge of the town, with long lines of Chinese made Honda motorbikes lined up outside, high 
walls topped with barbed wire and two armed guards at the entrance who check everyone’s ID 
before opening the wall high reinforced gate to allow them to enter. Inside there are open grass 
lawns, a shop selling snacks and a crowds of young people clustered together in groups on the 
lawn and walking purposefully between the buildings. There crowd is diverse in appearance. 
Male students wear clothing from suits and ties to traditional shalwar kameez while female 
students wear clothing that ranges from traditional shalwar kameezes with a light dupatta over 
their shoulders and chest to the full niqab that covers their body, head and face in billowing 
black material. The student body is diverse and large – the campus is crowded, with makeshift 
building to add new class rooms. They are soon to move to a new, dedicated campus able to 
hold twice the number of students.  
 
As a student of marketing and commerce, Umaid is dressed in a two-piece business suit and 
carries a briefcase,  presenting an image as a serious, ambitious young man. He explains that his 
ambition is to work for a mobile phone company or a bank. As well as his professional 
ambition, Umaid impresses on me that he is also very committed to his faith. He explains that 
his father is very proud of him for his academic work but also for his attention to his religious 
studies and knowledge. He explains that he is a Sunni, but when I ask which sect he belongs to, 
he is very quick to correct me:   No, no. No. My group is Ahle Sunnah.  I have to follow the 
Sunnah (ways of the prophet of Islam) and hadith (sayings of the prophet of Islam).  It is before 
the sects, before Ahle Hadith. The Ahle Hadiths, and the others...sometimes it is wrong. 
Sometimes they don't read it right. Or they have bid’ah, they go away from the Sunnah”. Umaid 
embodies the aspiration for material success with a passionate observance of his conservative 
creed.  Umaid explained that his particular form of Islam views the words and deeds of the 
prophet Muhammad as guidance, rejecting the hadiths and other interpretations of the words 
and deeds of the prophet as bid’ah or the introduction of ideas not based on the literal words and 
deeds of the prophet. In his embrace of both material aspiration and faith, Umaid embodies the 
modern, conservative Muslim and demonstrates that modernity and religion can flourish 
together.  
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The compatibility of material and religion was also apparent in Umaid’s use of technology. He 
explained that he had a mobile phone and a laptop and used both to connect to the internet, but . 
He described how he used his laptop at home and at University for studying and researching 
things on the internet, and admitted that he sometimes watched movies, “but the good ones, not 
the bad ones. I like Salman Khan [an Indian actor known for playing gangsters], because he is 
a Muslim and a fighter”. He proudly showed his mobile phone, a new Samsung Galaxy that his 
cousin in Norway had sent to him. He explained that he used Telenors 3G services when he was 
in town “but mainly the Wi-Fi, because Wi-Fi, it is free.” For Umaid, his mobile phone was for 
socialising, and sometimes for work, for sending emails. He explained that he used his phone 
for Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber and Skype, and also had a LinkedIn account, because “it is for 
professionals. And when I am looking for a job, I must be professional”.  But it was Facebook 
that he said he used the most, mainly at home and mainly in the evenings, for between twenty 
minutes and “sometimes for the whole night. Just gup-shupping [chatting]”. But it was not just 
chatting, as he revealed when he described how he discussed religion on Facebook.  
 
As Umaid described his Facebook activity, the topics he talked about, and the content of his 
newsfeed, he revealed how significant religion was in his experience of using Facebook. Apart 
from breaking news, pictures from friends and “ some quotations that are so much beautiful”, 
Umaid indicated that of the first ten items in his Newsfeed, “twenty five percent are related to 
religion, twenty five percent to the sports, twenty five percent to the news, breaking news etc”. 
In Umaids mind, religious content constitutes a significant percentage of the overall content he 
engages with on his Newsfeed. But when I ask him how he engages with the different kinds of 
content that he sees on his Newsfeed, he reveals how his religious belief informs the way he 
uses Facebook.  
 
Umaid’s religious beliefs influence both how he expresses religious views on Facebook, and 
who he expresses them to. He described how he  “post things like prayers from the Quran. 
Sometimes I also post things about the prophet, what he did and what we must do”. Umaid at 
first described he only commented on positive things, saying thinking “‘nice’ or ‘very good’ or 
‘mashalla’ [thanks to God]”. But when I pressed him on how he reacts to something that he 
disagrees with, he conceded that “If it is written something wrong, then I must comment also”. 
How Umaid responds to content that he disagrees with, and how his response and Facebook’s 
design interact reveal the nature of the relationship between Facebook and religious debate in 
Pakistan.  
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When Umaid encounters a post that he believes to be wrong, he describes how he feels it is his 
religious obligation to respond and provide what he believes is the correct response. As he put 
it, “If the post is wrong, like it is not what the Prophet said or did, or it is something bid’ah, 
then I have to comment. You see, it is ‘hidayat, it is teaching and to hidayat is like a prayer, as 
Muslims we must do it. We get sawab”. For Umaid, responding to and correcting content that he 
believes to reflect false or wrong information is a religious duty that must undertake in order to 
earn religious merit. This means that correcting religious content, and in practice engaging in 
sectarian debate with people of different views, is viewed as a religious obligation.  
 
The reason this is significant is because when Umaid engages in this practices, he described 
how it often becomes the main thing he does on Facebook, and that the more he engages in 
sectarian debate, the more sectarian content there is for him to engage with. As Umaid said, 
“Sometimes I am up till night, commenting and chatting. The longest I have chatted is two 
hundred comments in one night I think. He was Shia, and sometimes they don't know the 
Sunnah”. Umaid went on to recount how this interaction triggered other people to comment, as 
“ many people liked and said well done”. In addition to other peoples responses, Umaid 
described how in his Newsfeed “There were many more of those posts too, and I got very busy 
that day responding to all the posts. Not only Shia but Sunni too. I think I was a good teacher, 
but mostly the didn't listen. Umaid described how when he engages in sectarian debate, and how 
when he does not only does it work to include his wider social network but he sees more of the 
same kind of content in his Newsfeed. In other words, the more he engages in sectarian debate, 
the more sectarian content Facebook seems to place in his Newsfeed.  
  
For Umaid, like so many others, engaging with religious content is an important part of his 
experience of Facebook. He feels it is a duty to teach others, and particularly to correct those 
who have different views about religion, especially if they are what he understands to be 
‘innovations’ from the original Sunnah. This inevitably leads him to engage with the ideas 
posted by people from other schools and sects, such as Shia and Barelvi. What was also 
revealing was that he described how the more he commented on this kind of content, the more 
of this kind of content appeared in his Newsfeed. He went on to explain that this was not just a 
continuing conversation or when people tagged him to invite him to comment, but the 
comments of friends who were responding to content from Muslims of different sects. The more 
he commented, the more content there was to comment on. Sometimes, he said, “it’s too much. 
So I ignore. It gets me tired and it’s just a fight. But it’s important to tell the truth. It’s 
difficult.”. He explained that when he stopped and ignored the content, then sometimes it 
seemed there was less of the content to correct, until a friend tagged him and it would start 
again. In other words, Umaid describes how his religious duty to teach – hidayat – leads him to 
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comment on sectarian content on Facebook. When he does, he sees more sectarian content, and 
he feels compelled to comment again.  
 
This section has described the experience of a member of the Ahle Sunnah school of Islam 
experiences the using Facebook. It described how religion plays an important part of Umaid’s 
experience of Facebook, and that this has a particular sectarian aspect. It showed how Umaid’s 
strong commitment to his beliefs plays out in his sense of obligation to teach others, and to 
correct what he identifies as being new interpretations or errors in the practice of Islam. This 
echoes how Sunni Deobandis view the practices of Barelvis, Shia and other Sufi oriented sects 
who turn to interpretation or intercession. Umaid’s account highlighted how this sense of 
injunction interacts with Facebook so that the more he conducts this practice, the more content 
to interact with appears on his Newsfeed. As such it points towards the interaction between 
religious beliefs and the way Facebook selects content that Facebook users are exposed to.   
 
 
7.3.4 Analysis: Authenticity, Hegemony and Algorithmic Individualism  
This analytic section analyses the experiences of Sunni Facebook users and shows that Sunni 
Facebook users feel free to talk about authentic religious beliefs, but that Facebook’s demand for 
authenticity results in sectarian divisions. It goes on to analyse the interaction of Facebook’s 
newsfeed algorithm with the religious practice of hidayat to show how the algorithmic discourse 
of individualism intra-acts with the practice of religious guidance to increase sectarian criticism. 
This analysis is significant because algorithms have already been linked to polarisation and 
extremism (Pariser 2011; Sunstein 2001, 2008), and thus this section analyses their implications 
for religious identity in Pakistan.  
 
Authenticity and Hegemony 
The survey found that more Sunni respondents felt free to post religious opinions online than 
other religious groups. Indeed, 43 percent of Sunni respondents also indicated that, in general, 
they felt free to express their feelings, compared to only 29 percent of Shia respondents. In other 
words, Sunni respondents felt better able to express their feelings both online and offline. This 
strengthens the identification in the literature review of Sunni Islam as the normative subject in 
the hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism. It also reinforces the notion of an entangled 
relationship between online and offline and the rejection of a digital dualism.  
 
The hegemonic position of Sunni Islam is reinforced in the accounts of Sunni Facebook users that 
describe Islam as a monolithic, uniform group. This commonly took the form of a uniform Islam 
under threat. For example, a performative reading of Hamid’s description of an image of a Syrian 
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refugee circulating on Facebook echoes this common narrative of a uniform Islam under threat 
from an external other. When Hamid states, ‘They died because they were Muslim’, he is using 
the image of a refugee to cite the discourse that all Muslims are under threat. The appropriation 
of the image of the young Syrian refugee’s body within a discourse of a threatened Islam reflects 
a ‘picking up of the tools where they lie’ (Butler 1990). The work of sharing that enacts a subject 
that finds recognition by others is more important than the content of the information, object or 
image being shared. Enacting the authenticity demanded by Facebook is not an act of 
interrogation to investigate the truth of the image, but rather the performance of an authentic 
subject. It draws on the available props to enact as convincing a portrayal as possible of the 
individual who believes Muslims are being targeted. 
 
Despite the willingness to talk about religion indicated in the survey and in many interviews, 
some respondents said they were reluctant to do so or rarely engaged in sectarian debate, with 
many saying a lack of religious knowledge fuelled misunderstanding. Mustafa, for example, 
expressed a desire to discuss sectarian matters, but was concerned that people who discussed 
religion lacked knowledge, saying, ‘I want to talk about it [religion] but I think their knowledge 
is limited about religion.’ Social media democratises the religious sphere (Campbell 2013a; 
Blondheim and Katz 2016) and can allow a new ‘technocrati’ (Teusner 2013) that challenges 
established religious authority.  Facebook’s democratisation of access to the public sphere was 
described by many as problematic for the expression of religious beliefs amid concerns about 
sectarian tensions.  
 
Yet in the main, Sunni Facebook users express greater confidence and freedom in expressing their 
views, including religious beliefs, than do Shia respondents. Their accounts also reflect a tendency 
to homogenise the Muslim community as a singular, Sunni community, and to characterise this 
community as one that is under threat from outsiders. Many Sunni respondents indicated that they 
were reluctant to engage in sectarian debate for fear of stirring up tensions, and that, in any case, 
their social network was dominated by other Sunnis. When they did see content from Shia 
Facebook users, many said they ignored it. The technological discourse of authenticity intra-acts 
with the hegemonic discourse that privileges Sunni Islam as the normative religious identity in 
Pakistan. Sunni Muslims are thus able to respond to Facebook’s demand for authenticity by 
articulating their beliefs, limiting this only out of concern for others. Thus, the agential cut enacted 
through the intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourse of authenticity with the hegemonic 
religious nationalism reinforces Sunni Islam as the normative religious identity in Pakistan.  
 
Algorithmic Individualism and Religious Instruction  
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When Umaid describes his practice of hidayat in correcting bid’ah sayyi’ah (unacceptable 
religious innovation as opposed to bid’ah hasanah or acceptable religious innovation), he is 
enacting a particular form of religious discourse. While the concepts of hidayat and bid’ah are 
common to all Muslims, for Wahhabis and Salafists unacceptable bid’ah is anything not 
specifically performed or confirmed by the Prophet in the original texts of the Quran and Hadith 
(Metcalf, 1982). In Pakistan, the Deobandi and Ahle Hadith view the Barelvi and Shia as 
practicing forms of bid’ah sayyi’ah; in this, both are seen as jahil. As such, the enactment of 
hidayat as a response to the discourse of bid’ah has contributed to contemporary sectarian 
divisions in Pakistan. In this sense, Umaid’s accounts of hidayat and bid’ah are enactments of 
this discourse of sectarian division. 
 
In order to understand Umaid’s description of how his Facebook newsfeed has more bid’ah 
sayyi’ah content the more he practices hidayat with people from other sects, it is important to 
understand how the Newsfeed algorithm works, and the technological discourse it embodies. 
Algorithms are designed to structure online life and everyday practice (Couldry 2012), but are 
largely invisible (Eslami et al. 2015) and believed to promise a ‘mechanical neutrality’ (Gillespie 
2014, 181). Yet, as Gillespie argues, algorithms embody entanglements of values and should be 
considered part of a new logic of structuring public discourse; this situates algorithmic logic ‘as 
posed against, and perhaps supplanting, the editorial as a competing logic’ (Gillespie 2014, 193). 
DeVito’s analysis of the values entangled in Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm, based on a content 
analysis of Facebook documentation, concludes that the algorithm is based on a discourse of 
individualism and categorises content based on personal significance, such as the impact on 
oneself, one’s interests and friends (DeVito 2016, 15).  
 
Analysing Umaid’s experience of Facebook through the lens of algorithmic values explains his 
exposure to content with which he disagrees. When his friends comment on sectarian content, the 
newsfeed algorithm predicts that Umaid will find it interesting – and so is more likely to place it 
in his newsfeed. Similarly, his history of engaging with content from particular users, forums or 
groups explains why, when he comments on sectarian content, the algorithm selects more 
sectarian content to go into his newsfeed. The algorithm discourse of individualism interacts with 
Umaid’s practice of hidayat to enact a feedback loop that amplifies sectarian debate.  
 
Sectarian debate has an historic form and it is instructive to analyse this algorithmically driven 
sectarian feedback loop in the context of the munāzarā, the paradigmatic form of sectarian debate. 
Munāzarā is an Islamic term for theological dispute, with the form of munāzarā constituting a 
model for theological debate while actual munāzarās are circulated and used as reference 
materials (Rahman 2009). In South Asia, they can be traced at least as far back as the initial 
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debates between Muslims and Christian missionaries in 1857 (Powell 1993) and continued 
throughout the early 1900s (Metcalf 1982). These early debates were rancorous and conflictual, 
but as Metcalf notes, ‘the very competition helped create a familiarity with religious issues that 
was unprecedented in Indian history (Metcalf 1982, 234).  
 
The purpose of the munāzarā was to persuade opponents their beliefs were false by appealing to 
sacred texts. This usually started out with courtesies and honorifics, but often descended into 
anger and insults, including charges of apostasy and heresy and personal attacks. Consequently, 
although the effects of munāzarā on sectarian division and antipathy towards the other have not 
been studied, ‘the possibility the munāzarā creates or increases sectarian antagonism cannot be 
denied’ (Rahman 2009, 137). Munāzarā, then, are important for a number of reasons. First, they 
serve as a model for and legitimation of sectarian critique – a model that, historically, was 
structured and (though often conflictual) contained within a formal process. Second, they serve 
as a process through which sectarian orthodoxy and division are established and a resource 
through which these are legitimised.  
 
There are clear commonalities between munāzarā and sectarian debate on Facebook. Both 
involve a debate between individuals who present structured arguments. Both draw on theological 
knowledge, define sectarian boundaries and maintain sectarian orthodoxy. Both, in other words, 
serve as boundary-making exercises in establishing sectarian religious identity. Yet, Facebook 
debates are clearly not munāzarā. Indeed, a number of respondents stated that, ‘It’s not munāzarā 
because no one is trained.’  
 
Facebook’s algorithmic discourse of individualism intra-acts with the discursive form of 
munāzarā. Both emphasise and orient around the discourse of individualism and promote the 
interaction of high-value subjects, with the value determined as theological knowledge in the 
context of munāzarā or a high-value social network in the case of Facebook. In the case of the 
munāzarā, the debate was organised, chaired and structured by an authoritative figure who could 
repair any damage done. In the case of Facebook, the debate is structured and organised in large 
part, as Umaid’s case demonstrates, by the algorithm. However, while the authoritative figure in 
the munāzarā can at least attempt to repair social tensions, the algorithm takes no responsibility 
for the outcome of the interaction it structures.  
 
Facebook’s algorithmic discourse of individualism intra-acts with the discourse of religious 
debate such that it creates the structure of munāzarā but without any responsibility for its 
outcome. In other words, Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm interacts with the religious injunctions 
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of conservative Sunni Muslims such that, for some, it increases interactions that have the potential 
to raise sectarian tension. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This section analysed and compared accounts of Facebook use by Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni users. 
It focuses on these groups as representative of minority and majority groups to explore the intra-
action between Facebook’s discourse of authenticity (Haimson and Hoffmann 2016), hegemonic 
discourse and the enactment of marginalised and normative identities.  
 
The conclusions from this analysis offer a critical interrogation of the liberatory and 
transformatory claims made for new ICTs (Castells 2000; Giddens 1991; Kleine 2013). 
Specifically, findings from the analysis of the way social media shapes the enactment of minority 
identities leads to a questioning of the claim that new ICTs hold emancipatory qualities. It 
challenges the claims that social media and ICTs liberate users from the traditional constraints of 
their everyday lives to reveal their true, ‘authentic’ identity. Theorists who link these technologies 
to universal forms of social change suggest that minority identities should find online the 
opportunity to create second selves (Turkle 1984), form new network identities (Castells 2010) 
and fulfil modernity’s project of the ‘true self’ (Giddens 1991). Instead, this analysis showed how 
Facebook’s technological discourse reinforced hegemonic discourse, strengthening the normative 
position of Sunni Islam and further marginalising Ahmadis.  
 
A performative, sociomaterial reading of these accounts shows how Facebook’s features and 
demand for authenticity silence Ahmadi enactments of religious identity or force the enactment 
of fake ‘authentic’ subjects. In contrast, Shia Facebook users resist the demand of hegemonic 
discourse and enact authentic subjects, though some emphasise nationalism to demonstrate their 
conformity to hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism. As dominant, normative subjects, 
Sunni Facebook users enact authentic subjects but limit debate to their own sect.  
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8. Performing Gender on Facebook 
 
“It’s a famous joke in Pakistan that a hawker was passing from a street. He was selling 
the vegetables and he met a woman who was buying some vegetables, he said ‘O lady! I 
remember that I met you before’. The lady said ‘Are you in your senses?’ and he replied 
‘Ah! I remember we are friends on Facebook”.       
(Sherazi, Gujranwala) 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The quote above reveals the extent to which Facebook has become a part of common discourse; 
it is now the subject of jokes and is commonly associated in the public imagination with the issue 
of gender roles and division. In the public imagination this association takes the form of violations 
of women’s rights and the position that women hold in Pakistani public discourse. Newspapers 
commonly tell stories in which women are harassed through the social network, frequently 
through featuring men gaining and exploiting womens trust through the use of fake female 
accounts. Reports document how women experience online harassment (Haque 2014), and how 
that online harassment translates into offline violence (Parkin 2016), highlighting  the contentious 
role that new ICTs play in public discourse and in everyday practice. This chapter explores these 
dynamics in the context of Facebooks’ demand for authenticity and its affordances for context 
collapse.  
 
The survey findings in Chapter Six described distinct differences between male and male accounts 
of how they used mobile phones and social media. Female users reported smaller social networks 
that were commonly constituted by domestic, family relationships, and with many respondents 
reporting a preference for WhatsApp over Facebook. Social networks that are limited to the 
family and to private over public means of communication reflect  the description in Chapter Five 
of the production in religious discourse of submissive gender identities that embody both national 
and family honour. This chapter describes the gendered nature of social media practices in order 
to help explain the survey findings and the link between broader hegemonic discourse and 
everyday enactment of religious and gender identity.   
 
This chapter therefore shows how Facebooks demand for authenticity and its affordances for 
traversing friendship groups have implications for the gendered subject positions that are part of 
Pakistan hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism. It achieves this through descriptions of 
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specific Facebook usage practices that reveal how users negotiate two aspects of Facebook’s 
technological discourse; first, its demand for authenticity and second, its affordance for traversing 
friendship groups and the resulting implications for context collapse.  
 
This chapter shows ways in which Facebook is used to both overcome traditional social 
boundaries as well as to reinforce established social norms, specifically in relation to the issue of 
gender divides and roles. A key aspect of this is how in order to overcome social boundaries 
between men and women, Facebook users, particularly but not only male users, commonly 
created fake Facebook accounts. These were created and used for a variety of reasons, but the 
common theme was the negotiation and management of traditional gender roles. By contrast, 
Facebook users who sought to maintain established gender boundaries and particulalrly the 
seclusion of women from public life did so through the creation and use of multiple ‘authentic’ 
Facebook accounts. In other words, to achieve the liberation and social progress that is linked to 
notions of ‘authentic individualism’ articulated by Zuckerberg and proponents of modernity, 
Facebook users had to create fake identities. In contrast, those wishing to maintain the traditional 
social norms supposedly replaced by technologies and modern indvidualistic society created 
multiple ‘authenitic’ identities. These practices trouble the assumption that Facebook successfully 
‘translates’ a discourse of authentic individualism, and that technologies predictably disrupt 
established social norms and structures.  
 
This chapter reviews the accounts of Facebook users who create multiple Facebook accounts. It 
presents a summary overview of the practices associated with the creation of fake accounts that 
seek to overcome established social boundaries, followed by more indepth accounts of the ways 
in which users create multiple authentic Facebook accounts. This first describes how male and 
female users create new spaces where they can be free to enact new subjectivities and secondly 
how female users defend themselves against the consequences of context collapse. This is 
followed by examples of how multiple authentic accounts are used to sustain traditional practices 
of gender segregation and seclusion, and by describing female perspectives on this form of ‘digital 
purdah’. The chapter concludes with analysis of these findings as an example of how technologies 
can reinforce traditional social norms, providing a counter case to the claims of universal 
liberation and a teleologic path of progress towards modern individualism.  
 
8.2  Faking Authenticity – male and female fake Facebook accounts  
The most common reason given for creating fake female accounts was to play tricks on their male 
friends. In Mandi Bahauddin, Usman explained that “We make an account as a girl, in the name 
of Sana Mandi… like a real Pakistan girl.” Usman went on to explain that he and his friends 
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would together use the account to trick others. He described how he would to “go to my friend, 
and pretending to be Sana, on Facebook I say I like you, will you be my friend? So we trick him, 
and he is in love!! For Usman and his friends, creating fake female accounts was fun, a way of 
passing time and built on creating female accounts out of the content and signifiers of existing 
discourses of female identity.  Creating fake accounts to for fun and to play tricks on their friends 
subverts the demand for authenticity not as an exercise in malicious deceit but as part of young 
men finding playful ways to exploit the gender divisions that characterize Pakistani social life.  
  
Female Facebook users also described creating fake accounts, but described it as a way of 
interacting with men in ways that they couldn’t before, and that allowed the safety of anonymity. 
In Mandi Bahauddin, Mehreen explained that she came from a very conservative Sunni Deobandi 
family in a small village, and was the first girl in her family to be allowed to go to college. She 
explained how created fake accounts “to test how good men are. My profile is, it is secret, not my 
name and not my picture. And not any of my real friends on Facebook”. Mehreen’s description 
of her use of Facebook shows that although she uses it as a vehicle for real interaction, she hides 
behind anonymity through the use of a fake name and picture. This fake Facebook account allows 
her to interact with men in ways she wouldn’t otherwise be able to and in this way understand 
male behaviour.  
 
This use of fake Facebook accounts for a new kind of interaction was described as taking place 
in bigger cities as well. Yet while many say it’s happening, few admitted to the practice 
themselves. For example, when I asked Farhana, a Masters student at a university in Gujranwala 
if she used fake accounts, she started laughing and said “I don't, but at least 98% of my friends 
do”, and when they do, it’s just to meet men”.  
 
In addition to creating fake female accounts to trick their friends, male Facebook users also 
described creating fake accounts to over come gender boundaries and establish real connections 
to female users. Anwar explained that since he had come to Gujrat he had started to play a lot 
with Facebook, as the internet was so much faster than the village he came from. Before, he could 
“couldn't download a song, and could only look at simple websites”. Internet use changes when 
the speeds area faster, as Anwar went on to describe how “In Gujarat, I can do everything. 
Facebook is much more possible, I can watch videos, listen to music and I can make profiles 
also.” Anwar explained that he had ‘at least two’ other fake accounts in which he pretended to 
be a woman, and that he used these to reach out to female Facebook users. He explained that 
female Facebook users would only interact with other female users – he’d tried with his real, male 
account but was always rejected and blocked. So he created fake accounts to try and establish 
friendship. But successful contact required more than just a convincing account, you had to be 
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able read their personality and approach them appropriately.  Anwar explained that he could 
usually tell what kind of person the girl was, ‘if they are looking for friendship, you can tell, and 
sometimes, maybe it becomes something else”. He went on to say that sometimes girls were very 
sexually explicit in their interaction, which he described as his ‘fantasy’. Indeed, the idea of this 
fantasy was something that Anwar was very animated about - although he was a little shy talking 
about it, he was very clear in describing it as the only place in his life that he could act out or 
imagine such experiences. Anwar didn’t seem surprised or curious about the fact that women 
would have explicit ‘sexy talk’ with him, it was simply something to be enjoyed. Indeed, it was 
as close to a relationship with a woman that Anwar had ever got.  
 
This section has described how male and female Facebook users use fake and real Facebook 
accounts to play games and explore relationships, illustrating how some female Facebook users 
experience these ‘virtual’ relationships. It has highlighted how Facebook’s demand for 
authenticity must be thwarted in order to pursue these forms of play. Common to all of these is 
the desire of users to establish relations with members of the opposite sex, to pursue desire, even 
if only in virtual form. This desire remains one of the drivers of innovative Facebook practices, 
and in the next section the issue of desire and it’s management on the basis of social and religious 
norms is explored from the perspective of maintaining multiple authentic accounts. 
 
8.3 Family and Friends – enactments of multiple authentic identities 
 
“I have two Facebook profiles. I have 60-65 friends in my family account and about 700 
in my friends account. And I don’t have any female friends in my friends account, all are 
male friends.” 
                   Nadeem, Gujarat 
 
In the previous section I showed how male and female Facebook users break the demand for a 
singular authentic identity and create multiple accounts as ‘fake female’ in order to play games 
with their friends or pursue ‘real’ relationships with other Facebook users. But creating fake 
female accounts is not the only reason that people create multiple accounts. In the exploration of 
how male and female Facebook users create fake accounts, respondents described how many 
users also create multiple ‘real’ accounts. This is to say that they created multiple accounts in 
which they used their real name to connect with real people they knew in ‘real’, offline life. Whilst 
fake female accounts enable users to bridge the often unsurmountable social divide between men 
and women, creating multiple ‘real’ accounts serve to negotiate new social divisions and maintain 
existing ones.  
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In this section I describe how Facebook users create multiple authentic accounts, that is accounts 
in which users connect to friends and family using their real names. I first show how male and 
female Facebook users describe this as a form of freedom from their family and traditional social 
norms, and illustrate how female users create multiple authentic accounts to navigate the digital 
gender divide. The chapter concludes with a description of how male and female Facebook users 
create multiple authentic accounts specifically to uphold traditional social structures and practices 
that are characterised by social norms of social status, honour and gender segregation.  
 
 
8.3.1 Digital Freedom – or how male Facebook user’s separate family and friends  
The first insight into the practice of creating multiple ‘authentic’ accounts emerged when a friend 
of Anwar’s cousin called Nadeem overheard his description of fake female accounts and 
mentioned that that he too had multiple accounts. As Nadeem went on to explain, he too had 
multiple accounts, but they served very different purposes and revealed very different insights 
into the interaction between Facebook and the discourses that structure Pakistani social life.  
 
Nadeem described how he had two Facebook accounts, one which he used for family and one for 
friends, with “Islamic things in my family ID and everything related to entertainment in my 
friends ID”. Nadeem explained that it wasn’t that he was hiding from his family, “Basically my 
family know about me [laughing”] but that it was important to be a “a little bit reserve in the 
Facebook ID of family and more open in the ID of friends”. For Nadeem, maintaining a family 
and friends account allowed him to maintain the distinction between different social context 
online. As he described, on his friends account he could chat to women in ways that his family 
would disapprove of, saying things like “I used to give comments to girls in my university in 
Punjabi like ‘you use very rude, very silly words, so when you will be married you will give your 
husband a tough time, so that he will be very rude, very strict very tough.”  
 
Like Anwar, Nadeem is in his mid-twenties but unlike Anwar he went to college, graduating with 
an MBA in marketing three years ago. Despite this, he has been unemployed since then and like 
many young people in Pakistan, still lives with his parents. He describes how amidst a general 
sense of failure in life, compounded by having twice failed the army entrance exams, social media 
is a lifeline through which he can be the person that he aspires to be. Yet Nadeem has very limited 
access to the internet, as the only computer in the house is in his bed-ridden paraplegic brothers 
room and though he cannot afford a smartphone, he occasionally uses his friends’ smartphones. 
This is complicated though, as there is a process of negotiation around his friend logging out of 
Facebook and Nadeem logging in, and then having to remember to log out again. On more than 
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one occasion he has forgotten, and he has had to get his friend to promise not to embarrass him 
or compromise his account by posting inappropriate, embarrassing updates or comments. But 
despite this limited access to the internet and social media, Nadeem described Facebook as an 
important space in which he can, intermittently, be free from the constraints and cares of his home 
life. But to realise that sense of freedom and to express an ‘authentic’ aspect of his own identity, 
Nadeem has to have one Facebook account for his family and one for his friends.  
 
When Nadeem first describes the reason for having separate accounts, he emphasizes the 
distinction between having to conform to family expectations and also wanting to have a space 
where he can be free. He describes the family account as one where he is connected to his brothers, 
sister and female cousins as well as his father. In total he has around twenty-five friends in his 
family account, a mixture of male and female but all of whom he knows and has met. He describes 
how he enacts what he feels his family expects, saying that “Mostly as I said before that within 
my family I must to be a bit reserve. I always try to be a person, a decent person in the sight of 
my elders.” In contrast, Nadeem describes his friends account as one where he can be much freer, 
and where he can interact with female Facebook users. He described how when he uploads posts,  
“Many friends make comments even, the female friends, and most comments are in 
Punjabi, because fun is mostly enjoyed in Punjabi!!” As Nadeem explained, he and his 
friends characterise the use of Punjabi by it’s often salacious and explicit terminology, 
and enjoy the transgressive nature of reading words in Punjabi written by women.    
 
When I asked Nadeem to explain what was important about this kind of interaction that takes 
place on his friends account, he described the importance of being able to speak freely, and also 
of interacting with female Facebook users. He described how on Facebook you can write 
“whatever you want, whatever is in your mind in your heart”. This freedom to express 
inner thoughts without being concerned about being judged by parents or elders was 
emphasised as being really important. Furthermore, the ability to interact with female 
users was described as being very significant, and providing a space where female users 
could interact openly with men. As he put it, “in Pakistani culture women feel a 
reluctance to have a face to face conversation, so when comments are made by them and 
then by male friends, then everything is open on Facebook. Where else can these 
boundaries be forgotten? Where else are the boundaries as negligible and you can 
interact freely as Facebook?” For Nadeem, Facebook is a space that allows new 
opportunities for self expression and for interaction with members of the opposite sex, 
opportunities denied in the established social norms that govern his offline life.  
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However, this description of a technological liberation from social norms and conformity are not 
the whole story of why Facebook users such as Nadeem create multiple accounts. In later 
conversations, it turned out that Nadeem’s motivation for creating separate accounts for family 
and for friends is more complex than simply a desire to talk about his interest in Indian adult 
actresses and Bollywood music. When I pressed him to explain how he had come to create 
separate accounts for family and for friends, he described how it was not to protect his privacy, 
but the privacy of the women in his family.  
 
Nadeem described how Facebooks affordances for social interaction and emphasis on sharing had 
collapsed social contexts and complicated family relationships. He described how about four 
years ago he had commented on a cousins posts, which meant that a friend of his also saw her 
post and also commented on it, directly communicating with his female relative. As he said, “This 
was very shocking for me, I was afraid, and so I unfriended my female cousin and made an 
another Facebook ID”. For Nadeem, Facebook had allowed his male friends to transgress 
the social division between male friends and female relatives, forcing him to create a 
separate family account for his immediate and extended family. As he put it. “I made this 
family ID for the sake of privacy because of the shock of seeing my friend comments on 
my cousin’s post, then I thought that, yaar, some privacy should be made”.  
 
In this account, Nadeem describes how Facebooks design allows his male friends to traverse 
social contexts, and able to see the comments and photos of Nadeem’s female relatives. For 
Nadeem and his male relatives, it was this collapse of social context and impact on family privacy 
that was the impetus for the creation of a separate ‘authentic’ family account. This impact on 
social context and privacy is something that many of the respondents I spoke with emphasized, 
regardless of social position or technology access.  
 
Nadeem’s story  highlights two distinct lines of social boundary, between family and friends and 
between male and female. For Nadeem and many other male respondents who described having 
multiple ‘authentic’ Facebook accounts, the practice serves to maintain a space where they can 
be free from the restrictive social of family and female friends. Furthermore, female friends are 
commonly associated with family and domestic life, though there are of course exceptions, such 
as Nadeem’s description of the ‘frank’ relations with female friends from University. However, 
there are also descriptions of the purpose of multiple accounts that go beyond simply establishing 
spaces for users to be free from their family and associated social norms. The next section explores 
how the practice of multiple authentic accounts are understood in terms of their role in protecting 
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family privacy and maintaining social practices of gender segregation that are characterised by 
principles of honour and religious values.   
 
 
8.3.2 Digital Freedom – or how female Facebook user’s separate family life 
The practice of maintaining multiple Facebook accounts is particularly common amongst male 
social media users, though a small number of female Facebook users did describe having more 
than one account. For those that did report having more than one accounts the practice was 
described as a liberatory one. Like male users, they said that it enabled them to achieve a degree 
of freedom they could not experience if they had just one account, and indeed a greater degree of 
freedom than they were able to realise in their offline lives. Yet the practices have characteristics 
that are distinct from male user’s creation of multiple accounts.  
 
Nadia is a nineteen-year-old student at a college in Gujarat and is in her second year of studying 
marketing and communications. She has two ‘real’ Facebook accounts, one for family and one 
for friends, yet her use is distinctive and reveals how the values of different social groups demand 
different forms of authenticity. Nadia’s parents and elder brother have been in Portugal for the 
last fifteen years, and because a visa is so expensive it is her two younger brothers were a priority 
and were going to join them before she did. Yet her parents have allowed Nadia freedoms that 
the rest of the family find uncomfortable, as she says, because they live abroad they have “given 
me liberty of every type”. Nadia described being comfortable with Skype, WhatsApp and other 
messaging programmes, as she uses them to stay in touch with her family. Yet although she uses 
these different messaging platforms, her mother wasn't initially keen that her daughter used 
Facebook.  
 
Nadia describes an interesting journey through different forms of Facebook authenticity. Initially 
when she set up her account she created a profile with a fake name, ‘Maha’, after her favourite 
Indian drama actress, but used her real details and posted real ‘selfie’ pictures of herself. Yet she 
described how this wasn't very satisfactory as people complimented her on her picture, but using 
a fake name, denying her the pleasure of directly attributed comments. As she put it, Nadia: “if 
people are saying “Maha you are looking nice” so it has no meaning, because who is Maha? I 
am not Maha, my name is Nadia“.  
 
Faced with the unsatisfying likes, Nadia changed her profile back to her real name, and connected 
to both her family in Gujrat as well as her parents and in Portugal. However, as she continued to 
take ‘selfies’, she soon started running into problems as male relatives started to make 
inappropriate comments, causing rumours to circulate. She described how when a cousin posted 
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comments under a picture that revealed her arm, another cousin started asking what was going 
on, “wondering if I was having some sort of affair with him”. She explained how her mother had 
scolded her, and advised her “to create a friends account and fulfil your interests there.”  
 
Nadia’s mother was also concerned that the side of her family in Gujrat were more conservative 
and would judge both Nadia and also the rest of their family for the way they lived abroad. As 
Nadia put it, “they have a different mentality than mine. My family mentality is different. Because 
my parents have given me liberty of every type and here in Pakistan”. As a result, Nadia described 
how she has one account for family, which only has modest photos and mainly used to share 
information and updates with family, and one account for friends. She only uses the family 
account every month or so, to maintain contact with her aunts and extended family, to comment 
on photographs that are shared and to show her family that she is still in touch and communicating 
with them.  
 
But Nadia checks her ‘real’ account throughout the day on her phone, an expensive Samsung her 
mother sent from Portugal. She has mainly female friends in her account, with around four or five 
male friends, but has divided her friends into two separate groups, one ‘close friends’ group that 
is only girls and on which she shares everything, including full face ‘selfie’ pictures and another 
group that is not so close and on which she only shares ‘side poses’ (profile pictures). She 
describes herself as ‘the selfie queen’ but is careful to set the correct privacy settings for particular 
kinds of pictures, saying “if I have displayed a picture of half-face, arm or lips or eyes so that are 
for everyone in friends. But if I have shared a complete selfie then it is only shared with close 
friends”. Having divided up her social contexts into full face and ‘side pose’ selfie groups, Nadia 
is able to maintain the integrity of her social networks.  
 
This real account is a place for expression and performative presentation. But this freedom is only 
possible when it is protected, and Nadia is also very careful about security especially after a scare 
when a friend of hers gave her boyfriend her password as a trust building practice and her 
boyfriend had started harassing her friends. So she now has two factor authorization, with text 
messages sent to her phone to authorise each new log in.  
  
For Nadia, multiple accounts serve to separate her extended family from the rest of her life, and 
although she is exceptional in that her mother lives abroad and is very permissive, Nadia’s 
example serves to illustrate how for women, multiple accounts can also serve as a practice that 
allows a form of freedom, but that it must be carefully managed, such as in the formation of 
different friendship groups. Nadia’s example also shows how important peer recognition and 
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affirmation are for some Facebook users, to the extent that she risks changing her Facebook 
profile to her real name. 
 
This section has described how male and female Facebook users create multiple authentic 
accounts in order to find a form of freedom from traditional constraints of family and social norms 
that are inhibiting and limit their ability to express themselves as they wish. For male users, this 
freedom was characterised as the ability to talk about and share references to films that their 
family wouldn't approve of or interact with female users that would similarly invite familial 
sanction. For female users such as Nadia the freedom from family constraints was described 
largely in terms of explicit and overt presentation of an idealised self in the form of ‘selfies’. The 
distinction between male and female conceptions of freedoms highlights how for female users 
this is associated with liberation from practices associated with shame, or in other words that for 
these female users the freedom they aspire to is to enact particular forms of self that are labelled 
as shameful by others. Importantly, these examples describe how users create multiple authentic 
accounts to enable forms enactment that they otherwise wouldn't be able to express. In the next 
section I describe how female Facebook users create multiple accounts as a defensive act to avoid 
the complications of the collapse of gendered social context.    
 
 
8.3.3 Digital Defence – or how female Facebook users negotiate context collapse  
Although many do describe using multiple Facebook accounts to manage the sites affordance for 
context collapse, others struggle to manage the integrity of their social lives. Farya’s story 
describes how she creates multiple authentic accounts as a defence against Facebook’s tendency 
to collapse social spheres, specifically the gendered spheres that divide men and women in 
Pakistan.  
 
Faryal is a lecturer at the same Lahore University campus in Mandi Bahauddin where I met 
Umaid, the Ahle Sunnah student who engagaed in sectarian debate. The university has strict 
security, with armed guards on the gates and strict security protocols. On the other side of the 
gate the campus is a quiet oasis from the dusty, bustling street outside, with boys and girls sitting 
and talking together on the lawn. Inside her office it is quiet and she explains that this is a separate 
world where “people are for learning, it is not like outside where people are always watching”. 
Faryal has been a lecturer to just over a year now, after graduating from the same university, and 
now teaches as well as living in and managing a girl’s hostel. Although her family live only an 
hour away, after her mother passed away a year ago she rarely goes home. Because she is a single 
female teacher living alone, Faryal is very concerned about her reputation, and indeed the 
protection of her reputation plays an important role in the way she uses social media.  
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Faryal described the difficulties she has experienced that resulted from Facebook’s affordances 
for traversing friend’s groups and that subsequently forced her to create multiple ‘authentic’ 
Facebook accounts. She described how when she started her MBA a friend had helped her create 
her Facebook account, setting up the username, password as well as adding some friends, but that 
when she had added her female classmates, they had all rejected her friends request. This led to 
her experiencing social anxiety,  “I was thinking that they have some negative things about me 
and that's why they're not adding me”, and felt excluded throughout her time at University. She 
explained that “Because of my shame and self-respect, I didn't ask them again and again. I thought 
they must not like me.”. As she finally finished her course, she asked her friends why they’d 
rejected her and excluded her from their Facebook discussions. As she said,  “They told me that 
it was because I had male friends in my account and they were afraid they would see their updates 
and things like that”. Because Faryal was not aware of the way Facebook collapsed social 
contexts, she had endured years of social exclusion and anxiety.  
 
The consequence of this experience was that she became very aware of managing privacy and 
security on Facebook, particularly in relation to the management of gender divides. She created 
two more accounts, also in her real name, one for her family and one for her new college life. 
Faryal described that this was important because she wanted to be able to share feelings and 
emotions, especially with her family and also needed to be able to communicate and manage her 
relationships with her students. She explained that she created separate accounts for family, 
friends and students because “If I am using the same account with my students, with my friends, 
with my family, they can know about.... I'm not doing wrong, this is the demand of my job, but 
some people think negatively.” 
 
Faryal described that although she was careful to separate out the different social contexts of her 
lives through different accounts, privacy management and social norms had caused problems in 
the past. The importance of privacy is not just a personal one though, as Faryal also worries about 
her own role in creating problems for others, specifically for female students. She describes how 
she has both male and female students as friends on her students Facebook account, but is 
concerned about the implications this might have. Faryal uses Facebook to manage her students 
assignments and coordinate coursework, and so has a large number of students as friends. When 
she realised that some female students weren’t joining the discussions, they said “Madam you 
have lot of students in your account that’s why I am not adding you’. So I am facing some concern, 
thinking that my female students would get into relationships with my male students through my 
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account.” For Faryal, even a dedicated educational account fails to resolve the challenge of 
gendered social contexts and the platforms affordance for context collapse.  
 
Faryal’s experience of using Facebook and negotiating the collapse of social contexts is shaped 
by gendered divides that through the concept of ‘purdah’ are understood as fundamentally cultural 
and religious in nature. Her lack of awareness of the sites design and resulting affordances for 
traversing friendship groups caused high levels of social anxiety and a failure to establish new 
friends. To meet Facebook’s demand for authenticity Faryal had to create multiple accounts in 
order to avoid the consequences of transgressing the cultural and religious norms that are 
embodied in Pakistan’s patterns of religiously justified gender segregation. The next section 
explores efforts to mitigate the transformatory effects of Facebook through cases of male 
Facebook users who create multiple authentic accounts to maintain traditional social norms and 
female Facebook users who find a sense of meaning in submission to traditional gender positions.  
 
8.3.4 Digital Izzat – or how male users protect honour   
The previous sections have described different practices related to the use of Facebook in 
overcoming, negotiating or managing deeply entrenched gender divisions. These last two sections 
turn to practices that reveal underlying social norms of honour and social status that influence 
technological practices. First it looks at how male Facebook users create multiple authentic 
accounts to separate family and friends and then how female Facebook users find religious 
meaning in the digital seclusion created by male Facebook users use of multiple authentic 
accounts. This section shows that the practice of gender segregation described in the previous 
section is also characterised by the principles and practices of social status and honour.  
 
I meet Shakir at the Gift University in Gujranwala, after being introduced to him through a 
respondent from the telephone survey. Shakir is 18 years old and the son of a policeman who 
moved here from the neighbouring village of Hafiz Abad when he was three years old. As the son 
of government employee Shakir is not wealthy but has the confidence and comforts of a family 
with a stable job. He proudly shows me his iPhone 5 but complains of the lack of battery life and 
the fact that he can’t use memory cards with the phone. He explains that the phone was a gift from 
a cousin in Norway, and because it came from abroad it has an Apple iTunes account that he can 
buy music from, which he described with both pride and also frustration, as although he could 
‘real’ songs, he couldn’t ‘sideload’ music or movies through memory cards onto his phone.  
 
Shakir said he has been on Facebook for at least two years now, and has at least five or six hundred 
friends, “who I have met face to face. I know them to an extent, because I belong to a village”. 
Shakir described himself as an ‘addict’ of Facebook, particular to putting up pictures of himself 
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‘selfies’ and the likes that he got, “more than 300”. Shakir was proud of his association with his 
village, describing how when he took selfies in the village whilst wearing traditional dress friends 
from the city would say “what you are wearing yaar? Are you a ‘paindu’ [‘paindu is a derogatory 
word for villager], are you in your senses?”. Yet Shakir expresses a great deal of pride in his 
background, asserting this aspect of his ‘authentic’ identity. Despite this openness, Shakir 
emphasised the importance of privacy, particularly in relation to gender divides, and to stop his 
friends contacting his female relatives. As he described it,  “the whole privacy thing is because 
my female cousins are on Facebook. if there is any person who will send her [his female cousin] 
friend request my image would be broken”. For Shakir maintaining his social status and upholding 
the families honour was the reason for having strict privacy controls to ensure that his male friends 
were not able to break the social norm of gender segregation. Although Shakir described how he 
managed this through privacy settings, he also mentioned that “some people have two accounts 
to keep their friends and family separate and I think it’s beneficial. I am also thinking of making 
another account.” 
 
This management of privacy and protection of status is a very common aspect of how people 
describe using Facebook in Pakistan, and it was explained to me by Sulaiman, a Facebook user 
in Gujrat, as a practice that has a distinctly religious dimension. Sulaiman is a chartered 
accountancy graduate, but like so many is unemployed and living at home. He has a South Korean 
smartphone, but only uses the internet through Wi-Fi, mostly at home as he cannot afford to use 
3G data on his phone. He only has one account, but is friends with both male and female relatives 
as well as friends, in total about 60 friends. Although he uses Facebook for about 15 minutes 
every day to scroll through his newsfeed and see what his friends have been doing, he said that 
he rarely posts, preferring to communicate through WhatsApp messages and groups. In other 
words, Sulaiman is selective and careful about what he posts on Facebook, sensitive to the 
different audiences that exist for him on Facebook. Although he only has one account, he 
described how many of his friends have more than one, and that the reason for having more than 
one account was based on specific religious values:  
 
For around a third of Sulaiman’s friends have more than one Facebook accounts, and most do so 
to keep their friends and family separate. The main reason for this, according to Sulaiman, is that 
they want to keep “they want to keep the women apart from their friends. It’s our culture here. 
Sulaiman explained this as a cultural and religious matter, saying that keeping men and women 
separate was ‘a Muslim issue’, that “For Muslims, women should be kept in houses. Women are 
not supposed to communicate with people outside their family. It is just like purdah.”This 
description emphasises the religious dimension of multiple account usage, and the importance 
that many male Facebook users place on maintaining the gender segregation that characterises 
 157 
Pakistani social life. Importantly, Sulaiman emphasises that the main reason is not the ability to 
be free from the social constraints of family, but the desire to protect women from interaction 
with male friends and the maintenance of the social practice of female seclusion and purdah. 
These social and religious values are important part of people’s lives, and are entangled in how 
people use technologies in villages as much as in cities.   
 
In the village of Shahanalog just outside Mandi Bahauddin, this religiously justified digital gender 
segregation is even more extreme, with respondents saying that women shouldn't even be allowed 
to use the internet at all. Sitting in a small, one room tailoring shop open to the road, Zain and his 
friends describe how the women in the village are not allowed to use the internet. Zain explains 
that “this is a village, women on the internet, it is not considered good. Islam does not allow 
them… it’s purdah! Zain described this as a difference between cities in and villages, saying that 
“urban people they don’t think about this… in them everything is open”. The main focus of his 
concern was the impact on the seclusion of women. As he put it.  I have told you before that we 
don’t think it good that someone sees our sisters someone else or any non-Mahram (outside of 
family) sees them”. For Zain, and many others in rural contexts, the internet is regarded as a threat 
to the social norms of purdah and seclusion of women.   
 
This section has shown how male Facebook users who create multiple ‘authentic’ accounts to 
separate their family and friends do so for a number of reasons. These include the creation of a 
space for the enactment of selves that can be free from the disciplinary gaze of family and wider 
community and allow them to explore both interests and relationships that transgress social 
norms. Another reason for the creation of separation of family and friends is to stop their male 
friends from accessing and interacting with their female relatives through Facebook, a separation 
that users linked to the injunctions of purdah, the common practice of secluding women that was 
discussed in Chapter Five Religious Identity in Pakistan. Whilst male Facebook users explained 
this as a religious obligation it was also linked to social norms of status and the principle of izzat 
or honour. These social practices are described from the perspective of male Facebook users, and 
it is to female Facebook user’s perspectives on the use multiple accounts that we now turn.  
 
8.3.5 Digital Purdah – or how female users practice digital seclusion  
This section explores the same practice digital seclusion from the perspective female Facebook 
users. It shows that although many women do use these technologies to circumvent long 
established control over who they interact with, for many female Facebook users, these digital 
constraints are voluntarily undertaken as part of existing social practices that limit women’s 
interaction outside the family and in public life. The most common explanation for the practice 
of having male and female accounts was that it reflected the practice of purdah.  
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In this section I describe how female Facebook users experience the gender segregation that 
results from the creation of multiple accounts and the limitation on sharing of personal 
information. In particular, I focus on how this limitation of self-expression is understood as a 
meaningful practice, and specifically understood as practice of religious piety. I describe in detail 
the accounts of two groups of Ahmadi women, focusing on their descriptions because as members 
of minority and conservative religious groups their religious practices provide insight into the 
complex interaction of hegemonic discourse and transformatory communication technologies.  
 
In Rabwa, the home of the Ahmadi community, I am introduced to two female Facebook users 
whose father has allowed them to speak with a foreign male. We meet in the betak – the meeting 
room for male visitors – and sit on overstuffed velvet sofas, with the father serving green tea 
whilst his daughters sit on a sofa opposite me, wearing a black niqab that covers them from head 
to toe, revealing only their eyes. Zehra is 19 and at university, studying software engineering 
whilst her sister Sofia is 22 and works in a local bank.  
 
Sofia explains that she is married but her husband left three months ago for Mali where he is part 
of the Ahmadi evangelical mission. The Ahmadi place great importance on evangelism, and it is 
common for devout followers to volunteer for missionary work. Sofia explains that she uses 
WhatsApp, Viber and Skype to stay in touch with her husband, sending messages all day, mainly 
through Wi-Fi as no mobile operator had yet installed 3G signals in Rabwa. She didn't have a 
Facebook account “because I have no time, I don't like it and I am married now”.  
 
Although Zehra also uses messaging applications like WhatsApp, unlike her sister she also uses 
Facebook. she explains that she uses it mainly for catching up with news and staying in touch 
with friends, but not close family, because this would result in unwanted connections to unrelated 
males. As Zehra puts it, “I personally like Facebook.. Like I have university fellows, hostel 
fellows, area fellows, college fellows and many of them have moved far away …and we are not 
in contact with them anymore but a Facebook ID is the only thing that still remains”. Yet this 
function of Facebook as a link to the broader world remains very segregated along gender lines. 
As Zehra describes, her Facebook account is limited to female cousins while “For brothers I use 
WhatsApp and Viber”. She explains that this is “because on Facebook they have their male 
friends and then friends of friends. So on Facebook one feels insecure, but WhatsApp and Viber 
have a kind of homely feel”. This digital gender division serves to limit female users ability to 
reach out beyond the constraints imposed by religious and cultural norms.  
 
Zehra went on to explain that she actually felt more comfortable with this gender seclusion,  that 
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she used to be friends with her brother on Facebook, but had unfriended him herself because she 
felt it wasn't appropriate, and that she needed a ‘boundary line’. As she put it, “They speak 
something about girls or they joke with one another so you feel yourself that it is not for females, 
it is for males”. Instead she described how she felt it was better for her own wellbeing to be 
excluded from her brothers Facebook friends. She explained that “the trouble starts when it moves 
on to their friends …they send friend requests or messages even if they don’t know you”. For 
Zehra, the main concern was that if an unknown male contacted her, “it would create problems 
for my family – therefore I keep them at a distance”. Zahra’s account describes how she manages 
a boundary line between her brother’s male friends and herself, distancing herself from the kind 
of comments that male users make and her family from the consequences of unwanted 
communication. In this description Zehra reveals how she sacrifices the possibility of 
communicating with a wider social network because she finds their communication offensive and 
to protect the honour of her family.  
 
While Zahra’s account describes how female Facebook users withdraw from Facebook’s wider 
social sphere in response to the possibilities it presents of traversing friends lists and social groups, 
other accounts emphasise how this social segregation and gender seclusion have religious 
meaning as well. Ahmad, the leader of the Mandi Bahauddin Ahmadi youth chapter that I met in 
Rabwa persuaded his father to let me interview his mother and aunt, and so we meet in one of the 
small dark rooms off the central courtyard of a traditional ‘Haveli’ townhouse. I sit in the main 
‘betak’, the meeting room for male visitors, together with Ahmad’s father while in the adjoining 
room, the doorway covered in a curtain, are Farishta and Sheeba. It is unusual for the women of 
Ahmadi to be allowed to interact with strange men, but Ahmad’s family are more progressive 
than many as his father is an academic and they have spent some years living in Tokyo as part of 
his studies.  
 
Farishta and Sheeba explain that they both use social media extensively, though only Farishta 
uses Facebook, as Sheeba says she doesn't “because I don’t have any interest, because I think it’s, 
I think ahh! It’s a wastage of time”. Both have smartphones whilst Farishta also has a Samsung 
tablet and a laptop, and says that she accesses the internet, and Facebook specifically, through the 
tablet and her phone, using Wi-Fi and 3G “whatever is available”. Both Farishta and Sheeba 
explains that they prefer WhatsApp to Facebook because it is easier and more private, indeed they 
describe WhatsApp as ‘ghar ki bad’ [in the house]. They use WhatsApp for family messages, 
mainly within a family group that has about ten members with whom they share news, family 
updates and crucially, photographs of family events that also include female members. As Sheeba 
described it, “I like WhatsApp more as compared to Facebook, as I said before that image are, 
yeah more private and we can maintain our privacy. We can send our selfies and messages 
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quickly without delay, and I send too many selfies to my husband (all laugh again). He is in 
England.” While Sheeba emphasizes the important role that WhatsApp plays in maintaining 
privacy and thus ensuring a degree freedom amongst her family and with her husband, Farishta 
explains that she uses WhatsApp in a similar way, but also uses Facebook too.  
 
Farishta describes how she uses Facebook maybe once a day for about half an hour, but only to 
catch up with friends, to look at other people’s status updates and make comments on things that 
they post. As she says,  I only comment. I am not keen of updating statuses or anything else, just 
comments (laughs) and especially on the family people”. She explained that because she had both 
male and female friends in her network, she didn’t share any personal information or photographs. 
She explained that this was “because we are veiled women and we are not allowed to come in 
front of others. According to the teaching of the Jamaat (religious leadership), the females they 
don’t show their faces”. For Farishta, visibility on Facebook was considered in the same way as 
public visibility, and understood through the same religious norm of gender seclusion and purdah.  
 
Farishta went on to explain how purdah was an important to them because of religious as well as 
social reasons. She described how there were three reasons for the practice of purdah, namely 
safety, community and God. Farishta explained that she hadn’t practiced purdah when she was in 
Japan, because it was safe, and people didn't stare, and so in Japan she felt safer and ‘more free, 
because people are educated”. But when she came back, she wore the veil again because she 
knew that people stared and that the community expected it, and if they didn’t practice purdah the 
family would lose its honour and be disrespected. In contrast to these descriptions of external 
sources of demand for the practice of purdah, when Farishta described what practicing purdah 
meant in terms of religion, she emphasized the meaning that it had for her and the feelings that 
the practice generated. She said that Purdah is because Allah has said it is a must thing. When I 
follow the command that God has given you I feel very relaxed, very happy.” Yet while Farishta 
expressed a sense of fulfilment in religious practice, she also said that she felt it was unfair that 
men got to share so much but women had to be more careful.  
 
Farishta compared how men and women were able to share information and content on Facebook, 
and said that she thought she would like to share in the way that men do. As she put it “Yeah, I 
feel a bit jealous, because men have got more freedom than women. In general, and in Facebook. 
I want to share but I cannot.” She explained that she couldn’t post personal things, such as a 
picture with this myself, because of “the reaction from the community”. And in a recognition of 
the global nature of the internet and Facebook, she said that “even if we moved to Japan, I couldn't 
post things on Facebook. To post personal things on Facebook, my whole family has to be 
Japanese too (laughs).” 
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Farishta’s description of her desire to share personal information highlights the difference 
between male and female Facebook usage, and also the complex layers of meaning that constitute 
social practices such as purdah. These complex layers, which include the sedimented demands of 
community, safety and religious practice are entangled with the different affordances of 
technologies such as WhatsApp and Facebook. The personal nature of WhatsApp affords privacy, 
immediacy and a space that is limited to the family and those members of the WhatsApp group. 
Facebook meanwhile demands an authenticity and a sharing of personal details that Farishta and 
others describe as aspirational, practices they desire to perform. Yet the affordances of traversing 
friend’s groups and the resulting context collapse mitigate against this desire to limit the 
realization of the radical transparency of truly unfiltered ‘authenticity’. Instead careful 
management of the presentation of public selves’ structures what is shared, with whom and in 
what ways.  
 
These accounts of female Facebook users limiting their social networks and practicing forms of 
gender seclusion are not limited to Ahmadi Facebook users.  As Faryal, the teacher from Mandi 
Bahauddin , explained: ‘Purdah is important. In Islam it is prohibited for the female to come 
outside without Purdah, you know. We should follow those lines, and not come outside the house 
with a Paloo [veil] on your face. Don't show your face or your body to others, what are you 
having or what you are not”. Similarly, in Gujrat Nadia emphasized that even though her freedom 
was important to her, she understood how important the practice of purdah and principles of 
honour were. As she said, “everyone thinks of purdah and honour. Because if somebody says 
something about me then the whole thing will be effecting my family even if nobody knows my 
father then people will use the name of my grandfather. So in this way this thing effects the whole 
family.” And even in Islamabad, as Fareeha explained, purdah is important, and something that 
she valued as a religious practice. As she described it, “I think that purdah is for women, it’s good 
for her. I feel very good observing purdah. I mean my brothers are not here, I observe it myself”. 
 
This section has described how female Facebook users actively separate themselves from the 
wider social network that Facebook offers for reasons of safety, social conformity and religious 
practice. Facebooks affordances for traversing friendship lists and for authenticity create tensions 
between user’s desires to present aspirational aspects of themselves and the wider social norms 
of piety, submission and honour. In other words, female Facebook users in Pakistan welcome the 
gender segregation that is a result of male Facebook users creating multiple authentic accounts to 
separate their male friends from female relatives, and indeed undertake practices to achieve the 
same effect. Importantly, whilst all female respondents described these practices in terms of safety 
 162 
and upholding honour in the face of external threats, others also described the practice of digital 
purdah as a form of religious piety that had intrinsic meaning of its own.  
 
8.4 Analysis: Diffractions of Authenticity - Segregation and Digital Purdah 
This section and the subsequent one analyse how the use of Facebook shapes gender and religious 
practices. While the previous section analysed how the use of Facebook shaped the enactment of 
minority and majority religious identities, this section turns the analytic gaze towards specific 
practices. The first section examines the practice of creating fake accounts among male and 
female Facebook users, comparing an analysis of the practice as technological liberation with an 
analysis of the same practice as the production of new subjectivities. The second section examines 
the practice of creating multiple authentic accounts by male Facebook users, analysing it as a 
form of ‘digital purdah’ from both modernist and postmodern perspectives. The section that 
follows examines the practice of religious debate and specifically how Facebook’s newsfeed 
discourse of algorithmic individualism shapes the practice of hidayat or religious instruction.  
 
This section analyses the practice of creating multiple accounts as a strategy to segregate male 
and female Facebook users. It shows how analyses based on normative theories of development 
and modernity explain submission to digital purdah in binary terms of traditionalism and 
modernity. This is contrasted with performative sociomaterial accounts that reveal the complexity 
of submission as an act of subject formation.  
 
The practice of creating multiple accounts to maintain gender segregation is explained as a 
response to Facebook’s affordance for the collapse of family and gender boundaries. The 
enactment of this practice serves to seclude female Facebook users from participation in the wider 
digital public sphere, much in the same way as the practice of purdah secludes women from public 
view. The practice is thus termed ‘digital purdah’ and is situated within the traditional practice of 
purdah and its function in maintaining practices of arranged marriage and family structure. As 
such, the practice of digital purdah, like traditional purdah, serves to maintain female and family 
honour (Papanek 1973) as part of upholding the traditional institutions of family and biraderi as 
core units of social organisation (Alavi 1995).  
 
The practice of purdah is normatively described as a traditional practice of constraint that 
embodies religious conservatism. In Pakistan, the issue of purdah has historically divided those 
who see it as a religious practice and those who view it as limiting women’s freedoms (Ansari 
2009). Feminist literatures link veiled women to religious orthopraxy in contrast to gender-
equality activists who lack equivalent markers (Shaheed 2010). Purdah is also identified as a 
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barrier to development resources such as healthcare access (Grünenfelder 2013) and employment 
(Sultana, Jawan, and Hashim 2009). More generally, Sen describes headscarf-wearing women as 
‘traditionalist’ (Sen 2007, 62), while Giddens argues that the hijab ‘in many Islamic cultural 
contexts [it] expresses the continuing subjugation of women’ (Giddens 2004, 10). The seclusion 
of women is thus part of a broader concern about gender equality and limitations on women’s 
freedom of choice.  
 
From a male perspective, as Shakir explains, the purpose of digital purdah is to prevent the 
dishonour that would result if his male relatives were to see his female relatives. According to 
Shakir, if his friends were to send his female relatives a friend request, ‘my image would be 
broken.’ For Sulaiman, women ‘are not supposed to communicate with people outside their 
family. It is just like purdah.’ This is part of a wider set of practices that limit women from using 
the Internet. As Zain says, reflecting the views of many interviewees, ‘Women on the Internet, it 
is not considered good. Islam does not allow them… it is purdah!’ At the heart of these accounts 
is a concern for the protection of their female relatives’ reputation and marriageability and the 
family’s honour. Digital purdah thus serves the same function as the established practice of 
keeping women secluded from public life and the possibility of unsanctioned interaction with 
men.  
 
Women’s accounts of digital purdah confirm that the practice limits their ability to interact with 
other men. Yet, they also describe a willingness to submit to this seclusion. Farishta, for example, 
says that, although she is jealous of men’s freedoms and wants to share pictures but cannot, she 
has chosen to limit her presence on Facebook. She emphasises how purdah is a religious practice 
that makes her happy. Faryal describes how she actively chose to unfriend her brother on 
Facebook to limit exposure to his male friends. Zehra says she prefers WhatsApp to Facebook, 
despite the latter’s promise of a wider public sphere, because ‘one feels insecure therefore 
WhatsApp gives a kind of homely feel. On Facebook one feels insecure.’ Indeed, women’s 
overwhelming preference for WhatsApp over Facebook could be understood as a reflection of 
their choice to minimise their exposure to a wider public sphere, secluding themselves within the 
confines of a social network that is socially acceptable.  
 
A Normative Analysis 
The normative perspective of mainstream development theory explains the individual’s choice to 
limit his or her choices – as in the case of submitting to the practice of purdah – as malformed 
and essentially ‘wrong’. For example, Sen’s capabilities framework explains decisions to limit 
choice as malformed or ‘adaptive’ preferences (Bruckner 2007; Khader 2011; Nussbaum 1998) 
– a response to external factors such as the contraction of feasible options (Bruckner 2007, 307) 
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or ignorance of alternative options (Khader 2011). Adaptive preferences have been used to 
explain why, for example, women choose to give up their mobile phone at home to maintain 
domestic harmony (Masika and Bailur 2015). Authentic preferences are always, according to Sen, 
for freedom and the maximising of choice (Sen 1999). Thus, the only authentic choice is to reject 
digital purdah and pursue possibility in the wider digital sphere.  
 
According to this analysis, the practice of creating multiple Facebook accounts to seclude female 
relatives from male friends is a new form of the established practice of purdah. The practice of 
digital purdah thus constrains women’s freedom and limits their ability to realise the benefits of 
participating in the wider digital public sphere. Women who choose to submit to the practice of 
digital purdah do so because they are forced to (their choices are constrained) or because they are 
not aware of alternatives. Either way, submission as religious practice is always and only 
subjugation to traditional oppression.  
 
The above analysis is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it rests on a conception of the 
individual as a ‘choosing, reasoning individual’ (Gasper 2002, 451) for whom the only form of 
empowerment is through liberation from communal and social ties (Hopgood 2000). This account 
of the individual was shown to be problematic in Chapter 4 because the idea of the rational 
sovereign subject was a product of Western Christian thought, which privileged secular modernity 
over other sociocultural ways of being in the world. In other words, the account of digital purdah 
echoes theories of modernisation that privilege an Enlightenment model of modernity.  
 
A Sociomaterial Performative Analysis 
This liberatory account is further complicated when read through a performative sociomaterial 
lens. A performative account of identity argues that there is ‘no doer before the deed’ and that 
identity is made up of pre-given identity categories, experiences and labels (Butler 1990, 40). 
Thus, for example, Nadia’s enactment of the selfie-taking feminine subject is not the expression 
of a repressed liberated self, but the performative enactment of an already existing subject. Among 
the fragmentary, hegemonic discursive regimes, the ‘selfie queen’ is one of the tools to be picked 
up, the script to enact (Butler 1990).  
 
A performative analysis also allows an alternative reading of voluntary submission to digital 
purdah as religious practice. Drawing on Butler’s performative account of subjects in discourse, 
Mahmood describes how the piety practices of Egyptian women, such as wearing the veil, are 
subject-forming acts. She notes that ‘the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s 
subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent’ 
(Mahmood 2006, 188). Similarly, Jamal’s description of female members of the conservative 
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political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, shows how they came to find themselves in the submissive 
practices of patience and tolerance as ‘more rational, disciplined and open-minded’ beings (Jamal 
2009, 20).  
 
Analysed in the same way, accounts of female submission to piety and purdah can be 
acknowledged as subject forming and not merely self-repressive, malformed preferences. When 
Farishta says of purdah, ‘When I follow the command that God has given you I feel very happy’, 
and when Fareeha says, ‘I feel very good observing purdah’, their account of the meaning their 
feelings have is the performative enactment of themselves as a subject.  
 
This analysis of submission to digital purdah is not to conclude that submission is a form of 
empowerment or liberation, or the erasing of the politics of gender, power or ethics. Rather, it is 
to acknowledge that all subjects are produced by a discursive practice ‘that enacts or produces 
that which it names’ (Butler 1993, 13). Although Butler’s performative notion of citation and the 
submissive subject has been critiqued for its failure to allow the possibility of resistance and 
change (Nussbaum 1999; Bordo 1992), she argues that ‘there is no subverting of a norm without 
inhabiting the norm’ (Butler 2006, 285). The point is to acknowledge the possibility of subject 
formation in ways other than the liberation or detachment of the self, including through piety 
practices.  
 
Thus, in contrast to the claims in the feminist literature that frame emancipation as the movement 
from traditional, oppressive religious practices towards modern, liberal freedoms, a performative 
account of religious practice offers alternative ways of conceptualising gender identity. In contrast 
to Pakistani feminists who describe Islam as inextricably bound up with the constitution of a 
subjugated female identity (Rouse 1986; Shaheed 2010), others argue for the possibility of 
conceptualising gender identity ‘through alternative formulations that question not only the liberal 
subject of freedom and autonomy but also the feminist subject of resistance and agency’ (Jamal 
2009, 13). Instead of a binary polarity between submission and liberation or tradition and 
modernity, this performative account recognises both the constitutive nature of submission as well 
as the multi-dimensional nature of religious practice. To recognise that all identities are subjects 
produced by discursive regimes enables us to recognise the power and interests that are served in 
(re)citing hegemonic regimes. 
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9. Religious Identity as Digital Secularisation: Diffraction in 
Pakistan 
 
This chapter draws on the preceding empirical chapters to present an outline of a theory of how 
Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan. This chapter consolidates the 
insights from the analysis of empirical accounts of Facebook use to formulate a theory of religious 
identity as enacted through Facebook as ‘digital secularisation’. The previous empirical chapters 
outlined specific experiences and practices of different religious groups as well as male and 
female Facebook users, and described how they negotiated Facebook’s affordances for the 
enactment of religious identities. Analyses of these accounts showed how Facebook’s affordances 
for singular authenticity reinforced dominant discourses, further strengthening Sunni nationalism 
as the normative form of Pakistani Muslim identity and marginalising Ahmadi and Shia identities. 
It also showed how male and female users negotiated Facebooks affordances for singular 
authenticity through the use of multiple accounts to enact the gendered subjects positions 
established in hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism.  
 
The theory of religious identity as digital secularisation is grounded in the work of scholars who 
argue that the concepts of religion and the secular are historically contingent and embodied in 
everyday practices. Digital secularisation follows Asad to argue that the meaning of religion can 
be understood as the product of genealogical power, that 'their possibility and their authoritative 
status are to be explained as products of historically distinctive disciplines and forces (1993, 10).  
Digital secularisation thus describes how religious  identity emerges in the form of religious 
practices that are the product of genealogical power translated through social and technological 
discourse. Digital secularisation theorises how Facebook shapes religious identity as 
secularisation through incorporating the role of technology as agentic actors, translating specific 
discourses. The theory of digital secularisation describes a process and a form of religious identity, 
and distinguishes between ‘the secular’ as an epistemic concept and secularism - as a political 
project. As Asad argues, ‘the secular’ is conceptually prior to the political doctrine of ‘secularism’  
(1993, 16) but is not a preceding or enabling state – ‘the secular’ is not a gateway to secularism. 
This means that digital secularisation is not a statement about the nature of religion prior to 
Facebook use – in other words, it is not arguing that Facebook secularises the sacred, or is 
disenchanting. Instead, digital secularisation argues that Facebok affords a religious identity that 
is of a particular nature, namely voluntaristic, rational and individualistic – forms of subjecthood 
that are commonly characterised as modern (Giddens, 1991; Castells, 2010).   
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This chapter draws on Asad’s reconceptualization of religion and secularity and operationalises 
it through drawing on Iqtidar’s (2011) framework of religious identity and secularisation  to 
characterise Facebook’s shaping of religious identity as ‘digital secularisation’. The chapter then 
proceeds to outline the nature of agency in this process, drawing on Butler’s (1990) notion of the 
desiring subject to explain how the desire for recognition drives users to conform to expectations, 
and explains this through female users accounts of enacting pious religious identities. The chapter 
then proceeds to outline the implications of digital secularisation through drawing on Barad’s  
concept of diffraction. The chapter concludes with an outline of the implications of digital 
secularisation and diffraction for religious identity in Pakistan.   
 
  
9.1  Digital Secularisation 
The empirical chapters found that in many cases the use of Facebook to enact religious 
identity appeared to reinforce existing hegemonic discourses, whether they be in the form 
of entrenching Sunni Islam as the normative form of religious nationalism or the 
established positions of women as submissive embodiments of family and national 
honour. Yet the performative enactment of hegemonic discourse and the resulting 
‘amplification’ of religious nationalism is not simply a faithful reproduction of 
hegemonic norms. Facebook shapes religious identity through the introduction of 
particular forms of subjecthood that change to the nature of the religious identity that is 
being performed. It is the nature of the process of enactment that points towards the kind 
of social change that is introduced through the way Facebook shapes religious identity in 
Pakistan. This emphasis on the process of enacting religious identity echoes Iqtidar’s 
(2011) account of the way the Jamaat Islami introduce new forms of religious practice 
that result in changes to the nature of religious practice and identity. In paying attention 
to religious identity in practice the argument follows Asad’s call for greater attention to 
understanding religion and secularity in practices, to look at  ‘the occurrence of events 
(utterances, practices, dispositions) and the authorizing processes that give those events 
meaning and embody that meaning in concrete institutions.’ (1993, 43).  
 
I argue that the process of enacting religious identity on Facebook is a secularising 
process because it transforms the nature of religious identity into a form that is 
individualist and voluntaristic, rationalist and performative.  Iqtidar’s (2011) concept of 
secularisation as a process (distinct from secularism as a policy) consists of three core 
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attributes, and which allow her to argue that the Jamaat Islami are a secularising force 
and a modern institution that produces modern subjects. The first attribute is the exercise 
of choice over religious identity, the second is the rationalisation of religion through it’s 
application beyond the private sphere to everyday life and thirdly the conscious enactment 
of religious identity. I show how Facebook affords similar processes of enactment and 
therefore argue that Facebook introduces a process of social change that I describe as 
‘digital secularisation’.  
 
9.1.1 Choice and Religious Identity 
Iqtidar argues that the Jamaat Islami exists in a context where individuals can exercise 
choice over their affiliation to a particular religious community, and specifically to one 
of the many Islamic groups such as one of the ulama-led maslaks (Deobandi, Barelwi, 
Ahl-e Hadis, or Tablighi Jama`at) or one of the Islamist groups such as Jamaat Islami. In 
other words, Muslims in Pakistan live in a competitive religious market place and can 
exercise voluntary, individual agency in their choice of religious affiliation. This reflects 
a shift from religious identity as historically defined by the community or tribe to one in 
which individuals exercise individual voluntary agency in their choice of religious 
identity. As Iqtidar describes it, this is “a trend toward individuals trying to define the 
right ‘religious package’ for themselves’ (2011, 6), and reflects the modernist conception 
of individual identity central to theorists of modernity (Giddens, 1991; Castells 2010).  
 
Social media platforms such as Facebook offer new platforms for the exercise of choice 
over how individuals perform their identity. Firstly, social media platforms such as 
Facebook exist in a marketplace of platforms, and must compete with others for the 
attention and time of users. Though this competition is real, many respondents reported a 
sense that they had no choice but to join Facebook out of social pressure or logistical 
reasons such as the distribution of homework. The choice of platform also results in 
different forms of religious expression, as respondents described different patterns of 
Facebook and WhatsApp use. Male respondents described a preference for Facebook, 
and a degree of comfort in articulating religious identity in public whilst female 
respondents tended to prefer WhatsApp and to talk about religion in private and amongst 
known friends.  
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Social media platforms themselves also afford users choice in the nature of their identity 
performance. Although Turkle (1984) was wrong to categorise the internet and online 
forums as a separate, ‘second life’, she was right to identify them as a new medium 
affording particular forms of expression. A characteristic affordance is the possibility of 
interacting with people that users might not have met, and the finding of new 
opportunities for self-expression. Mark Zuckerberg describes the site as offering users ‘a 
way to say what they're thinking and have their voice be heard’ (Zuckerberg, 2012). Although 
many respondents described ways in which self-expression was qualified or constrained, 
many also described how the platform provided new opportunities for self-expression. 
Nadia for example described how she embraced Facebook and Instagram for the 
possibility of being ‘a selfie queen’. As Nadia said, ‘there was this trend in Pakistan of 
having names like “attitude queen” or “stone heart”…so I used mermaid …to specify 
how I am considering myself nowadays”. Here Nadia describes how she consciously 
exercises choice over how she articulates herself to a ‘public’ audience. Users can also 
exercise choice over their audiences through affiliating themselves to groups, interests 
and categories. Indeed, Facebook is designed to respond to those choices by selecting 
content it believes is relevant to that specific identity and audience. Many respondents 
described how they self-selected into sect specific groups in which the nature of religious 
debate was more open than in mixed-sect groups, and also how Facebook would populate 
their Newsfeed with content from friends in similar groups. In other words, Facebook 
affords users the opportunity to choose amongst many different religious identities and 
then responds to that choice by selecting content that is relevant to the identity a user has 
chosen .  
 
Facebook shape religious identity through its affordances for individual choice in identity 
enactment, introducing a process of voluntary, conscious consideration about the nature 
of the identity being enacted. Iqtidar describes how the competing Islamist groups bring 
about a ‘critical engagement with the notion of Islam as cohesive religion and a deepening 
realisation that there is no single Islam’ (2011, 6). Similarly, Facebook’s introduction of 
new choices in how to perform and present oneself force users to exercise critical thinking 
about the form of Islam that they enact in their daily lives. Users compare their 
performative presentation of the self in relation to others and as conscious acts. This 
introduces an engagement with religious as a conscious practice that is distinct from 
historic practices in which religion was assumed, unquestioned part of everyday life.  
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9.1.2 Rationalisation and Religious Uniformity  
Facebook also shapes religious identity through a ‘rationalising’ process in which users 
enact uniform, ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’ form of religious identity across all areas of 
their life. Because Facebook demands a singular, authentic self across all social contexts 
(Marwick and boyd, 2014), Facebook users must consciously enact a religious identity 
that meets the demands of the hegemonic social order. This process of rationalising 
religious identity is a similar secularisation of religious identity that reflects the 
organisational processes of the Jamaat Islami, as described by Iqtidar (2011). Iqtidar 
argues that that JI are a secularising force because they promote a ‘rationalising’ of 
religion through the conscious and rational application of religion to social contexts 
outside the private sphere (2011, 151-155). This extension of religion outside the private 
sphere goes against theories of modernisation and secularisation that predeict a declining 
importance of faith as religious authority wanes (Chaves, 1994) or is differentiated from 
public life and relegated to the private sphere (Luckmann, 1967). Common to these 
accounts is the assumption that the ‘quantity’ of religion declines as it is diminished in 
peoples everyday life.  
 
However, Iqtidar argues that focusing on the quantity of religion fails to explain the 
continuing role of religion in processes of social change and modern life. Iqtidar argues 
that we can better understand how religion retains it’s salience by paying attention to the 
quality of religious practice rather than assessments of the quantity of religion. Paying 
attention to the nature of religious practice reveals how Muslim men and women bring a 
modernist religious lens to all aspects of modern life that leads to a ‘refashioning of belief 
in Muslim societies' (2011:150). Iqtidar argues that this refashioning of religion to all 
aspects of non-religious life involves a ‘rationalizing’ of religion that introduces a modern 
form of faith that is applied to all aspects of life. In other words, religion is rationalized 
as all life must conform to the ‘authentic’ form of rationalised faith, and all ‘non-
religious’ life must be lived according to religious norms and values.  
 
The assumption of a singular, universal identity that is uniform across social contexts 
reflects the conception of the individual afforded by Facebook’s design. Mark 
Zuckerbergs assertion that “Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of 
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integrity.”(Zuckerberg in Zimmer 2015) reflects his belief in the principle of an authentic, 
singular self, a belief that underpins the modernist ideal of authentic, sovereign subject. 
Zuckerbergs’ belief is translated through Facebook affordances for the structuring of all 
spheres of life according to one ‘authentic’ set of norms. Facebooks affordance for 
collapsing contexts means that users are forced to maintain a coherence and integrity of 
subjectivity – that is, they must enact a single identity that conforms to the ‘lowest 
common denominator’ (Marwick and boyd, 2014) of audience expectation. This serves 
to reinforce a dominant, hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism because in 
Pakistan Sunni religious nationalism is the normative religious national identity.  Many 
of the Facebook users I spoke to described how religious content constituted a significant 
element of their social media activity, and how a significant number of the first ten items 
in their newsfeed consisted of religious content, in contrast to the prediction of a decline 
of religion that one might expect from the liberatory claims for ICTs.  For example, 
Fareehad and Waheeda, Shia students at a University in Gujrat, described how they would 
often post “sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) as good wishes for a friend, or to share good 
wishes for the day’. Similarly, Nabeel, a young Sunni working at a mobile phone shop in 
Gujranwala, described how he would commonly post “hadiths and good things for others 
to follow. If there is a post or a good saying, then I will like, and if it is really good then 
also share. Sharing is like a prayer”. Respondents also described how a significant 
number of the first ten items their newsfeed, items selected by Facebook’s algorithm 
because it calculated that it would be content users would interact with, were religious in 
nature. Nabeel, for example, said that “now, the first and the last three items are like 
hadiths, or pics of the Kaaba or at least three, maybe four of the items. Many others 
described how on average at least three or four of the top ten items in their newsfeed, 
items that Facebook selects because it predicts users are most likely to interact with them 
(Skeggs and Yuill, 2016), were religious in nature. In other words, the Facebook 
algorithm knows that for the uses I spoke to religious content drives interaction, and so it 
includes this content in the items it selects for peoples Newsfeeds.  
 
Religion continues to be salient because it is part of the subject that Facebook users seek 
to enact, as well as being a product of the context afforded by Facebooks singular subject. 
When users break Facebook’s terms of service and create multiple Facebook accounts 
they do not enact ‘authentic’ secular selves when they are free from the demanding gaze 
of parents or community. When users created separate family and friends accounts 
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religion remained a significant dimension in each of the identities they enacted. For 
example, although the Facebook users I spoke work described ‘family’ and ‘friends’ 
accounts in order to be different in different social contexts, common to both was the 
posting and engagement with religious content. Even in their ‘friends’ accounts, where 
users described how they felt free and able to talk about ‘modern’ subjects such as 
Bollywood music, Hollywood films and porn stars, they also described posting religious 
content too.  
 
For many users, religious content was part of all their multiple profiles. For example, 
Nabeel described how he has two IDs, “One for family and the other for friends”. At 
first, he described how in his family account he makes a conscious effort to enact a 
religious identity as he knows that’s what his family expects. As he said, “Islamic pages 
are within my family ID and the other ones are within my friends ID. He went on to 
describe in a later conversation how when using his friends account he often came across 
sectarian related content, and claimed he would often participate in debates, defending 
users who were being attacked. As he said, “Yeah I have [got involved] many times.  The 
person being attacked is also a human being…he also have rights and we should care 
about them as well as we care about ourselves”. For Nabeel, religious content is part of 
both his family and friends accounts.  
 
Facebooks affordances for a singular, authentic subject interacts with the dominant 
hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism in such a way that it demands users enact a 
religious identity that is uniform and consistent across the multiple contexts and identities 
they enact. This rationalisation of religion into all aspects of life reflects Iqtidar’s (2011) 
description of how the Jamaat Islami encourages a ‘rationalisation’ of religion across all 
aspects of life and Weber’s (1950[1904]) account of the way in which the Calvinists urged 
a uniform whole life of good work, in contrast to the discrete ‘good works’ advocated by 
the Catholic church. This is not to argue that Facebook serves the same secularising 
function as the JI or the Catholic church, or that it leads towards the same outcomes. 
Rather, Facebook affords a process of rationalisation that is agnostic on the content of 
that rationalisation. Whilst religious institutions necessarily urge a rationalisation of their 
own beliefs, Facebook affords a rationalisation of whatever discourse holds a hegemonic 
position in the context of it’s users. Facebook shapes the quality of expression and shape 
of identity that emerges from the platform, yet is agnostic as to the content of this identity.  
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Facebooks sociomaterial technological discourse of singular authenticity demands that 
users enact a uniform, coherent self that is the same across social contexts, forcing users 
to rationalise their performance so that it meets the lowest common denominator of 
conformity. Drawing on Barad’s idea of technology as an ‘apparatus’ allows us to see 
Facebook as a site in which religious identity is enacted as well as playing an active role 
in shaping the form of religious identity that is enacted. Like Barad’s account of the slit 
in the wave-particle experiment described in the beginning of this thesis, as religious 
identity is enacted through Facebook ‘it is not merely that the past behaviour of some 
given entity has been changed, as it were, but that the entities’ very identity has been 
changed!’ (Barad, 2010:260). Facebook changes the nature of subjectivity through its 
affordance for a singular, authentic identity leading to a rationalisation of whatever 
discourse dominates the users context. In Pakistan, enacting religious identity reinforces 
the hegemony of a Sunni nationalist identity.  
 
9.1.3 Conscious Enactment of Religious Identity 
Facebook also shapes religious identity is through a process of ‘objectification’, a process 
in which religious identity becomes a conscious, performative act differentiating the 
individual from others. Because Facebook affords the traversing of social contexts and 
friendship groups, it shapes religious identity through increasing the conscious exposure 
to people from different religious groups and sects. Users respond to this exposure of 
‘others’ by consciously defining and enacting their religious identity. This objectification 
of religion is a similar process to the objectification that Iqtidar describes being afforded 
by the JI, a process she argues is secularising because it shapes how individuals define 
their beliefs and practices in a conscious, deliberate way (2011:25). Iqtidar draws on 
Eickelman and Piscatori’s (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996) concept of ‘objectification’ to 
describe the process in which people consciously define the meaning and role of religion 
in everyday life. Iqtidar describes how the JI exists in a competitive marketplace of 
religious groups, and in having to explain their positions the JI and other Islamists 
differentiate their practices and beliefs from others. This leads to an objectification of 
religion ‘in which religion is not emptied out of its transcendental value but is transformed 
into a more historically situated, critically analysed set of values and practices’ (Iqtidar, 
2011: 36). One of the ways the JI and other Islamist parties shape religious identity is 
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through the way they encourage constant comparisons with other Islamist groups and 
related ways of being’ (Iqtidar, 2011:126).  
 
This objectification is the conscious rationalisation of questions of individual religious 
identity, questions that historically were unproblematised and taken for granted. In the 
same way that religious identity was normally part of the milieu in which one lived and 
in which following a different faith would at the least be noticeable if not sanctioned, the 
conscious effort to think about identity and enact it in the ‘right’ way introduces a form 
of rational consideration of the self that makes religious identity a performative 
enactment. Facebook shapes religious identity through affording similar processes of 
objectification, as it demands that users consciously select and portray themselves in 
relationship to others and to other beliefs. Facebook’s affordances for sharing content and 
traversing friendship groups serves to strengthen a process of objectification. Many of the 
users I spoke with described how through Facebook they were exposed to people from 
different religious groups, and how that exposure led to an increased sense of self-
definition. For example, Fahad, a young student in a private university in Gujarat, 
described how it was easy to tell which sect someone on Facebook belonged to, as he said 
“We can guess it by their posts, the links which they have shared. If most of their posts 
are related to the Pious Caliphs of Islam then one can say that they belong to a Barelvi 
or Sunni sect. But if they have most of their posts regarding the Imams, the twelve Imams 
which is the belief of Shias”. This assessment of users religious identity was something 
that nearly every respondent articulated.  
 
Facebooks affordances for traversing friendship groups increases exposure to Muslims 
from different sects, even as they self-select into broader silos, such as Sunni and Shia. 
Some users described how they self-selected into intra-sectarian groups, but that this 
process of self-selecting was also accompanied by exposure to inter-sectarian debate. 
Qasim for example described how in the dedicated Shia groups that he was part of there 
was lots of debate about sectarian issues because it was amongst people of the same faith 
and that he only got dragged into inter-sectarian debate when he was tagged by friends 
participating in other groups with Sunni and Shia members.   
 
Facebooks affordances for algorithmic individualism, and for giving users what it thinks 
they want also affords a process of objectification as some individuals described how 
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their newsfeed was populated by content they disagreed with the more they interacted 
with that content. Facebooks affordances for religious objectification are most apparent 
in the descriptions of people who describe spending significant amounts of time engaging 
in sectarian debate. For example, Umaid’s account of engaging in what I termed 
‘algorithmic sectarianism’ described how Facebook’s algorithm selected inter-sectarian 
content because it had learned that Umaid spent time interacting with it. For Umaid, this 
was understood as a practice of hidayat and part of his own religious identity that was 
enacted in relation to people of different beliefs. As Umaid put it, “If the post is wrong, 
like it is not what the Prophet said or did, or it is something bid’ah, then I have to 
comment”. That this differentiation was an important part of Usmans’ identity was clear 
from the way he emphasised other peoples’ positive reactions, saying “many people liked 
and said well done”. Other respondents also described how their sense of religious 
identity was manifest in their interaction with people from different groups. One young 
female student from Islamabad who had converted from Sunni to Shia described how she 
responded to Facebook criticisms of the Shia faith, saying that she “became obsessed, it 
was all the time, it was so energising”. Later she told me that she had got so animated 
about responding to these attacks that her mother had begged her to stop, and so instead 
she started attacking people posting atheist quotes instead, saying “now it’s the 
secularists, I tell them that religion is important and we must protect Islam in Pakistan”. 
Facebooks affordances for singular authenticity leads to Newsfeed algorithm populating 
users feeds with content that can provoke sectarian debate and lead to users further 
objectifying their faith as they seek to define their own religious identity in relation to 
others. 
 
For many of the respondents I spoke to, their online religious practice was characterised 
by this distinguishing of their beliefs and practices against others from other branches or 
sects of Islam. Many described how these behaviours were part of practices through 
which religious merit was earned, and as such were important part of their religious life. 
In other words, change in the form of religious practice was linked to a process of 
conscious objectification of religious identity and experience. In this sense, the 
affordances of social media platforms enable religious experience in a form that is 
secularising but does not lead to the displacement or decline of religious belief. Iqtidar 
makes a similar argument in relation to the impact of the JI on religious practice. She 
argues that the change in religious practice is not the ‘disenchantment’ and loss of 
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religious experience but rather a transformation of experience of the transcendent. She 
agues that the religious practices that are afforded by the Islamists is characterised by ‘a 
largely individualised decision that must be justified internally, that is, within a subject, 
and externally, to others around the subject’ (Iqtidar, 2011:157).  
 
Facebook also affords a religious practice that is individualistic yet comparative. The 
simultaneous siloing of public debate into echo chambers and the exposure to the publicly 
articulated views of other Muslims increases the objectification of religion as a conscious, 
performative act across all spheres of life. The incorporation of Facebook into religious 
practice, not least its function as a sphere in which religious practice can earn sawab, 
emphasises the practice of religion in modern form. This refusal to separate life into 
religious and non-religious spheres is characteristic of the secularising force of the 
Islamists as described by Iqtidar. She argues that the Islamists rejection of the public-
private divide and the belief that religion cannot be modern means that ‘political and 
social entanglements cannot proceed along strictly linear formations’ (Iqtidar, 2011:158). 
There is no path from traditional, religious life to modern, secular life, but rather that 
religious practices take on new, diverse forms and qualities.  
 
This account of the performative enactment and ‘objectification’ of religion reflects a 
change in the nature of religious practice, particularly a shift towards the individualism 
of modernity and away from the communalism typically associated with tradition. 
Facebook affords a form of religious practice that echoes Iqtidar’s description of the form 
of religious practice afforded by the JI, ‘a largely individualised decision that must be 
justified internally, that is, within a subject, and externally, to others around the subject’ 
(Iqtidar, 2011:157). Iqtidar describes the JI as an institution that is the product of it’s time 
- it's political nature originating in the colonial, state oriented context, a context where 
identities were in a process of being formalised and defined through “codification of 
religious laws, political constituencies, and census activity” (p. 45). In much the same 
way, Facebook demands that users reflect and make internal decisions about the nature 
of their religious identity that must also be justified to the audience of their performance. 
Facebook’s conception of identity is a product of specific socio-historical contexts, 
embodying Silicon Valley’s belief in the singular, sovereign and authentic individual 
whose liberation is the greatest goal of all.  
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9.2 Facebook, Agency and the Desiring Subject 
The previous section outlined the three ways in which the use of Facebook secularises 
religious identity, introducing processes of choice, rationalisation and conscious 
enactment. This section explains Facebook’s power for shaping religious identity through 
it’s ability to feed users desire for acknowledgement, drawing on Butler’s conception of 
the nature of individuals as ‘desiring subject’s that seek recognition. It shows how 
nuanced understandings of agency can explain female Facebook users accounts of 
making choices that limit their exposure can contribute to theories of ICTD, development 
and social change. Facebook has been described as affording a process of digital 
secularisation, but this is not to suggest a technological determinist stance. Individuals 
are motivated to engage with and use Facebook to achieve particular goals, interacting 
with the possibilities for action that Facebook affords in a particular context. Explaining 
individual agency in a theory of digital secularisation requires an outline of the desires 
that motivate individual users.  
 
The question of individual choice and the agency to make those choices is a central 
concern in development and ICTD  literatures, and indeed in the wider social science 
literatures that assume information technologies increase individual choice, and that 
individual choice is leads inevitably towards liberalism. The assumption that underpin 
the claim of technologies as somehow liberating  is that people will always choose choice. 
This is particularly the case in the context of gender, where digital technologies have been 
described as offering particular potential for emancipation and liberation from patriarchy 
and oppression (Giddens 2004; Sen 2010). Indeed, a number of the female Facebook 
users I spoke with described how they used social media platforms like Facebook to 
interact with male users in ways that were not previously possible and to enact forms of 
self-representation that they could not in public. Nadia for example described how she 
presented an outspoken, feminine ‘selfie-queen’ identity on Facebook, an identity that 
she had to separate from her conservative extended by using multiple Facebook accounts. 
This account, like many others, reflects the liberatory, secularist account of individual 
freedom and choice. However, there were also others who described using the same 
technologies to limit choice and to conform to social and religious norms of pious 
modesty. I draw on Butler’s (1990, 2004) idea of ‘the desiring subject’ to explain these 
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self-limiting choices and the motivation that shapes individual practices of technology 
use.  
 
In contrast to this liberatory account many female respondents described using 
information technologies and social media in ways designed to limit exposure and 
interaction with the wider world. The findings from the survey of mobile data users 
painted a picture in which female respondent’s digital lives were characterised by closed, 
family based social networks through a preference for Whatsapp over Facebook and the 
limiting of friendship groups to family members. Only 45% of female respondents 
identified Facebook as their preferred social media platform, compared to 85% of male 
respondents, whilst 34% of female respondents said the parents were in their social 
network, compared to 16% of male respondents. Only 33% of female respondents said 
they were connected on Facebook to their male friends, compared to 48% of male 
respondents who said their female friends were in their contact list. In other words, female 
respondents described a family oriented, gender segregated online social network, a 
picture of that reflected interview respondent’s descriptions of their offline social 
network. Far from using ICTs to liberate themselves from the restrictions of traditional 
norms and conservative religious values, female users actively chose to replicate their 
offline social works online.  
 
Many female Facebook users explained this by describing how social media platforms 
could be a means through which established piety practices could be upheld, rather than 
a platform through their restraints can be escaped. Faryal, for example, the university 
teacher in Mandibahudin, described how she created multiple Facebook accounts as part 
of her attempts to negotiate the platforms affordances for visibility in a bid to maintain 
the offline practice of covering herself in her online social life, saying “it is like Purdah, 
we must cover”. Similarly, Farishta, one of the Ahmadi sisters in Rabwa, described how 
she preferred WhatsApp because it was “ghar ki bad” (in the house) and that she avoided 
showing pictures of herself because “we are veiled women, and according to the Jamaat, 
Muslim women don’t show their faces”. Many respondents emphasised that veiling was 
not simply a response to external pressure, and that they found a sense of fulfilment and 
meaning in practising purdah. Indeed, many of the female respondents described how 
they found a sense of identity and a feeling of wellbeing that came from submitting to 
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practices that are viewed by many secularist feminist as the product of false consciousness 
and inherently oppressive.  
 
These practices of limitation and the question of agency is closely linked to the process 
of secularisation and secularism, as both are understood to be conditions in which 
individuals are free to exercise choice. In this sense, secularism is commonly linked to 
agency whilst religion is associated with submission, the giving up of individual choice 
and agency ‘to follow norms and traditions unthinkingly’ (Iqtidar, 2011:130). Islam 
particularly is, as Iqtidar (2011) notes, commonly associated with misogyny, and so there 
is a great deal of literature exploring the role of women in Islam, and particularly why 
women submit to oppressive religious practices. In contrast to secular feminists view of 
voluntary submission as ‘false consciousness’, a growing literature explores female 
religious practice in Islam and challenges this conceptualisation of religion, secularity 
and agency to describe how agency can be found within practices of submission. Some 
describe how women find a sense of subjecthood and agency through practices such as 
maintaining modesty and veiling, arguing that ‘the very processes and conditions that 
secure a subject’s subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-
conscious identity and agent’ (Mahmood 2006, 188). Other describe how female 
membership of conservative Islamist parties (Iqtidar, 2011) or religious revival 
movements (Babar 2008; Jamal 2006) provide real opportunities for women to exercise 
choice and agency despite subordination to apparently oppressive norms.  
 
This conceptualisation of agency and subjecthood can also be drawn on to understand 
practices that appear to be liberatory, such as Nadia’s presentation of herself as a ‘selfie-
queen’ can be understood not as liberation but as a similar practice of submission. 
Viewing subjecthood as being realised through submission can help show Nadia’s selfie 
queen not as the liberation of an ‘authentic’ subject, but rather as the enactment of a 
subject that is produced by other forms of oppressive, patriarchal power. Nadia’s poses, 
her calculation about whether to reveal a “side-pose with arms, lips and eyes or a full 
selfie”, her attention to make-up and flattering angles suggest a concern for the gaze of 
the viewer that reflects well established arguments about the nature of the female subject 
and the ‘male gaze’.  Nadia’s presentation of herself could be read as an internalised ‘male 
gaze’ (Mulvey 1989), and thus the enactment of an identity also subject to forms of 
oppression and patriarchy. In the same way Warfield draws on Barad’s agential realism 
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to explore agency in the enactment of selfie images that produce subjects contained in  
hegemonic discourse, so Nadia’s negotiation of selfies and contexts reflect ‘a kind of 
agency that emerges as the result of small shifts and reconfigurations of gendered 
apparatuses of bodily production’ (Warfield 2016, 6). Nadia’s enactment of a liberated 
subject can also be read as the enactment of a subject that exists in the patriarchal 
discourse of the Western male gaze. 
 
Similarly, it is possible to read Nadia’s account of producing selfies that negotiate the 
competing demand of subjects demanded by conservative family and community, close 
friends and her imagined audiences as submission to externally produced subjects, yet 
still always with spaces of agency through the reconfigurations of body, self and 
technology. As she says, “in my close family account, if ever there is a photo I always 
present myself covered, but in my proper account I can be the selfie-queen”.  Through 
these negotiations of social norms, contexts and technological affordances Nadia finds 
forms of agency even as she submits to the forms of identity demanded by religious 
conservatism or patriarchal male gaze of Western modernity. Nadia’s negotiation of the 
competing demands of different contexts is motivated by what Butler (2004) describes as 
a desire for recognition for it is ‘only through the recognition of the Other’ (2004, xviii) 
that individual identity comes to be. For Nadia, it is through recognition by family and a 
wider public that she simultaneously realises her identities as a good Muslim daughter 
and a free modern woman.  
 
Facebook shapes religious identity through its affordances for strengthening the 
hegemonic Other at the same time as creating the possibility of recognition by marginal 
or distant others. Yet the common denominator of audience recognition, and Facebooks 
agnosticism on the nature of the subject, means the dominant discourse further 
strengthens it’s hegemonic position. In this way, Facebook reinforces the female subject 
position contained within Islamist discourses of female piety and seclusions. Yet this 
reinforcement is not simply an exact replication of the existing hegemonic order, but 
rather a remade ‘diffraction’ in what emerges from the intra-action of Facebooks 
technological discourse of singular authenticity and the hegemonic discourse in the 
context of its use is a refraction of both. This diffraction is the social change arising from 
the use of Facebook. 
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9.3  Diffraction and Change in Pakistan 
Theorising Facebook’s shaping of religious identity in Pakistan as ‘digital secularisation’ 
has theorised a non-technologically determinist role for technology and a conception of 
human agency beyond Kantian sovereign subjecthood. In other words, the previous two 
sections have explained how the intra-action of technologies, bodies and discourse result 
in the emergence of new forms of religious identity. This final section brings these 
together to form an emergent sketch of a broader account of social change through an 
outline of a framework for theorising the changes that emerge from the process of digital 
secularisation.  
 
Digital secularisation describes the amplification of hegemonic discourse and explains 
the continuing role of religion, yet it also describes how change can happen. Interrogating 
the normative discourse of modernisation within ICTD and development theory it rejects 
the linear conception of progress, following Asad to argue that “If anything is agreed 
upon, it is that a straightforward narrative progress from the religious to the secular is no 
longer acceptable” (2003, 1). Yet whilst a linear process of change from religious to the 
secular is rejected, it is important to outline a role for technology in processes of change 
that go beyond reinforcing the status quo. To do so I draw on the concept of ‘diffraction’, 
a central concept in Barad’s (2007) theory of agential realism and for which she draws 
heavily on Harraway’s account of the term. Haraway describes diffraction in the 
following manner: ‘Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, 
reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. 
Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less 
distorted form’ (1997, 273). Whilst Barad draws on the concept of diffraction as a 
methodological approach of ‘reading insights through one another’ (2007, 72), here I 
draw on it as a way of describing the kind of change that emerges from the interaction of 
Facebook, users and religious identity.  
 
The term ‘amplification’ is a description some use to describe the role of technology in 
change that attempts  to avoid the traps of social or technological determinism. On the 
one hand, theorists of modernisation and modernity have granted ICTs with the power to 
shape democratic outcomes (Diamond, 2010), and liberating individualism (Giddens, 
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1986, 1991) and network societies (Castells, 2000, 2010). On the other, critics of the 
development project have argued that technologies impose macro-systemic formations of 
Western knowledge ideology (Ferguson 1994; Mosse 2005). Instead, as  ICTD theorist 
Toyama (2011) suggests, viewing technology as an amplifier rejects claims of technology 
alone as additive or transformative and instead recognises that it cannot substitute for 
institutional capacity or human intent, that it can amplify existing inequalities as well as 
positive intent (2011, 75). In other words, technology translates human action. Yet this 
account, whilst a useful departure from technological and social determinism, lacks a 
specific role for technology as an active agent in processes of change.  
 
The idea of diffraction as a way of thinking about processes of change in which there is 
no singular, authentic ‘original’ but rather phenomena in socio-historical contexts that 
interact and from which emerge new reconfigurations of already existing phenomena. In 
other words, the impact of Facebook on religious identity in Pakistan is not an impact on 
but rather an interaction with existing discourses of identity from which emerge 
reconfigurations of technologies, discourses and practices. The process of enacting 
religious identity with Facebook introduces forms of subjecthood that reconfigure the 
elements of the religious identity that is being performed. Importantly, it is the changes 
in the form of enactment, the ‘quality of belief’ as Iqtidar (2011:150) puts it, that points 
towards the kind of social change that is introduced through the entanglement of 
Facebook and religious identity in Pakistan.  Facebook shapes religious identity in 
Pakistan through a process of secularisation characterised by rationalisation, 
objectification and conscious enactment so that hegemonic discourses are reinforced as 
individualised assertions of authenticity and legitimacy.   
 
This thesis argues that religious identity in Pakistan is the product of historically 
constituted discursive formations, and that the establishment of these subject positions 
through a diverse range of media material texts has served particular interests. This has 
led to the formation of discourses of religious identity characterised by increasingly 
assertive conservative religious nationalism. Importantly, this assertive nationalism is 
understood not as the authentic expression of individuals, but rather as hegemonic 
discourse and the enactment of subject positions. The analysis shows that Facebook is not 
neutral in these processes. Despite its commitment to the principle of free speech, the 
technological discourses embodied in Facebook’s design means that the site has specific 
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biases. These are not specific, but rather generic. That is, the technological discourse of 
singular authenticity serves to strengthen the already dominant definition of legitimate 
authenticity. Thus, Facebook is biased towards the reinforcement of normative identities 
and the consolidation of an already hegemonic discourse even as it affords particular 
forms for their enactment.  
 
The implications for Pakistan are that the use of Facebook to enact religious identity 
reinforces – through the performative enactment of discursively constituted subject 
positions – the already hegemonic discourses of religious identity and a homogeneous, 
exclusive religious nationalism. In this sense, the use of Facebook to enact religious 
identity in Pakistan echoes, and indeed amplifies, the contradiction between the state’s 
efforts to establish a singular, homogenous authentic Muslim identity and the resulting 
diversity of subjects defined as inauthentic. As Facebook’s technological discourse of 
singular authenticity reinforces the demand for a singular, Sunni Muslim nationalism, it 
makes even more legible the sectarian differences within Sunni Islam as well as between 
the Sunni, Shia and Ahmadi sects. This reinforcing of sectarian identity functions as part 
of the Pakistani state’s efforts to establish a Pakistani subject that strives towards a 
singular authenticity by denunciating innumerable others. As Iqtidar notes, while the 
attainment of a singular, authentic Muslim identity remains elusive, ‘the possibility of 
that uniform, homogenous majority animates a specific kind of selfhood – one that is 
impatient with the idea of doctrinal difference even as it is increasingly confronted with 
the practice of it, of more choices given the proliferation of religious groups in 
contemporary Pakistan’ (Iqtidar 2012). Similarly, Facebook allows users to self-select 
into same-sect networks that disparage others, even as patterns of algorithmic 
sectarianism promote inter-sect interaction around principles of hidayat and bid’ah.  
Facebook amplifies the same selfhood as the state, on the one hand bolstering the idea of 
a homogenous, authentic majority and, on the other, reinforcing sectarian divisions 
through the creation of echo chambers. 
 
The implications of using Facebook to enact religious identity are thus the hardening of 
a hegemonic religious nationalism and the boundaries of sectarian division. As the 
adoption of mobile phones grows and they are used increasingly to access fast mobile 
Internet services, these implications will only become more significant. Mobile phone use 
is growing rapidly. PTA reports that the number of mobile Internet users increased from 
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20 million in October 2015 (when this research was finished) to 31 million in July 2016. 
In August 2016, Facebook reported there were 27 million Facebook users, up from 20 
million in December 2015. This rapid growth is increasingly linked by civil society 
organisation to concerns about the social impact of such technologies. Internet-based 
NGOs such as Bytes4All and the Digital Rights Foundation have published reports 
highlighting issues such as state control over the Internet (Bytes4All 2016), hate speech 
(Haque 2014), violence against women (Digital Rights Foundation 2015) and blasphemy 
(Digital Rights Foundation 2015). The new digital cybercrime bill passed in August 2016 
has raised concerns about its potential for misuse, not least in terms of providing a legal 
mechanism to charge Internet users on blasphemy grounds. As noted in the introduction, 
the first arrest under the bill was for the use of Facebook to harass and blackmail women 
(The Express Tribune 2016).   
 
While there is increased attention to the potential for the state to exercise control over 
freedom of speech and the risks to religious minorities and women, the implications of 
increased Internet and social media use, and specifically Facebook, for the nature of 
religious identity, remain under-examined. The sociomaterial perspective demonstrates 
how Facebook’s technological discourses structure individual subjects and the publics 
they interact with in such a way as to reinforce a dominant, exclusive religious 
nationalism that amplifies the marginalisation of minorities. The agential realist 
perspective rejects the ontology that would underpin causal claims for Facebook’s role, 
and instead shows how they arise out of the intra-action of Facebook’s technological 
discourses of singular authenticity and the hegemonic discourse of a singular, 
homogenous Pakistani Muslim subject.  
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9.4  Conclusion:  
This chapter has analysed the empirical data to outline a theory of ‘digital secularisation’ 
as a way of conceptualising the way Facebook changes the enactment of religious 
identity. Figure 1 shows how desiring subjects seek recognition through the enactment of 
religious identity through Facebook, which affords choice, rationalisation and 
objectification of identity enactment. The diffractions of identities that emerge through 
their enactment through Facebook conform or trouble the hegemonic discourses that 
contain religious identity. Through diffractions that trouble hegemonic discourse change 
emerges in the form of enactments that reconfigure the dominance of hegemonic and 
marginal discourse formations. The chapter described how processes of rationalisation 
and objectification shape a modern, individualist practice of religious identity that 
sharpens the boundaries of difference between identity groups. In Pakistan this 
Facebook:  
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Figure 4 Digital Secularisation 
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simultaneously reinforces hegemonic discourses of Sunni nationalism whilst presenting 
new discourses of subjecthood to which users may submit and find recognition. This 
process of digital secularisation introduces familiar yet distinct logics of identity 
enactment that point towards an increasing emphasis on religion as a core discourse of 
identity and division between religious groups and sects. The process of digital 
secularisation has specific implications for change in Pakistan, as well as for theorisation 
within the fields of ICTD and development. It is to these that the next chapter turns.  
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10. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The preceding chapters have presented empirical accounts of the relationship between the use of 
Facebook and religious identity, and analysed these accounts through the theoretical framework 
to propose a theory of enacting religious identity through Facebook as ‘digital secularisation’. 
This chapter discusses the theoretical implications of these findings for the literatures on ICTD 
and development. This is followed by a discussion of the study’s methodological contributions 
and the implications for policy and practice. The chapter concludes with an outline of avenues for 
further research, the theoretical and methodological limitations of the study and some personal 
reflections on the process of working on this thesis.  
 
 
10.1  Theoretical Contributions: ICTD Theory 
This thesis makes the following contributions to theorisation in the ICTD literatures , 
Theorising identity as the sociomaterial performative enactment of hegemonic discourse makes 
the following contributions to the ICTD literature. It contributes to addressing the gap in the ICTD 
literature that is the lack of indepth explanations for how individuals interact with technology, 
particularly in relation to issues such as identity. This lack is compounded by a common 
assumption in the literature  that human behaviour is determined by a universal rationalism 
(Madon and Avgerou 2004, 176; Walsham and Sahay 2006, 20).  
 
In light of this, the thesis makes the following contributions. First, it shows that identity plays an 
important role in how individual actors use ICTs. The empirical research shows how individuals’ 
religious identity shapes their ICT use patterns. For example, it shows that marginalised identities 
are less likely to use a specific technology if it leads to exposure that causes harm, and if it reduces 
their ability to manage public visibility. The experience of Ahmadi respondents showed how 
marginalised groups experience involuntary exposure through Facebook’s affordances for public 
visibility. Importantly, it is the intra-action of the marginalised and persecuted nature of Ahmadi 
identity in Pakistan with Facebook’s affordances for collapsed contexts that shapes their use 
patterns.  Understanding the nature of users identity and particularly vulnerability and the 
affordances for public visibility and context management can help explain the practices of ICT 
users.  
 
This contribution is both a response to Walsham and Sahay’s call to theorise identity in ICT usage, 
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and an argument for theorising identity as performative enactment. Theorising identity as the 
performative enactment of hegemonic discourses helps make explicit the operation of power in 
constituting specific identity performances. For example, it showed how religious groups 
leveraged the power of the state to advance as the ‘authentic’ Pakistani identity a Sunni religious 
nationalism through ‘othering’ Shia, Ahmadi and other religious minorities. This thesis shows 
how the historically constituted nature of hegemonic discourses is characterised by the operation 
of power and competing stakeholders. Thus, while Walsham and Sahay (2006) call for theorising 
the individual, a performative account emphasises the broader operation of power through the 
discursive regimes that constitute the individual as a subject position (Butler 1990). 
 
This thesis also argues that in theorising identity, in addition to attending to the broader discusrive 
regimes, it is helpful to theorise the artefact (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001) in studies of identity 
in ICT use. In other words, explaining how identity shapes the use of ICTs also requires us to 
theorise how ICTs shape identity. As the analysis shows, Facebook’s demand for the enactment 
of singular, authentic subjects shapes the enactment of religious identity from which emerges a 
process of ‘digital secularisation’. The sociomaterial perspective provides a framework that 
highlights how theorising causal interaction between entities fails to account for the inherently 
entangled (Barad 2007) nature of social and material elements.  This thesis thus argues for the 
value of theorising the social as well as material aspects of technology, describing how 
technologies embody discourses as materialisations of particular interests and values. Theorising 
how these interests and values are mediated and intermediated  expands the empirical and analytic 
gaze beyond temporal and spatial instances of use. The sociomaterial account recognises that 
technologies have their own histories – that ‘matter is always already an ongoing historicity’ 
(Barad 2003, 822) – and that these histories play an important part in constituting technologies. 
Therefore, a sociomaterial perspective emphasises the importance of theorising the artefact’s 
material and social elements,   
 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the value of a performative sociomaterial conceptualisation of 
identity and technology for the theorising the individual in accounts of ICT use. In addition to 
theorising ICT use, this conceptualisation has broader implications for development literature. 
Theorising the enactment of religious identity through Facebook as digital secularisation, and the 
ontology of conceptualising identity and ICTs as perpetual entanglements of matter and meaning, 
introduce implications for the theorisation of development.  
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10.2 Theoretical Contribution: Towards a Sociomaterial Theory of ICTD   
This thesis contributes towards the theorisation of religion and secularisation in development 
literatures. It theorises the role of religion and secularisation in processes of social cange through 
an account of on non-instrumental, ‘everyday’ technology use and the broader sociomaterial 
theorisation of digital secularisation in processes of development. In doing so, it offers a way of 
theorising the continual relevance of religion in everyday life as well as the role of technology in 
broader theories of development.  
 
Theores of development are characterised by assumptions of development and progress as 
secularisation, rational individuals and the normative value of choice (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011; 
Sen 1999; Kleine 2013). Theorising identity as the performative enactment of hegemonic 
discourse helps explain why, despite predictions of secularisation and the disembedding of 
individuals from social contexts, religion has an enduring role in individuals’ lives. Theorising 
religious identity as performative enactment explains that it is ‘more than belief’ (Vasquez 2010) 
or an individually determined phenomenon. Rather, it is a subject position within the broader 
context of the hegemonic discourses in which individuals are situated. Religious identity in 
Pakistan is shown to be the outcome of ‘a heterogeneous landscape of power’ (Asad 2003, 6) that 
has established religious nationalism as the hegemonic discourse to which all who desire 
recognition must submit. It is the enduring nature of this landscape of power that explains how 
religious identity continues to shape Pakistani citizens’ everyday lives.  
 
Thus, conceptualising religious identity as the performative enactment of hegemonic discourse 
explains how it is inherently and ‘inextricably connected with other (nonreligious) ways of being 
in the world’ (Vasquez 2010, 8). Contrary to predictions of secularisation and social 
differentiation, and despite access to new information and means of communication, religion 
remains a source of meaning and subjectivity because it is the materialisation of hegemonic 
discursive regimes. The empirical findings show how individuals who live in both densely urban 
contexts, which development theory commonly associates with modernisation and secularisation 
(Deneulin and Rakodi 2011) and comparatively rural environments use technology to enact 
religious lives. This continuing significance of religion presents a challenge to models that assume 
religion will decline as people turn away from traditional sources of meaning to exercise 
individual, sovereign choices. At the same time, by theorising how enacting religious identity 
through Facebook shapes the form of religious identity as ‘digital secularisation’ explains how 
the modernisation that development theory describes can be modern in form yet religious in 
content.  
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The sociomaterial performative lens adopted by this thesis has substantial broader implications 
for theorising development. This section draws out the basis for these assumptions and points to 
a non-dualistic, flat ontological conceptualisation of development.  
 
This studies performative approach helps explain the continuing relevance of religion. Theorising 
religion as the enactment of socially and historically situated discourses highlights religious 
practices and discourses within already existing power relationships  and in the wider social 
context in which these communities exist. Theorising religion as performative enactment points 
to the role of power in particular contexts in shaping and determining legitimate subjects and 
behaviours. As such, religion is not ‘sets of private beliefs in the minds of individuals’, but rather 
is ‘subject to conflicts over their interpretation of their core teachings’ and their role in public and 
private life (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011, 51). Understanding religion as knowledge regimes of 
power and ideology (Asad, 2003) thus demands situating religion in contexts in which 
development interventions are also the enactment of discursive regimes. To understand religious 
identity, as well as technology, as situated in knowledge regimes introduces a  conceptualisation 
of development itself as part of broader knowledge regimes.  
 
Theorising development itself then  as a political project of competing interests and power reflects 
the broader critique of development mounted by post-development theorists such as 
anthropologists Ferguson (1994) and Mosse (2005), who conceptualise the idea and practice of 
development as a macro-systemic formation of Western knowledge ideology (Ziai 2007). For 
them, development is viewed as a continuation of Western colonialism through epistemic 
hegemony (Donovan, 2014). Yet the post-development perspective is characterised by a 
deterministic conceptualisation of technology that is unable to incorporate technology as 
sociomaterial in nature.  
 
A sociomaterial approach to development incorporates the post-development insight that 
development is a Western knowledge regime with its attendant notions of legitimate forms of 
subjecthood and identity, as religion too is a knowledge regime with its own set of norms and 
subjects. A sociomaterial account of development goes beyond the post-development perspective 
through a more nuanced account of technology in processes of social change.  
 
Post-development perspectives on technology commonly assume a technological determinism 
synonymous with Western domination (Alvares 1992) or an agency-less machinic approach 
(Ferguson 1994). In this account technology is a tool for the extension of Western domination, 
and its users are largely viewed as passive subjects to be structured according to the will of the 
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machine (Donovan, 2014). This account fails to allow for resistance or for uses to exercise agency 
over the subjects demanded by the technology. Instead, a sociomaterial account of technology 
and development incorporates a view of technology as always ‘entangled’ (Barad, 2007) with 
social and material forces.  
 
A sociomaterial account of technology and development thus rejects the totalising, deterministic 
view of technology and grants the social equal weight, yet maintaining a place for technology as 
actors in the process of change. This perspective, in the words of Barad, ‘allows matter its due as 
an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing intra-activity’ (2003, 803). As 
Donovan argues, ‘as mobile phones are increasingly relevant to the lives of marginalised 
populations, it would be quixotic to limit attention to humans alone’ (Donovan 2014, 11). 
Granting the social a role in development means a rejection the way modernisation, neoliberal 
and post-development theory conceptualises culture, where resistance to development is 
understood as protecting a static culture from change. Instead, a sociomaterial account of 
development sees culture as an always dynamic entanglement of social and material agencies, 
adapting through adoption as actors engage with new ideas, practices and discourses (Donovan 
2014).  This entanglement is apparent at the instance of use, through the agential cut enacted by 
an apparatus, but is entangled in the histories of matter and meaning that stretch through the chain 
of associations and attachments.  
 
The sociomaterial performative perspective shows the mutually constitutive nature of ICT use 
practices and identity; development as an assemblage of actors, interests and discursive 
formations. These processes of change are both social and material. The new ICTs of social media 
contribute to processes of social change by structuring the formation of subjects and their publics. 
Describing their structuring role echoes the determinism of modernisation theory (Lerner 1958; 
Schramm 1964), but conceptualising it as intra-active performative enactment (Barad 2003; 
Butler 1990) shows the outcomes to be always contingent and unstable. The determinism is never 
predictable. A sociomaterial approach to development allows the possibility of introducing 
processes of change as diffractions. The emergent changes are not predictable outcomes, but 
rather always performed and thus subject to fail and change. As Barad says, this form of 
diffraction ‘is not a static relationality but a doing – the enactment of boundaries – that always 
entails constitutive exclusions (2007, 135). The intra-action of knowledge regimes translated 
through technologies with knowledge regimes in contexts of use results in the diffraction of the 
subject forms contained in each. These diffractions, such as the reinforcement and troubling of 
hegemonic norms allows change as a continual process that is always contingent and emergent 
rather than predictable and linear. As this thesis demonstrates, understanding the role of Facebook 
and religious identity in processes of social change in Pakistan requires tracing these discourse 
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from their instances of use to the contemporary interests of ICT owners in Palo Alto, California, 
as well as the historic formations of Islamic reformist movements. Their diffraction in Pakistan 
in the form of hegemonic and troubling subjects allows the possibility of religious identity in the 
form of ‘digital secularisation’. 
 
10.3  Methodological Contributions 
This thesis demonstrates how the sociomaterial agential realist methodological perspective 
contributes to theorising ICTD, development and modernity. This perspective leads to a deeper 
understanding of how technologies come to matter, and their history and politics, thus allowing a 
critical perspective on the role of technologies in social change.  
 
A positivist approach would have allowed a description of usage practices, but with limited power 
to explain the significance and meaning of these practices. Thus, for example, the survey provided 
a useful description of the difference in usage practices between religious and gender identities, 
but no account of why, for example, women preferred WhatsApp and men preferred Facebook. 
Similarly, an interpretive perspective would have allowed an explanation of these practices in 
terms of what they mean for individuals and the role they play in social practices. Indeed, it would 
have allowed an analysis of the construction of discourse in texts and their symbolic meaning. An 
interpretive perspective would have allowed descriptions of how people use technology and what 
it means for them, but its emphasis on the account of individuals and their interpretation and 
construction of reality would not have led to a theorisation of the technology. This would have 
veiled the way Facebook’s technological discourses intra-act with hegemonic discourses.  
 
The agential realist perspective allows us to see how instances of use are related through chains 
of association and attachment to discourses’ local contexts, which might be separated by miles 
but closely related in practice. This perspective helps recognise that ‘the world is a dynamic 
process of intra-activity’ (Barad 2007, 140). This methodological contribution is particularly 
significant for ICTD and development, both projects whose premise is furthering people’s 
wellbeing. The thesis argues that the dominant, normative perspective in both literatures is 
characterised by a limited conceptualisation of the individual and of technology. This 
sociomaterial perspective contributes a reminder and an epistemological approach that can help 
locate development activities in their broader social, political, cultural and historical contexts.  
 
As Latour notes, ‘In order to make a diagnosis or a decision about the absurdity, the danger, the 
immorality, or the unrealism of an innovation, one must first describe the network’ (Latour 1991, 
130). The study’s methodological contribution is that it demonstrates the utility and feasibility of 
 193 
using a sociomaterial perspective to map the network and understand the processes of intra-
activity that lead to particular innovations and phenomena. It is to the policy and practice 
implications of this that we now turn.  
 
10.4 Policy and Practice Contributions  
This thesis has conducted an historically situated, theoretically informed account of Facebook use 
in three locations in northern Punjab. The insights from this research are necessarily contextually 
specific, but the following practical contributions are made as suggestions to further policy and 
practice.  
 
For Pakistan, the following contributions are based on the findings from this study. First, as 
indicated earlier, there is growing awareness of the challenges presented by the adoption of new 
ICTs, especially for women and increasingly for religious minorities. This is to be welcomed, and 
efforts to address these issues need further support from the Government of Pakistan, civil society 
organisations and the international development community. This support could take the form of 
increased research to understand the nuance of the implications of this research and to identify 
other potentially vulnerable communities. It could also involve further work to support vulnerable 
communities, in the form of support to increase digital literacy and the capability to manage issues 
around privacy and self-protection in ICT use.  
 
As the research demonstrates, however, challenges emerge from the intra-action of technological 
discourse and the enactment of subject positions constituted in discourse. Given this, while 
focusing on individuals to strengthen their ability to manage the use of ICTs, the real focus of 
attention should be the broader hegemonic discourses that constitute specific groups as vulnerable 
subjects. It is only in the broader discourse in which Ahmadis are constructed as non-Muslims 
and women are positioned as bearers of honour that these challenges can be addressed.  
 
Of course, as this thesis argues, this needs to go beyond the historical debate between Islam and 
secularism that has characterised the debate so far. Solutions to the challenges that vulnerable 
groups face can only be found within the hegemonic discourses themselves. In other words, 
addressing the challenges faced by Muslim subjects can be done best within Islam, not by turning 
instead to secularism. There may be value in a public debate about Islam, minorities and the kind 
of state that Pakistanis believe Pakistan should be.  
 
This has broader implications for engagement with the wider Islamic world. As the section on 
modernities suggested, Islamic and Western societies are mutually constituted or rather, entangled 
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through the intra-activity of matter and meaning. The characterisation in the West of Islamic 
societies as backward – and particularly of fundamentalist Islamic movements such as ISIS as a 
throwback to the past – marginalises the space for understanding how the Muslim and Western 
worlds are phenomena that emerge from continual processes of reconstruction and 
reinterpretation (Jung and Sinclair 2015). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore this in 
greater depth, but this is one of the most pressing needs of our time.  
 
There are contributions to development practice as well. The thesis argues that identity, and 
specifically religious identity, play an important role in processes of development and social 
change. There is clearly a need for greater attention to the role of religion in the uses of ICTs and 
processes of development more broadly. For ICTD interventions, the attention to identity is 
particularly important for issues related to minority or marginalised groups, such as Ahmadis or 
women. These shape questions of access and use and thus the implications of technology-based 
interventions.  
 
The sociomaterial perspective also highlights the significance of understanding the technological 
discourses that are embodied in technologies. This has particular implications for the use of 
technologies that are part of everyday life, such as social media. The implications of these 
discourses for the enactment of identity, and indeed for broader social relations and structure, are 
only just beginning to garner attention. For example, there is a pressing need for greater attention 
to the role of algorithms in structuring social life. While this is beginning to be highlighted in 
relation to issues in the Global North (Gillespie 2014), these same issues as well as others are 
relevant to the Global South. There is need for development actors to pay attention to the role of 
technological discourses in all aspects of technology design, including but not limited to 
algorithms.  
 
Finally, this thesis highlights the role of intermediaries in shaping usage practices. Although there 
has been attention paid to the role of intermediaries in the use of telecentres (Bailur and Masiero 
2012), and the beginnings of attention to their role in the use of mobile Internet (Rangaswamy 
and Cutrell 2013; Donner and Gitau 2009), there would be value in exploring in more detail how 
these intermediaries could be enrolled into ICT interventions that seek to engage with the way 
people use ICTs.  
 
10.5 Avenues for Further Research 
A number of avenues for research emerge from the findings of this study. These are further 
investigations of the implications of social media for women, the implications of algorithms for 
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religious debate and comparative research on social media and honour practices. The first two 
reflect more applied concerns based out of concerns emerging from the critical reading of 
Facebook in Pakistan and its implications for women and the sectarian debate. The third area of 
research reflects an awareness of the value of comparative approaches.  
 
Facebook and Gender 
A further area of investigation concerns the implications for gender identity, and for women in 
particular. This research has focused on religious identity but, perhaps inevitably, the question of 
gender emerged as a significant one that could only be touched upon, given the scope of this 
study. It is clear that Facebook’s strengthening of hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism 
and patriarchy has grave implications for the position of women in Pakistan.  
 
The issue of female safety, specifically that arising from the increasing adoption of Facebook, is 
a question that demands greater and urgent attention. During the fieldwork and also subsequently, 
the number of cases in which women have been attacked or harassed has continued to grow. 
Although there is growing awareness of the issue among the activist community (Digital Rights 
Foundation 2015; Haque 2014), further understanding the dynamics involved and ways to protect 
women would be of great value. As the numbers of people using Facebook increase, the need for 
this will only become greater.  
 
Algorithms and Religious Debate  
Research investigating the role of algorithms in shaping religious identity and practice in Pakistan 
would be of great value. As my research indicates, there appears to be a relationship between 
Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm and religious practices that has amplified sectarian debate. This 
finding is part of a growing recognition that algorithms play important yet under-examined roles 
in structuring social life (Berg 2014; Crawford 2015; Gillespie 2014). My research has only 
touched on this, but it warrants further investigation. This is not just for the sake of investigating 
novel relationships between technology and society, but because it has the potential to drive 
sectarian division and violence. The rates of sectarian violence are increasing and the numbers of 
people using Facebook are growing. If the findings from this research project are at all indicative 
of wider use practices, then this has the potential to be a significant issue.  
 
The implications of widespread religious debate on Facebook are potentially of great concern if 
sectarian debate and violence is considered cause for concern. Therefore, I would suggest that 
further investigation of the nature of the relationship between algorithms and religious debate, as 
well as its frequency, would be highly informative and useful for efforts to engage with 
sectarianism in Pakistan.  
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Social Media and Honour Practices 
Based on the study’s findings, a further area of research is the relationship between honour and 
social media use. This research found that honour practices were significant in shaping how 
people used Facebook, specifically the practice of creating multiple accounts to protect women 
as bearers of honour. This is also clearly linked to the questions of gender above. These honour 
practices are grounded in the arrangements of family, marriage and gender identity in Pakistan. 
Emerging research suggests that honour affects social media practices in other contexts too, such 
as Azerbaijan (Pearce and Vitak 2015) and Turkey (Costa 2016). This research would contribute 
to further understanding the relationship between cultural values and new ICTs.  
 
10.6 Limitations 
10.6.1 Theoretical Limitations  
One of the main theoretical limitations of this thesis is the diversity of literatures and disciplines 
on which it draws. In Chapter 11, the analysis drew on debates and issues from a number of 
literatures to engage in an analysis that is rooted in fundamental challenges to the normative 
ontology of technologies and human beings. This has necessarily resulted in a decision to address 
a breadth of literature, from fields including the sociology of technology studies, media and 
communication studies, and IS to the sociology of religion, development and, of course, the 
sociology, political science and international relations literature on Pakistan. The limitation of 
this is that it has come at the expense of engaging deeply with one particular body of literature. 
This is justified on the basis that the concepts of identity and technology with which this thesis 
engages have diverse origins and applications. Therefore, insights to power the analysis have 
drawn on these literatures.  
 
A further theoretical limitation is the implicit epistemological implication of a non-essentialist 
theoretical framework. Conceptualising religious identity as the enactment of discourse in 
everyday practice (Vasquez 2010), or technologies as assemblages of matter and meaning (Barad 
2007) imply that the boundaries of these entities are entirely arbitrary. If religion is everywhere, 
in everyday life, then in principle the study of religious identity is the study of everyday life . 
Although this study focuses on specific religious identities, as constituted in hegemonic discourse 
in Pakistan, the implication of the theoretical framework is that these foci are arbitrary and the 
result of decisions made by the researcher as for any theoretical reason. Indeed, as Barad notes, 
in the agential realist perspective, it is not just technologies that are apparatus but researchers 
themselves.  
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Thus, a further theoretical limitation of this research is that the agential cut enacted by the practice 
of conducting this research is a product of the intra-action of the research and the context. To 
fully trace the relation of associations and attachments, a full biography of the researcher would 
have to be added in order to make transparent the full network out of which this thesis has 
emerged. While this is addressed through the statement on positionality in the Methodology 
Appendix, it is acknowledged that this a relatively superficial account of the researcher as 
apparatus.  
 
10.6.2 Methodological Limitations 
This thesis faced a number of methodological limitations. The most significant of these was 
access to research respondents. This limitation presented three specific challenges related to 
method, religion and gender.  
 
First, the method of accessing respondents had to adapt as the original plan was not as effective 
as had been anticipated. The initial plan was to conduct exploratory interviews and observations 
with young people in the three locations, followed by a telephone survey through the mobile 
phone company to identify respondents as cases for longer, in-depth interviews and observation. 
In the event, only a limited number of telephone interview respondents were prepared to meet in 
person for further interviews. Resolving this took time and meant abandoning the attempt to 
achieve a completely random sample. Instead, the study used a snowball sampling technique 
through those telephone interview respondents who were prepared to meet and through research 
assistants from the area.  
 
Second, the telephone interview failed to identify any Ahmadi respondents at all, as it had become 
clear fairly early on in the fieldwork that their experience was significant in understanding the 
nature of the relationship between religion and social media. In addressing the lack of access to 
Ahmadi communities through the telephone survey, it was necessary to build trust with significant 
community gatekeepers in their London headquarters and in Islamabad, and eventually meet their 
community leaders in Rabwa. This took very long and also resulted in very controlled access to 
Ahmadi respondents, who were all selected by their relevant district community leaders. This 
further constrained the diversity of the respondents.  
 
Third, although I spoke enough Urdu to hold a basic conversation, it was insufficient to engage 
in the deeper discussions around the complex issues of social media use and religious practice. 
Working with a research assistant who came from one of the research sites and had basic field 
research training was both a constraint but also, in many ways, a benefit to the study. It meant 
that conversations with respondents were often more discussions than straight interviews, of 
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course mediated through a third person (although all interview transcriptions include both original 
and translated questions and answers to ensure accuracy). The benefit was the insight that being 
from the area and the culture brought to the research. As one example, it was my research assistant 
who was able to explain the implications of the practices of religious guidance and innovation for 
sectarian debate.  
 
Fourth, my identity as a white male had implications for the research. It limited the possibility for 
interaction with female respondents and meant that, in most cases, the interaction I had was more 
structured than my interaction with male respondents. This was particularly the case with the 
female Ahmadi respondents who all practiced full purdah and were interviewed through a curtain. 
On the other hand, being an outsider also meant that some people felt more comfortable opening 
up to me, knowing that what they said wasn’t going to go back to their family or friends. Faryal 
in Mandi Bahauddin, for example, emphasised that she was upset a friend of hers had passed her 
number to my research assistant – not because she didn’t want to speak to me, but because it 
meant my research assistant had her phone number. Similarly, Nadia in Gujrat opened up to me 
in ways she said she hadn’t to anyone before, because she knew I was separate from her 
community.  
 
This distance in terms of language and gender has a further implication for the nature of the 
research undertaken. I had hoped to spend significant amounts of time with individuals to really 
understand their inner, psychic life and how the experience of social media use shaped their inner 
world. This is, of course, the kind of experience that emerges from deep, ethnographic research 
and was beyond the scope of this project. Nonetheless, the extent to which people opened up, and 
their willingness to share their inner life, has hopefully allowed at least a glimpse of the worlds 
that exist within each individual.  
 
10.7 Conclusion: Personal Reflections 
This thesis was born out of a desire to improve my understanding of the relationship between 
technologies and identity in Pakistan in order to contribute to development practice, indeed to 
develop my own career. It was an attempt to go beyond the superficial engagement that had 
characterised my experience of working in international development, and instead to better 
understand the everyday lives of ordinary people. The journey that ensued has been both 
frustrating and transformatory.  
 
I started the PhD motivated to develop my understanding of communication processes and social 
change in order to contribute better to development practice. This motivation was quickly 
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frustrated, however, as I came to see, through the reading and intellectual engagement prior to 
fieldwork, that the development sector was a project bound up in larger sociopolitical movements. 
This was a distressing experience, as I found that my reading had resulted in a loss of faith in the 
project I had set out to contribute to.  
 
However, that sense of pessimism about the purpose of my work and the value of the PhD 
diminished through the experience of fieldwork and the subsequent analysis and findings. My 
experience of fieldwork was hugely stimulating. By escaping the bubble of the international 
community and getting slightly closer to the everyday lives of people, I developed a greater sense 
of how people used technology for fun, play and to negotiate their social lives. This was 
fascinating and hugely invigorating. These everyday experiences were far more interesting in 
their own right than the implications they had for any instrumental purpose – a view that only 
strengthened as I developed an increasingly critical view of the consequences of ICT use.  
 
The outcomes of this research in the form of the analysis and findings have been hugely 
stimulating and very important to me. Working through the empirical findings has led to some 
semblance of understanding the nature of the relationship between the use of social media and 
religious identity for the people who shared their experiences with me. The processes that shape 
this relationship have significance for the role of technologies in people’s lives across Pakistan 
and, indeed, everywhere. It is the critical understanding of technologies as sociomaterial 
assemblages and of identity as a performative enactment that has shaped my understanding of the 
role of technologies in social change as a subject of critical importance today.  
 
The great personal insight that has come from the work to produce this thesis is that our lives are 
increasingly framed by technologies that represent interests that are not always ours, and whose 
functioning we often have little control over. The task of understanding these functionings better 
and mitigating the negative outcomes they often lead to has come to motivate me far more than I 
would have believed possible. 
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Appendix I: Research Methodology 
 
 
Sampling and Respondents:  
The selection of research respondents derives from the research approach, questions and design 
and plays an important part in research outcomes (Creswell 2014; Flick 2014). The mixed method 
sequential nature of the research design had been selected because it allowed both quantitative as 
well as in-depth qualitative research but also because it allowed the identification of research 
respondents through the conduct of the survey.  
 
The selection of respondents from the sample of mobile data users was purposive and pragmatic 
(Creswell 2014). The selection of respondents was intended to purposively select a maximal 
variation (Creswell and Clark 2006)  in terms of the central phenomena (Miles and Huberman 
1994), with maximal variation determined by religious identity, time spent online and attitudes 
towards talking about religious identity online. It was intended to be pragmatic in the 
acknowledgement that there might be a limited variety of respondents who agreed to take part.  
 
In total, thirty respondents agreed to be part of further research, a number that was felt to be 
sufficiently strong to allow for the anticipated number of people who would drop out. In the event 
however, only five people agreed again to be part of further research, with most saying they 
weren’t interested, didn't have time or didn't want their telephone number to be shared outside the 
mobile operator. From those five, only two people actually agreed and eventually met. In other 
words, the survey as a tool to identify respondents failed in its purpose. Furthermore, from the 
completed surveys no respondents had identified as Ahmadis. Whilst this was not statistically 
significant, given the number of Ahmadis in the country, it meant that this also had to be 
addressed.  
 
Instead of random sampling, a purposive sampling approach was used (Flick 2014). The 
purposive sampling involved seeking out people who used mobile phones to access Facebook, as 
well as people who might have something interesting to say about religion and Facebook. This 
was achieved through my research assistant, who came from Gujarat and knew people in all three 
locations. This process usually involved a focus group of three to eight people from which 
individuals were purposively selected and requested to participate in further interviews and 
discussion. Reaching Ahmadis was harder, and involved having to contact their headquarters in 
London who facilitated a meeting in Rabwa with their community leader who in turn arranged 
introductions to their district youth leaders in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandibahudin. These three 
individuals became critical entry points as they arranged meetings with both male and female 
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Ahmadis.  In total, seven hundred and fifty respondents were interviewed through the telephone 
survey and one hundred and seven were interviewed through focus groups and interviews.  
 
Quantitative Data Collection 
The first phase of this research strategy involved carrying out a survey to identify mobile phone 
and social media usage patterns. Preliminary research to investigate potential patterns to explore 
was conducted in April 2014 and involved meeting and interviewing young mobile phone users 
at a local state university and in Gujrat. This preliminary research was used to get a general sense 
of usage patterns and to construct a survey design.  
 
Survey Design and Implementation  
The survey was therefore designed to explore the following five areas through specific questions 
(for the full survey see Appendix 2: Mobile and Social Media Survey), namely Internet and 
Mobile Phone Use, Social Media Use on Mobile Phones, Social Media Use – the impact and 
consequences, Social Media use – diversity, tolerance and values and finally Demographics.  
 
These questions were first tested in English on students, and refined in order to reduce the number 
of questions. Then they were translated into Urdu, and back translated into English in order to 
ensure validity (Schwarz and Sudman 1995). Interviewees were then re-interviewed to ensure that 
they understood the questions being asked. A final series of revisions occurred when the questions 
were piloted with the telephone call centre. Although the interviewers were inducted into the 
survey by going through the questions, after a pilot run it became clear that a number of changes 
needed to made. These were:  
 
- re-structuring the order of questions, so that the demographic questions came last, as people 
reported being reluctant to answer personal questions so soon in the interview.  
- Introducing clarifying questions at the beginning about internet use as people said they 
weren’t using the internet on their phone but then indicated they used Facebook, WhatsApp 
and Skype.  
- Reducing the number of questions again, mainly by removing a set of values questions that 
it was agreed were replicated 
 
The survey was implemented by a dedicated call centre run by a research agency that had an 
existing contract with a mobile network operator. The mobile network operator provided the call 
centre with a random sample of thirty thousand telephone numbers that had used data services 
from their mobile towers within the last month.  
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The first stage involved inducting the call centre interviewers into the study and explaining the 
purpose and meaning behind the questions. As noted, this stage and the subsequent piloting led 
to revisions of the survey to make it more effective. This first stage was then followed by a full 
rollout of the survey, with the actual interviews conducted in the morning, lunchtime and evening 
over a staggered period of two weeks to reach people at different times. Because there was no 
known information about the respondents from the telephone numbers a simple random sampling 
strategy was followed (Dillman et al. 2009). The sample size required from the total population 
of thirty thousand mobile data users provided by the mobile operator in order to be ninety-five 
percent confident of the results within a five percent margin was calculated to be three hundred 
and eighty respondents. This number was increased to seven hundred and fifty respondents 
because in the pilot it emerged that few people were prepared to meet participate in further face 
to face research, citing issues around availability but also privacy. Increasing the number of 
respondents therefore increased the number respondents who would agree to further face to face 
interviews.   
 
 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
In sequential explanatory mixed methods designs, the quantitative data is analysed prior to the 
qualitative data collection, indeed the results of the quantitative informs the direction of enquiry 
(Creswell 2014).  In other words, the findings from the quantitative data inform the kinds of 
questions that are explored in the qualitative data collection. Analysis was conducted using simple 
descriptive statistics to explore responses according to specific demographic categories, with 
particular attention being paid to religious identity, gender and location. 
 
In this case, the analysis of the survey findings was focused on identifying patterns in the 
relationship between mobile internet use and religious identity and practices. In this sense the 
results of the survey help plan who to speak to as well as what themes to explore in more detail.  
For example, the survey found no respondent who identified as Ahmadi and thus emphasised the 
potential in focusing on exploring how Ahmadis experienced the relationship between social 
media and religious identity.  
 
In addition to informing the questions and demographics that the qualitative research phase would 
explore in greater depth, the quantitative phase was also intended to identify specific individuals 
to participate in the qualitative research. In practice however this proved to be problematic. 
Despite increasing the sample size, only thirty respondents agreed to take part in further research, 
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and as the section below on data access outlines, few of these were either actually from the 
research locations or in the event actually willing to meet.  
 
Qualitative Data Collection 1: Interviews, Focus Groups, Research Diary  
 Interviews 
Interviews are data-gathering tools that an interviewer uses to gather information or beliefs from 
other people. According to Kvale, the purpose of interviews are ‘to obtain descriptions of the life 
world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena’ 
(Kvale 2007, 6).  Interviews were chosen as an appropriate method through which to explore the 
findings from survey, as they allow for greater explanatory detail than surveys. In-person, semi-
structured interviews and open-ended questions allow for the interpreting of body language and 
flexibility in the investigation of meaning (Flick 2014; Silverman 2010).  
 
The structure was based around an interview guide (Flick 2014; Kvale 2007) that was initial 
based on the themes of the survey, namely internet and mobile phone usage patterns, social media 
usage patterns, social media impact and consequences and issues of  diversity, tolerance and 
values. In addition, the interviews also sought to allow users to describe their own sense of identity 
in relationship to their family, their faith and to Pakistan. However, this interview guide went 
through a number of iterative refinements as the research developed, perhaps the most notable 
being the circuitous route to asking questions about religious practice, as direct questions about 
religious practice were sometimes resisted. Instead, users were asked to describe the first ten items 
on their Facebook Newsfeed as an entry point to wider discussions about religion and religious 
practice on Facebook.  
 
All interviews were recorded with the interviewees permission, apart from three who declined to 
be recorded (for privacy reasons). Although recording interviews can impact on interviewees 
willingness to speak freely (Esterberg 2002) this was mitigated by using a mobile phone as the 
recorder. The familiarity of a mobile phone usually meant that people were easily able to ignore 
the recording of the interview.  
 
In total, one hundred and seven individuals were interviewed through a combination of interviews 
and focus groups. See Annex II for full detailed list of every interview.  
   
Focus Groups  
Interviews, like focus groups, are a way of gather data that can provide insight into the 
understanding and meaning held by individuals. Focus groups however help reveal how meaning 
and account are articulated or negotiated through social interaction, and can provide insight into 
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how this relates to ‘peer communication and group norms’ (Barbour and Kitzinger 1998). Given 
the performative perspective adopted, how people interact with each other provides an important 
insight into accounts of identity enactment performed to others as well as the opportunity to 
observe actual identity enactments. In this research, focus groups were used to support exploration 
of this performative enactment of discourse.  
 
Focus groups also played a processual role, as they allowed the identification of subjects for 
further individual interviews and links to other subjects. This was particularly important given the 
limited success of the survey in finding further respondents.  
 
In total twenty focus groups were conducted with young mobile internet users in the three 
locations. Each focus group consisted of between three and eight individuals, and lasted between 
fifteen minutes and two hours. Indeed, some focus groups blurred the line between more informal 
discussion and focused exploration. Yet whilst they departed from the semi-structured focus 
groups, these informal discussions were important in revealing issues that might not have emerged 
otherwise, such as the practice of creating female fake accounts. Although focus groups can be 
viewed as problematic because group dynamics can shape who speaks and what is said (Flick 
2014), this shaping important as a process in and of itself. Nevertheless, efforts were made to 
ensure that all participants were invited to participate, without being pressured or placed under 
undue or unwelcome attention.  
 
 
Research Diary  
Notes and observations taken during interviews and focus groups were written up in the evening 
in a research diary. This research diary was an important part of initial reflection up on both the 
data being gathered as well as the experience of conducting research. As such, it played an 
important role in the iterative development of interview and focus group discussion guides as well 
as themes for further investigation. The research diary thus served as a place for the 
documentation and working through of ‘experiences, ideas, fears, mistakes, confusions, 
breakthroughs and problems’ (Spradley, 1980: 71 in Flick 2014).  
 
The research diary also served as a place to document ongoing conversations with my research 
assistants. The insights and observations that emerged in discussion and reflection with my 
research assistants played an important role in unpacking themes, testing assumptions and 
exploring the implications of emerging findings. Having the research diary provided a useful 
place in which to capture this data. The combination of both personal thoughts and discussion 
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with others meant that the research diary played an important role in the reflection on fieldwork, 
analysis and writing up.  
 
Qualitative Data Collection 2: Textual Data – newspaper articles, Millatfacebook 
The analysis of documentation is often used in qualitative research together with other qualitative 
research methods as form of triangulation (Denzin 1970). In this case documentation is used as 
data from which to identify and analyse the construction of religious identity and Facebook in 
discourse (Fairclough 1995).  
 
To this end, the second qualitative data component involved the building of a textual corpus 
(Bauer and Aarts 2000) through the collection of two sets of textual data to provide a corpus of 
data that could be analysed to identify the operation and function of discourses of religious 
identity and Facebook. A corpus consists of 'texts, utterances, or other specimens considered more 
or less representative of a language and usually stored as an electronic database' (McArthur, 1992 
in Bauer and Aarts 2000). The corpus consists of two data sets, the first of which consists of 
newspaper articles that referred to the banning of Facebook in 2010 and the second data set 
consists of the documentation and design of Millatfacebook.  
 
Newspaper articles 
For Bauer and Arts, (200), the process of corpus construction is functionally equivalent to 
statistical sampling but structurally different, and involves the ‘systematic selection to some 
alternative rationale’ (Bauer and Aarts 2000, 21). The process of corpus construction follows four 
rules.  
 
Rule 1: Proceed stepwise: select; analyse; select again. The systematic sampling is based on a 
stepwise process of identifying the variety of representations in texts. This means that unlike a 
survey, the corpus grows as the process unfolds and expands until it has achieved a saturated 
representation of the diversity of the subject. In this case it meant identifying newspaper articles 
that referred to the Facebook ban and then identifying the different ways in which Facebook was 
constructed in discourse, ways that the ban was justified and discourses of religious identity.  
 
Rule 2: In qualitative research, strata and function variety precedes variety of representations. 
The initial step to identifying diversity in representation is to identify and select the diversity of 
strata and function, which in interviews may be gender, age or education. In this case it was the 
English language newspapers The News, The Nation and Dawn and the Urdu newspapers The 
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Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt. The reason for this diversity was outlined in Chapter Four explaining the 
ideological differences between the newspapers, particularly in their relation to religious identity.   
 
Rule 3: Characterizing variety of representations has priority over anchoring them in existing 
categories of people. This is more of an analytical step, but involved characterising the variety of 
representations in the newspaper accounts of the Facebook ban, and paying less attention to 
locating these representations in specific newspapers.    
 
Rule 4: Maximize the variety of representations by extending the range of strata / functions 
considered. The maximising representations by extending the diversity of newspapers was 
considered by examining other Urdu language newspapers such as the Daily Pakistan or 
Khabrain, but on initial assessment the representations of the Facebook ban were not significantly 
different from those in the Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt. Saturation had been reached.  
 
The newspaper accounts were identified through their online archives, though in the case of the 
Nawa-i-Waqt their service was intermittent and resulted in having to visit the National Archives 
in Islamabad to identify and scan the relevant articles. The search was conducted together with 
an Urdu speaking research assistant, who also translated the articles into English. In total the 
corpus construction process identified one hundred and seventy-eight news articles, editorials, 
opinion pieces and letters to the newspaper. Through the process of analysis and corpus 
construction the number of articles that were analysed in depth was reduced to thirty articles in 
total (see Appendix II) 
 
 
Millatfacebook Documentation  
The data collected to establish the technological discourses of Millatfacebook included close 
reading of the website design and the content on the site. This was conducted by visiting the site 
and listing of the sites main design features, particularly guided by the design features of 
Facebook that were outlined in Chapter Three – theorizing Facebook. The content that was 
identified and noted on the site included terms of service, the selection of translations for hadiths 
and for the Koran.  
 
Furthermore, these were supplemented by interviews with the sites designers and owners in order 
to contextualize the technological discourses and the intent behind the site. The value of having 
multiple data sources for approaches to material technologies is because meaning is shifts from 
words to ideas and interests embodied in design and material structure. As Scott and Orlikowski 
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put it, multiple data sources are important in sociomaterial studies ‘where language is decentred 
in order to take account of historical reconfigurations in relational practice.(Scott and Orlikowski 
2014a, 888).  
 
The purpose of the second component of the qualitative research phase, the discourse analysis 
approach, is to describe how gender and religious identity become part of the stabilisation of 
mobile internet technologies. That is, it will explain how the regulatory regimes of gender and 
religious identity come to be associated with mobile and internet technologies, and how this 
association is stabilised.  
 
A discourse analysis approach examines the codes, language and way of speaking about a topic. 
From a critical discourse perspective, it aims to show how the objectification of peoples and 
technologies establish and maintain systems of knowledge and power (Fairclough 1992). Given 
the focus on language, discourse analysis examines a variety of texts to reveal the activity of 
discourse (Bauer and Aarts 2000). The aim of this is to go beyond what is 'in' those texts and to 
'trace some of the threads that connect that text to others' (MacLure 2003, 43). As Abdelnour and 
Saeed (Abdelnour and Saeed 2014) demonstrate in their study of humanitarian NGO 
documentation, discourses are constructed through the way fuel-efficient stoves came to be 
construed as a tool to reduce sexual violence. In this project the focus is the discourse in which 
mobile internet is associated with gender and religious identities.  
 
The main research approach adopted in this second qualitative component is Bauer and Gaskell's 
corpus construction approach, which is a principle of data collection that allows for a systematic 
collection of data without following a statistical sampling rationale (Bauer and Aarts 2000). Bauer 
and Gaskell's process of corpus construction consists of five rules (Bauer and Aarts 2000, 31–
35). The first is, once the topic has been selected, proceed step wise by selecting material, 
analysing and the selecting again. The second is that strata and function variety precedes variety 
of representations. Strata and function refer to categories that are known, such as age, gender, 
religion and so on while representations are concepts such as opinions, attitudes, beliefs, 
identities, discourses and practices. Although the selection of people and sources is according to 
function and category, the purpose is to understand the variety of moral issues and their 
argumentative structure. The second rule challenges norms of quantitative social research by 
emphasising that the variety of representation has greater priority than anchoring them in existing 
categories. The aim instead is to explore the representations, not anchor them to specific 
demographics. The fourth rule is, explore the maximal variety of representations. One should 
extend the range of strata and functions being considered. In principle this is endless. Bauer and 
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Gaskell's employ the principle of saturation as a stopping criterion, such that one stops the search 
for additional representations only when new strata add no new information.  
 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
  
Analysis of interview data 
The transcriptions of the interviews and focus groups were uploaded to the data analysis software 
NVivo, allowing flexible manipulation of the data. The interviews and focus groups were then 
coded through an iterative process of inductive open coding and deductive theoretical coding 
based on the theoretical framework and motivated by the research goals. As the data was coded, 
it was analysed and related back to the survey findings, to the theoretical and empirical literature 
to identify themes that helped explain the relationship between Facebook and religious identity. 
 
The transcriptions were analysed individually and then comparatively for common themes, 
understood in narrative analysis as discourses (Taylor and Littleton 2006), that were identified 
through common elements that occur across several interviews as well as at different times within 
a single interview. Within these narratives close attention was paid to accounts of religious 
practices, moments of trouble and themes related to the concepts of liberation and conformity 
discussed in the literature review and theoretical framework.  
 
Analysing narrative from a Butlerian performative perspective (Morison and Macleod 2013; 
Peterson and Langellier 2006) involves exploring how individuals 'position' themselves in 
relation to the discourse, and their accounts of moments of 'trouble', attempts to 'repair' . Analysing 
performativity from a material perspective involved drawing on Barad’s (Barad 2007) notions of 
entanglement, material-discursive practices and performativity, and allowed the move from 
conceptualising phenomena such as religious identity as a social attribute, and instead view it as 
a material doing (S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014, 889). The form of subject that the structure of 
Facebook allows emerged as one of the most significant aspects in this analysis. This points 
towards the practices that make phenomena work (S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2014a, 890) part of 
an acknowledgement of the sociomaterial intra-action of Facebook and religious identity. The 
analysis concluded with accounts of how these practices of subject formation have implications 
for religious identity in Pakistan, as well as for the broader themes of development theory and 
modernity. 
 
 
Discursive Analytical  
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The process of analysing the corpus of newspaper accounts followed the same procedure as 
discussed above. In other words, materials were coded to identify connecting and interrelating 
themes related to the hegemonic discourses outlined in Chapter Four Religious Identity in 
Pakistan. This involved identifying the process of problematisation in which Facebook was 
constructed in discourse as a technology that was a problem for Islam in Pakistan, the solution to 
which was to ban it.  
 
The construction of the corpus was intended to be concurrent with the case study research, to 
allow an interactive relationship between the two processes. This would have allowed processes 
of triangulation (Flick 2014) through referencing interviews with the designers and owners as 
well as the broader data set of respondents. In practice only the former was possible as the 
transcription of the interviews took much longer than anticipated, leading to the process of 
triangulation a static rather than dynamic process.  
 
Fieldwork Challenges 
The process of fieldwork and data collection always involves challenges, and part of successful 
research is resolving them without compromising the goal and objectives of the research.  The 
challenges that emerged in the conduct of this research involved issues to do with security, 
methods, language and environment.  
 
The first issue was the challenge of security that was resolved by relocating the field site. The 
initial research design as proposed at the time of the upgrade from MPhil to PhD had been to 
conduct research in the city of Karachi, but in the event a combination of factors led to the research 
being conducted in three locations in urban Punjab. Karachi had been selected for two reasons. 
Firstly, because according to sources working for mobile network operator’s mobile users in the 
city were relatively high mobile internet users. Secondly, the city is religiously diverse, allowing 
an exploration of the way people from different religious backgrounds experience enacting 
religious identity on Facebook. 
 
In the event, two factors led to a decision to relocate the research. The first factor was safety, as 
in the first week of research I was mugged at gunpoint whilst at a traffic light and my neighbours 
were robbed by an armed gang, and as a result I no longer felt safe or confident about travelling 
to remote parts of the city. In consultation with my department and supervisor the decision was 
taken to relocate the research to the Punjab, which was both safer but also of interest in terms of 
being able to study emerging urban areas in contrast to the ‘exceptionalism’ that some have 
described Karachi (Verkaaik 2009). Additionally, the Punjab has been the site of increased 
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religious tensions, including the 2010 Facebook related attack against Ahmadis in Gujranwala. 
Relocating to the Punjab thus mitigated the risks without compromising the original goals of the 
research, although it introduced a month’s delay to the research schedule.  
 
The second factor was the speed with which Telenor, one of the mobile operators, rolled out their 
3G internet network, particularly to small rural areas in Punjab. The possibility of exploring this 
initial roll out, and the offer of research support from the mobile network operator, together with 
the prospect of conducting research without constantly worrying about my safety, led to a 
relocation to Islamabad.  
 
The second challenge was unrealistic expectations of access and availability. The original plan 
had been to spend in-depth time over a long period with a few respondents. The aim for this had 
been to achieve the in-depth insight into the processes of desire and subject formation implicated 
in the psycho-analytic dimension to Butler’s (Butler 1990) notion of performativity. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the expectation that people would make long hours to accommodate a researcher 
was both unrealistic and reflective of a lack of understanding. Although people were unfailingly 
polite, tolerant and helpful, it was only with five individuals that anything close the kind of 
connection was feasible. The challenge this presented was not insurmountable, and has been dealt 
with by acknowledging that these insights are partial, and by privileging those accounts in the 
subsequent presentation of empirical data.  
 
The third challenge was that of language, and the resulting reliance on research assistants for the 
conduct of interviews. Although I had had a term of language training, and a few words that I had 
retained from assignments to Pakistan over the years, my language skills were far below that 
required for in-depth interviews. This meant relying on researcher assistants, which introduced 
challenges as well as opportunities. The main challenge of relying on research assistants was that 
they were not always available, and indeed I ended up working with three research assistants over 
the eighteen months. My first research assistant was a trained researcher with experience of 
working with British academics, and preparing for his own PhD. This allowed for fast, efficient 
research work, as he required little training or guidance. Furthermore, he was from Gujrat and 
knew many people in the three cities. He opened many doors. Once is own PhD preparations took 
over however, I had to find another, and this involved initially working with a friend of my 
research assistant from the same town. Despite training in research skills and ethics, particularly 
around translation and interview practices, it was clear that responses were increasingly being 
summarised rather than translated. This was further complicated by an incident interviewing an 
Ahmadi respondent, when it became clear that my research assistant had underlying prejudices 
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that, although discussed initially, were endangering the research, and potentially the research 
subjects. I was fortunate then with the third researcher, who came from the Ahmadi community 
himself and was experienced in working with journalists, particularly on religious matters. This 
transformed the research process as it allowed a dialogic and reflexivity in exploring religious 
identity. It was through this partnership that many of insights into religious practices and sectarian 
tensions were revealed.  
 
A heatwave in the last quarter of the research also impacted on the schedule and access to 
respondents, as it came just before the academic summer break. As the heat edged up to forty 
degrees’ respondents increasingly cancelled and anyway, I was unable to think and navigate 
interviews in settings that usually had no air-conditioning. Although this provided an important 
insight into the everyday challenges that people face in dealing with heat and lack of electricity, 
it introduced a further two-month delay as respondents increasingly cancelled and many of the 
students were unavailable to meet. Nonetheless, this period allowed a process of reflection on the 
data gathering and the start to coding of the documents.    
 
 
Researcher Positionality 
The positionality of a researcher plays an important part of the entire research process, from 
conceptualisation to final conclusions. Indeed, according to Barad the researcher is a research 
instrument, an apparatus that intra-acts with phenomena to enact an agential cut (Barad 2007). As 
such, the goal is not to remove bias but rather to account for the inevitable biases that form part 
of the entire research process.  
 
Positionality describes the ‘the relationship between knowledge and the ways whereby 
knowledge is produced’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2010) and requires the researcher to be 
reflexive about their own identity in the research process (Flick 2014). In the case of this research 
my own positionality was an important part of the conceptualisation, implementation and analysis 
of the research. I entered into the research process as white male with a history of working in 
Pakistan that was framed by the international development sector. This meant that I brought my 
own biases about gender, religion and the instrumental uses of technology. For example, organised 
religion has always seemed strange to me, and I believed that gender practices such as seclusion 
and piety practices such as the hijab were reflective of ‘traditional’, backward and oppressive 
values and social norms. That these have come to be challenged is a function of the literature I 
have read but most especially the people who have shared their experiences with me. Values such 
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as these framed the conceptualisation of the research agenda ways that I am aware of and also, 
inevitably, ways that I am not aware of.  
 
In the implementation of the research, my positionality as a white foreign male introduced power 
dynamics that were both constraints and opportunities. Firstly, it was only possible to be in 
Pakistan conducting field research because I was in a position of relative privilege defined by my 
colour, my nationality and my socioeconomic position. Furthermore, my background of working 
for the British government in Pakistan granted me the confidence to approach and request help 
from senior figures from the Pakistan government, private sector such as mobile network 
operators and civil society organisations. Whilst these made many things possible, they also 
created an othering from my research participants. For some, this distance limited interaction 
whilst for others, the novelty and ‘outsider’ status meant they could open up to me more than 
others. Significantly, this was the case for interviews with female respondents, who although 
difficult to access, were often very surprisingly open and willing to share their experiences.    
 
Ethics 
The subject of religion in Pakistan is one of the most controversial, and the rise of sectarian 
violence attests to this. Therefore, the question of ethics is not just one for conformity to 
prescribed ethical requirements, such as the ones stipulated by the University of London, but also 
of considerations to avoid doing harm. The following ethical considerations were undertaken to 
ensure compliance with the relevant regulations but also to avoid being the cause of harm to 
research subjects, assistants and myself.  
 
The ethics of working with research respondents was addressed through the maintenance of 
confidentiality and anonymity and ensuring informed consent (Davies 2008; Flick 2014). In order 
to ensuring confidentiality and anonymity respondents were anonymised through the use of 
pseudonyms and retaining respondent contact details as those pseudonyms on my personal 
telephone. All resulting information, from recordings to notes to transcriptions were kept on my 
personal computer and a backup hard drive, both protected by passwords. The importance of these 
procedures was reinforced regularly with my research assistants.  
 
Ensuring meaningful informed consent involved informing respondents of the following aspects 
of the research. I explained who I was as a researcher, and my related associations and funding, 
namely London School of Economics and a mix of grant and personal funding; the purpose of the 
research in relation to working towards a PhD; the confidentiality and anonymity that all 
respondents would offered; the security of the data and its storage; and the nature of the final 
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products of the research (namely a thesis and related publications) and how they might be quoted 
(under pseudonyms). Respondents were always asked if they were willing to continue, if they had 
concerns about participating and any other matters that they wished to discuss. Once interviewees 
agreed, they were asked if they would consent to having the interview recorded, and assured that 
they had every right and freedom to deny the request, and instead have written or no notes of the 
interview taken at all. Importantly, for repeated interviews, this process of informed consent was 
revisited to ensure that their agreement still stood.  
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaire – English & Urdu 
 
Mobile and Social Media Survey 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
I am (INTERVIEWER’S NAME), and I am calling from Gallup 
Research conducting academic research for a PhD project at 
the London School of Economics in London, the UK. I thank you 
for your time in speaking with us and agreeing to providing 
responses to our questions. Your views, which you will share with 
us today, are of immense value to us. Let me assure you that 
your responses will be recorded in complete confidentiality, 
and that your anonymity is guaranteed in this interview.  
 
PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW: 
The purpose of this interview is to collect your views on your use of the 
internet, specifically your use of social media services, and some vital 
issues of social and cultural concern. We are looking to get an insight into 
how Pakistanis use their mobile phones and what kinds of activities they 
prefer to undertake online and on social media.  
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Section 1: INTERNET AND MOBILE USE 
 
I would like to begin the survey by asking you a few questions about your 
internet and mobile usage. 
 
Q 1(a): Do you use internet on your mobile phone? (If No, ask question 1b; 
if Yes, move to Question 2) 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Q1 (b): Have you ever done any of these activities on your mobile phone? 
(If none of these, terminate interview). 
 Downloaded music or videos  
 Used Facebook  
 Used Whatsapp  
 Searched Google  
 Check Email  
 None of these  
 
Q2: Do you use social media on your mobile phone? (If yes, move to 
Question 3; If No, terminate interview) [For the interviewer: social media 
includes Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, Line, Instagram, Tumblr, etc;  
 Yes  
 No  
 
Q3: Thinking about your mobile internet usage on an average day, how 
frequently do you access the internet? For example, do you use it 
continuously, between two and three hours, between one and two hours, 
or less than an hour? 
 
 Less than an hour  
 One to two hours  
 Two to three hours  
 Continuously – I am always connected  
 I do not use internet every day  
 
Q4 (a): If you use your mobile phone to access the internet, do you get 
anyone else to help you with it? (If yes, move to Question 4b; if No, 
move to Question 5)  
 
 Yes  
 No  
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Q4 (b): If someone else helps you access the internet on your mobile 
phone, which of the following activities do they most frequently help you 
do on the internet?  
 
 Use Social Media Sites  
 Watch music or videos  
 Check Emails  
 News and Information  
 None of these  
 
Q5: The mobile phone that you use to access the internet, does any other 
individual use that same device to access internet? (If Yes, move to 
Question 6; If No, move to Question 7) 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Q6: If someone else uses your mobile phone device to access the internet, 
do they use it to access social media sites or services?  
 
 Yes  
 No  
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Section 2: SOCIAL MEDIA USE ON MOBILE PHONES 
Now I will like to ask you a few questions about social media usage on 
your mobile phone. 
 
Q7: Which social media sites/services do you use most often on your 
mobile phone? [For the interviewer: single response] 
 
 Facebook   
 Twitter  
 Whatsapp  
 Instagram  
 Line  
 Tumblr  
 Other (please list)  
 
Q8: Many people have multiple accounts on the same site (e.g. one 
person with multiple Facebook accounts). Approximately what 
percentage of your friends and family members  on Facebook has 
more than one account/profile? {OPEN ENDED} 
 
Q9: Thinking about your social media usage on an average day, how 
often do you access your favorite social media site/service? For 
example, do you use it continuously, between two and three hours, 
between one and two hours, or less than an hour? 
 
 Less than an hour  
 One to two hours  
 Two to three hours  
 Continuously – I am always connected  
 I do not use internet every day  
 
Q10: I am going to read out a series of three statements. In each set of 
three, please tell us which of these statement you agree with the most? 
[For the interviewer: read out each statement carefully and record the 
degree of agreement/disagreement] 
 
SET 1 
Only record one 
for each set 
In general, I feel free to say whatever I am feeling, and 
do not feel restricted 
 
In general, I feel free to say some things but not others 
– I feel somewhat restricted 
 
In general, I only say what I think other people expect 
me to say i.e. what other think I should feel/say, not 
what I actually feel/want to say 
 
SET 2  
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Social media is a public space that is inclusive (where I 
can say/post what I feel/think) 
 
Social media is a public space that is restrictive (where 
I only post/say what others expect me to say/think) 
 
Social media is a private and exclusive space (where I 
can post/say what I feel/think) 
 
SET 3  
I feel free to post and share my religious opinions and 
thoughts on social media 
 
I hesitate in sharing my religious opinions on social 
media because I am concerned with how others might 
react 
 
I do not share my religious opinions on social media  
 
Q 11: Now let us talk about religion and self expression in our society. 
Which of the following statements do you agree with the most?? [For the 
interviewer: read each statement carefully and register which statement 
the respondent agrees with the most) 
 
  
I want to publicly express my religious 
identity and beliefs, and feel free to do so 
 
I hesitate in expressing my religious identity 
and beliefs in public because I am 
concerned with how others might react 
(for example, friends, family, or the public 
at large) 
 
I do not want to publicly express my 
religious identity and beliefs because it is 
a private matter 
 
 
 
Q12: Approximate how many friends/followers/contacts do you have 
on your favorite social media site/service? 
 
 More than 500  
 Between 300 and 500  
 Between 100 and 300  
 Between 50 and 100   
 Between 25 and 50  
 Less than 25  
 Not sure  
 
 
Q13: Let us talk a little about your friend/contact list on ------ (insert name 
of favorite social media website). Are the following people a part of your 
contact list on (insert name of favorite social media website/service)? 
 
  Yes No 
 219 
 Parents   
 Brothers   
 Sisters   
 Female friends   
 Male friends   
 Work Colleagues   
 Educational Colleagues   
 
Q14: Have you ever adjusted or blocked your friends/followers/contacts 
on your favorite social media site/service so that you can post updates 
to specific people and groups? (For example, have you put someone 
on Limited Access on Facebook, or muted/blocked someone on 
Twitter?) 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 Don’t Know/No Response  
 
Q15 Now I will state a few activities that people generally undertake on 
social media. Please tell us how frequently you do these activities on 
social media? Do you do them frequently, occasionally, rarely, or never? 
 
 
Frequently Occasionall
y 
Rarely Nev
er 
Post my thoughts and comments     
Read and watch what others post 
and share (e.g. status updates, 
pictures etc) 
    
Chatting/sending messages      
Get news and information      
Have conversations on issues with 
other people 
    
Click Like on what others post and 
share 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3: SOCIAL MEDIA USE – IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
Q16: When was the last time you made an adjustment to your privacy 
settings? 
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 In the last week  
 In the last month  
 In the last six months  
 In the last year  
 Never  
 I do not know about privacy settings  
 
Q17 Have you ever got into trouble because of what you 
posted/shared/liked/sent on social media? (For example, did someone 
tell you that it was wrong or criticized you?) [If Yes, move to Question 18; 
If No, move to Question 21) 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Q18: What kind of an issue/content type caused you problems or 
criticism? 
 
 Domestic Politics/Current Affairs  
 International Affairs  
 Religious issue  
 Sectarian Issue  
 Sports  
 Entertainment (e.g. music, movies, dramas etc)  
 Gender and/or Sexuality-related issue  
 Private Post (e.g. picture)  
 Other (please list)  
 
Q19: You just told us that you faced problems/criticisms for posting 
something on --------- (insert option from Question 18). Did this online 
criticism cause you difficulty or harm offline? [For example, did this 
cause physical harm; did it cause emotional or psychological harm; 
were your social life and relationships negatively affected?) 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Q20: How did you respond to this disagreement/criticism? 
 
 Defended my position  
 
Accepted the criticism/disagreement and agreed that I 
was wrong 
 
 Ignored the criticism   
 Don’t Know/No Response  
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Section 4: SOCIAL MEDIA USE – DIVERSITY, TOLERANCE, SILENCE 
 
Q21: Inter-sectarian marriages are an important issue in our society. 
Thinking about inter-sectarian marriages, do you favor or oppose such 
marriages?  
 
 Strongly Favor  
 
Somewhat 
Favor 
 
 
Somewhat 
oppose 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
 
 
Don’t 
Know/No 
Response 
 
 
Q 22: If inter-sectarian marriages were 
being discussed would your -------- (fill in 
from the choice below) agree or disagree 
with your views on this issue? 
 
Agree Disagree 
 
Close Family Members   
Extended Family Members   
Close Friends   
Co-workers   
Neighbors   
People on your favorite social media 
site/service (e.g. people in your 
Facebook network, or people who follow 
you on Twitter) 
  
 
Q 23: If the issue of inter-sectarian 
marriages comes up -------- (fill in from the 
choices below) would you be willing or 
unwilling to join the conversation? 
 
 Willing  
Unwilling 
During Family Dinner   
At Restaurants with Friends   
At work   
On your favorite social media site/service   
 
Q24: Now I will briefly describe some people. Would you please 
indicate for each description whether that person is like your or unlike 
you? 
 
 
 Like 
me 
 Unlike 
me 
It is important to this person to think up new ideas and 
be creative; to do things one’s own way.  
1 2 
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Adventure and taking risks are important to this 
person; to have an exciting life.  
1 2 
It is important to this person to always behave 
properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is 
wrong.  
1 2 
Tradition is important to this person; to follow the 
customs handed down by one’s religion or family.  
1 2 
 
 
SECTION 5: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
Q25. What is your age? 
 ___________ Years 
 
Q26. Gender 
 ____________  
 
Q27. What religion do you most identify with?  
 Muslim Sunni   
 Muslim Shia  
 Ismaili  
 Christian  
 Parsi  
 Hindu  
 Sikh  
 No Religion  
  Ahmadi  
 Others (please list)  
 
Q 28 (a). What is your occupation? 
 
 Unskilled Worker  
 Small-scale trader  
 Skilled Worker  
 Non-Executive Staff  
 Supervisory Level  
 Small Retailer/Businessman  
 Lower/Middle: executive, officer  
 Self-employed/Employed Professional  
 Medium-sized businessman  
 Senior Executive Officer  
 Large Businessman/Factory Owner  
 
Q28 (b).  What is your educational level/qualification? 
 
 Illiterate  
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 Less than Primary  
 School 5-9 years  
 Matric  
 Intermediate  
 Graduate  
 Post-Graduate  
 
 
Q29. Which of the following best describes your income bracket? 
 
 Less than or equal to Rs. 5,000  
 Rs. 5,001-11,000  
 Rs.11,001-14,000  
 Rs. 14,001-16,000  
 Rs. 16,001-20,000  
 Rs. 20,001-37,000  
 Rs.37,001 or more  
 
Q30. Thank you very much for you cooperation so far. Your opinions 
have been very informative and interesting so far. Would you be willing 
to get involved in an in-person session, with your friends and relatives, 
where these issues are discussed further? (Your anonymity and privacy 
will be strictly preserved)  
 
[FOR THE INTERVIEWER: PLEASE NOTE IF THE PERSON RESPONDING IN THE 
AFFIRMATIVE WILL BE THE ONE PARTICIPATING IN THE FOLLOW-UP STUDY] 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
 
Q31: Thinking only about your mobile internet usage in the past week, 
what method did you use to access the internet most frequently? 
(SINGLE RESPONSE) 
 
 
Wi-Fi service at home/school/office/or public places 
like restaurants, malls etc 
 
 Through mobile data package (Edge/GPRS/DATA)  
 Through 3G Services  
 
Free data services provided by company (this 
includes company’s offers of free Twitter, Whatsapp, 
and Facebook use) 
 
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Appendix III: Full List Of Interviews And FGDs 
 
1. 01.09.2014. FGD. FGD #1, Male, Students, Sunni. Gujranwala. At home. 
2. 02.09.2014. FGD. FGD #2, Male, Student/Teacher/Job holder, Sunni. Gujrat. At home. 
3. 26.09.2014. FGD. FGD #3, Female, Teachers/Doctor, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At local college 
4. 18.10.2014. FGD. FGD #4, Male, Lawyer/Doctor/Student/Worker, Sunni, Gujrat. At 
community center. 
5. 18.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #1, Male, Marketing Officer, Sunni, Gujrat. At home. 
6. 19.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #2, Male, Student, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. At Office. 
7. 19.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #3, Female, Teacher, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At Education 
Academy. 
8. 19.10.2014. FGD. FGD #5, Male, Lawyer/Cable Operator/Telecom technician, Shia, 
Mandibahaudin. At Education Academy. 
9. 19.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #4, Male, Videomaker, Christian, Mandibahaudin. At 
church.  
10. 27.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #5, Male, Agriculturist, Sunni, Gujrat. At home.  
11. 27.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #6, Male, Agriculturist, Sunni, Gujrat. At home. 
12. 27.10.2014. FGD. FGD #6, Male, Students, workers, Sunni, Gujrat. At village restaurant.  
13. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #7, Male, Mobile Shopkeeper, Not known, 
Mandibahaudin. At shop. 
14. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #8, Male, Mobile Shopkeeper, Not known, 
Mandibahaudin. At shop.  
15. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #9, Male, Student, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At a friend’s 
office. 
16. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #10, Male, Medical Worker, Christian, Mandibahaudin. 
At a friend’s office. 
17.  29.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #11, Male, A young man (probably student), Shia, 
Mandibahaudin. At a local home 
18. 29.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #12, Male, Renting car business, Shia, Mandibahaudin. At 
a local home.  
19. 12.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #13, Male, Student, Sunni, Gujrat. At local community 
place. 
20. 12.11.2014. FGD. FGD #7, Male, Job Holder/Student, Ahmedi, Gujrat. At Home. 
21. 13.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #14, Male, Deputy Registrar at University, Shia, Gujrat. 
At Office.  
22. 13.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #15, Male, Student, Shia, Gujrat. At home. 
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23. 25.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #16, Male, Lawyer, Sunni, Lahore. At office. 
24. 25.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #17, Male, Lawyer, Sunni, Lahore, At office. 
 
25. 26.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #18, Male, Student, Shia, Gujrat. At home. 
26. 26.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #19, Male, Student, Ahmedi, Gujrat. At home. 
27. 29.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #20, Male, Mobile Retailer, Sunni, Gujrat. At office.  
28. 29.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #21, Male, Student, Shia, Gujrat. At home. 
29. 30.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #22, Female, College Professor, Sunni, Gujranwala. At 
home. 
30. 30.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #23, Male, Student, Shia, Gujranwala. At home.  
31. 02.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee #24, Male, Student, Ahle-Hadees, Gujranwala. At home. 
32. 02.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee #25, Male, Factory Worker, Shia, Gujranwala. At factory. 
33. 03.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee # 26, Male, Teacher, Ahle-Hadees, Mandibahaudin. At 
local college. 
34. 03.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee # 27, Male, Student, Shia, Mandibahaudin. At home. 
35. 09.03.2015. Interview. Interviewee #28, Female, Not known, Ahmedi, Rabwa. Not known. 
36. 17.03.2015. Interview. Interviewee #29, Male, Mobile Software Expert, Ahle-Hadees, Gujrat. 
At shop and institute.  
37. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #30, Male, Taylor, Shia, Kotli Kohala Village, Gujrat. 
38. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #31, Male, Mass-Communication Graduate, Sunni, Kotli 
Kohala Village, Gujrat. 
39. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #32, Male, Welder, Shia, Kotli Kohala Village,  
40. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #33, Male, Architect, Shia, Gujrat. 
41. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #34, Male, Student of Commerce, Shia, Gujrat. 
42. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #35, Male, Medical Graduate, Sunni, Gujrat. 
43. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #36, Male, Studying Commerce, Sunni, Gujrat. 
44. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #37, Male, Doing electrician course, Shia, Gujrat. 
45. 27.03.2015. FGD, FGD #8, Male, Students/Workers, Ahmedi, Gujranwala. 
46. 31.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #38, Male, Lawyer, Sunni, Lahore. At office. 
47. 01.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #39, Male, Not known, Not known, Phalia-
Mandibahaudin. 
48. 02.04.2015. FGD. FGD #9, Male, Family (Family heads run Shia praying place (Imam 
Bargah), Shia, Gujranwala. 
49. 08.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #40, Aspiring preacher, Shia, Gujranwala. 
50. 10.04.2015. FGD. FGD #10, Male, Workers/Business Manager, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. At 
factory. 
51. 10.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #41, Photographer, Ahmedi, Lahore. 
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52. 11.04.2015. FGD. FGD #11, Male, Students, Sunni/Shia, Mandibahaudin. At local college. 
53. 13.04.2015. FGD. FGD #12, Male, Lawyers, Sunni, Lahore. At office. 
54. 18.04.2015. FGD. FGD #13, Female, Administrator at local academy/Student, Sunni, 
Mandibahaudin. 
55. 11.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #42, Male, Student, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.  
56. 11.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #43, Female, Teacher, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. 
57. 16.04.2015. FGD. FGD #14, Male, Shopkeeper/farmer, Shia, Village (exact location not 
known). 
58. 18.04.2015. FGD. FGD #15, Male, RJ/Model/Telecomm Professional/Teacher/Wapda officer, 
Sunni/Shia, Mandibahaudin. 
59. 19.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #44, Female, Teacher, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. 
60. 24.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #45, Male, Martial Art instructor, Shia, Gujrat. 
61. 24.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #46, Male, Not known, Shia, Gujrat. 
62. 25.04.2015. FGD. FGD #16, Male, Pharmacist, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. 
63. 25.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #47, Male, Student, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. 
64. 26.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #48, Male, Wrestler-Surveyor, Shia, Shahana Log. 
65. 26.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #49, Male, Businessman, Shia, Shahana Log. 
66. 26.04.2015. FGD. FGD #17, Male, Jobless/not known, Shia, Warabalian. 
67. 26.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #50, Male, Student, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. 
68. 26.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #51, Male, Student, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. 
69. Not Known. Interview. Interviewee #52, Male, Jeweller, Ahle Hadees, Gujrat. 
70. Not Known. Interview. Interviewee #53, Male, Professor in Girls College, Not expressed, 
Gujrat. 
71. 27.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #54, Male, Engineer, Shia, Shahana Log. 
72. 11.05.2015. Interview. Interviewee #55, Female, Student, Ahle-Hadees, Islamabad. 
73. 30.06.2015. Interview. Interviewee #56, Male, Businessman, Shia, Shahana Log. 
74. 01.09.2015. FGD. FGD #18, Female, Family, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. 
75. 30.08.2015. FGD. FGD #19, Male, Cricketers, Shia, Mandibahaudin. 
76. 31.08.2015. FGD. FGD #20, Female, Teachers, Shia, Mandibahaudin. 
77. 31.08.2015. Interview. Interviewee #57, Female, Aurat Foundation Staff member, Not asked, 
Mandibahaudin. 
78. 31.08.2015. Interview. Interviewee #58, Male, Not known, Ahle Hadees, Mandibahaudin. 
79. 31.08.2015. Interview. Interviewee #59, Male, Not known, Deobandi, Mandibahaudin. 
80. 01.09.2015. FGD. FGD #21, Female, Students, Shia/Sunni, Gujranwala. 
81. 01.09.2015. FGD. FGD #22, Female, Not Known, Ahmedi, Gujranwala. 
82. 01.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #60, Male, Worker, Ahle Hadees, Gujranwala.  
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83. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #61, Female, Teacher/Facebook political activist, 
Deobandi, Mandibahaudin. 
84. 08.09.2015. FGD. FGD #23, Male, NGO Worker, Deobandi, Mandibahaudin. At school.  
85. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #62, Male, Not known, Ahle Hadees, Mandibahaudin. 
86. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #63, Male, Religious Preacher, Ahle Hadees, 
Mandibahaudin. At local education institute. 
87. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #64, Male, Active Defense groups in new areas, Shia, 
Mandibahaudin. 
88. 09.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #65, Female, Lawyer, Deobandi, Gujranwala 
89. 09.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #66, Female, Lawyer, Deobandi, Gujranwala. 
90. 09.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #67, Male, Scrap Dealer, Ahle Hadees, Gujranwala. 
91. 10.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #68, Female, Teacher, Not asked, Mandibahaudin 
92. 10.09.2015. FGD. FGD #24, Female, Students, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. 
93. 10.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #69, Male, Second Interview, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.  
94. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #70, Female, Main Transcriber, Muslim, Gujrat.  
95. 16.09.2015. FGD. FGD #25, Female, Students, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At local college. 
96. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #71, Female, Activist, Shia, Mandibahaudin.  
97. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #72, Male, Religious leader, Ahle Hadees, 
Mandibahaudin. At local college. 
98. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee # 73, Male, Religious Scholar, Deobandi, Mandibahaudin. 
At local education institute. 
99. 17.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #74, Male, Not known, Ahle Hadees, Gujranwala. 
Interviewed at Sewerage Contract. 
100. 17.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #75, Male, Not known, Ahle Hadees, Gujranwala. 
Interviewed at Sewerage Contract. 
101. 17.09.2015. FGD. FGD #26, Female, Students, Shia/Sunni, Gujrat. At University (Large 
Group). 
102. 17.09.2015. FGD. FGD #27, Female, Students, Shia/Sunni, Gujrat. At University (Small 
Grouo). 
103. 21.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #76, Female, Students, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At local 
college. 
104. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #77, Female, Student, Sunni, Gujrat. At University. 
105. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #78, Female, Student, Sunni, Gujrat. At University. 
106. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #79, Female, Not known, Sunni, Gujranwala. At home 
107. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #80, Female, Not known, Sunni, Gujranwala. At insurance 
office. 
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108. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #81, Male, Not known, Sunni, Gujranwala. At insurance 
office. 
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Appendix III: Full List Of Facebook Ban Newspaper Articles 
 
 
THE NEWS ARTICLES 
1. Alam, Ahmed Rafay. 2010. "The Facebook shame." The Facebook shame. 
Karachi: The News, May 21. 
2. The News . 2010. "Sensory shutdown." Sensory shutdown. Karachi: The News, 
May 21. 
3. Javed, Syed Umair. 2010. "Where is the responsibility?" Where is the 
responsibility? Karachi: The News, May 22. 
4. Khan, Imran. 2010. "Such a needless ban." Such a needless ban. Karachi: The 
News, May 22. 
5. Hyat, Kamila. 2010. "Ban the smearing of our global image." Ban the smearing of 
our global image. Karachi: The News, May 27. 
6. Sattar, Babar. 2010. "Facebook madness." Facebook madness. Karachi: The 
News, May 29. 
7. Hasan, Masood. 2010. "Facebook nonsense." Facebook nonsense. Karachi: The 
News, May 30. 
8. Hasan, Masood. 2010. "Facebook nonsense." Facebook nonsense. Karachi: The 
News, May 30. 
9. Naila, Inayat. 2010. ""On day 11..."." "On day 11...". Karachi: The News, May 
30. 
10. Sikandar, Sarah. 2010. ""I wasn't alone"." "I wasn't alone". Karachi : The News, 
May 30. 
11. Sultan, Ali. 2010. ""Curtain-raiser for curtailments"." "Curtain-raiser for 
curtailments". Karachi: The News, May 30. 
12. Rehmat, Adnan. 2010. "Access Denied." Access Denied. Karachi: The News, 
May 30. 
 
THE NATION ARTICLES 
1. Alavi, Emaan. 2010. "Freedom of speech." Freedom of speech. Lahore: The 
Nation, May 26. 
2. Khilji, Osama. 2010. "Facebook and Pakistan." Facebook and Pakistan. Lahore: 
The Nation, May 26. 
 
DAWN ARTICLES 
1. Dawn. 2010. "Facebook furore." Facebook furore. Karachi: Dawn, May 23. 
2. Dawn. 2010. "Internet censorship." Internet censorship. Karachi: Dawn, May 25. 
3. Dawn . 2010. "Face-off with Facebook." Face-off with Facebook. Karachi: Dawn, 
May 26. 
 
JANG ARTICLES  
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1. Liaqat, Dr Amir. 2010. "Let the Presumptuous ones of the Holy Prophet (SAW) 
Know that Muslims’ Sense of Honor is Alive." Let the Presumptuous ones of the 
Holy Prophet (SAW) Know that Muslims’ Sense of Honor is Alive. Karachi: Jang, 
May 21. 
2. Liaqat, Dr Amir. 2010. "We are to Show Faces on Doomsday— Not Facebook." 
We are to Show Faces on Doomsday— Not Facebook. Karachi: Jang, May 28. 
3. Arif, Irshad. 2010. "Freedom of expression." Freedom of expression. Karachi: 
Jang, May 22. 
 
NAWA-I-WAQT ARTICLES 
1. Sheikh, Qari Muhammad Yaqoob. 2010. "Desecration of the holy prophet is an 
unforgivable offence." Desecration of the holy prophet is an unforgivable offence. 
Lahore: Nawa-i-Waqt, May 20. 
2. Niazi, Ajmal. 2010. "I wish the name of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) could spread 
and enlighten the whole world." I wish the name of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) could 
spread and enlighten the whole world. Lahore: Nawa-i-Waqt, May 21. 
3. Zia, Tayyaba. 2010. "The real face of Islam." The real face of Islam. Lahore: 
Nawa-i-Waqt, May 26. 
4. Nawa-i-waqt. 2010. "Blasphemers of holy prophet are called ignorant even if 
they are sages." Blasphemers of holy prophet are called ignorant even if they are 
sages. Lahore: Nawa-i-Waqt, June 9. 
5. Bukhari, Prof Syed Israr. 2010. "The movement for honour of Prophet (PBUH)." 
The movement for honour of Prophet (PBUH). Lahore: Nawa-i-Waqt, June 17. 
6. Warraich, Ch Asghar Ali Kausar. 2010. "Muslims of Lahore are protesting 
against disrespectful followers of evil." Muslims of Lahore are protesting against 
disrespectful followers of evil. Lahore: Nawa-i-Waqt, June 18. 
7. Irfan, Prof Muhammad Yousuf. 2010. "Glory of the Holy Prophet and 
inappropriate Syllabus of Army Foundation School." Glory of the Holy Prophet 
and inappropriate Syllabus of Army Foundation School. Lahore: Nawa-i-Waqt, June 
25. 
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